


# Veritas

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### *In This Issue:*

In the past sixty years, ARSOF units and personnel have made history in diverse places throughout the world. Locations highlighted in this issue of *Veritas* are indicated on the map above.

- ▲ The China-Burma-India Theater of World War II is noteworthy for the clandestine coastal operations of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Maritime Unit and the mule-packed mountain artillery supporting the MARS Task Force.
- ▲ During the Korean War, ARSOF units engaged in behind the lines raids as well as extensive psywar and civil affairs operations.
- ▲ Logistical support was the mission of the 528th Quartermaster Battalion during the Vietnam War and today,
- ▲ Special Forces teams are an integral part of the campaign in Afghanistan.



# Veritas



**16** *Of Mules and Men*



**40** *The Rescue of Virginia 1*



**46** *Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea*



**71** *Afghan Ambush*

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COVER: Members of the 1st L&L's Team 10 broadcast Psywar messages to the enemy during the Korean War. Sergeant Lawrence O'Brien (middle) was later awarded the Silver Star. See related article and sidebar on pages 46 and 53, respectively.

# The Azimuth of the USASOC History Office

**W**E appreciate the positive comments from the field on the first issue of *Veritas*. Feedback is important because it helps to keep us “on azimuth” with our audience. In the special operations arena one cannot afford to be thin-skinned, so we welcome any and all comments.

Our charter is to balance the historical coverage of all ARSOF elements in each edition of *Veritas*, whether it is the annual campaign issue or the “spectrum” issues that have history articles spanning World War II to the present. This issue contains several articles that will support a future book on Army special operations in the Korean War. The articles cover psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare operations. The article on the Virginia 1 mission in Korea emphasizes the crucial role played by Sikorsky HO3S rescue helicopters. World War II articles and photo essays in this issue cover the First Special Service Force, the pack artillery battalions of MARS Task Force, Camp Mackall as the Army Airborne Command, and OSS maritime operations in the China-Burma-India theater. The article on the 528th Quartermaster Battalion in Vietnam adds to our understanding of the heritage of special operations support. The current operations article focuses on 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group in Afghanistan,

a unit that will become more familiar to readers when we publish our next campaign issue: ARSOF in Colombia.

This issue of *Veritas* also introduces two new features. When appropriate, we have included profiles of ARSOF personnel who have connections to featured historical events. The second new feature—“Books in the Field”—will provide summaries of the best books identified for further reading on subjects covered in the articles.

The next issue of *Veritas* will follow a similar format, and will feature a variety of articles, again covering the spectrum from WWII up through current operations. Continuing the ARSOF in Korea theme will be articles on the short-lived Ranger Infantry companies that took part in the Korean conflict, the origins of Special Forces Detachment-Korea, and a photo essay on PSYOP leaflets in the Korean War.

ARSOF history posters will soon be available, and will be distributed down to company level. The first poster features the *Veritas* cover for ARSOF in Iraq. The next will be an ARSOF OEF-Afghanistan campaign poster.

Thank you for the support. Please help us to keep ARSOF history “alive.” Both our heritage—WWII, Korea, and Vietnam—and current operations—Grenada to GWOT—are important parts of ARSOF.

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
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# The OSS Maritime Unit on the Arakan Coast of Burma

by Kenn Finlayson



**“THERE** were few less desirable places in which to fight a campaign,” wrote Lieutenant General Sir Geoffrey Evans of the Arakan coast of Burma.<sup>1</sup> The Arakan ran south from the Indian frontier along the Burmese coast for 120 miles to the town of Akyab, which marked the furthest advance up the coast by the Japanese Imperial Army. Riven by rivers and chaungs resembling the bayous of Louisiana, the Arakan coast was penetrable only during the summer dry season. The area became a mosquito- and leech-ridden swamp from October to May, when the monsoon dumped over two hundred inches of rain on the land. During that time, access to most of the coast was restricted to watercraft.

The British, established in the region since the days of the *Raj*, possessed extensive facilities in India and Ceylon from which to launch operations against the Japanese in the Arakan. Joining this effort was the Maritime Unit (MU) of the United States’ Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Lieutenant (LT) Fisher Howe, U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) arrived in the South East Asian Command (SEAC) Theater in February of 1944 with the mission to recruit and train a maritime group capable of infiltrating agents into hostile territory, conduct reconnaissance, and execute small-scale sabotage operations.<sup>2</sup> General William O. Donovan, Director of the OSS, promised Lord Louis Mountbatten, the theater commander, that the OSS would provide troops from the maritime unit to

augment the British intelligence gathering effort. Neither the British nor the United States had sizeable combat power in the theater and the addition of the OSS and their counterparts in the British Special Operations Executive was important.

Fisher Howe estimated that to accomplish the missions promised by Donovan, he would need four fast surface craft with crews; at least thirty of the trained MU swimmers; a like number of small boat (kayaks

and rubber rafts) operational men; and a headquarters staff for administration, supply, and operations. On 15 May 1944, a cable went back to Washington for an MU swimming group. Up to this time, Howe was the sole representative of the MU in SEAC, and he industriously built up connections and borrowed individuals from other OSS branches to further the preparation for the arrival of the personnel.

The primary base for MU operations was established on the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), initially at the harbor town of Trincomalee. The British maintained an extensive dock and maintenance facility there, and a substantial portion of their fleet in the theater. Howe succeeded in establishing close working relationships with the other U.S. and Allied agencies in the theater, and he contributed his expertise to a number of missions of a maritime nature. Ill health forced Fisher Howe to return to Washington in July 1944, and LT Kenneth Pier, USNR, replaced him. Pier had already been in the SEAC Theater for a considerable time, assigned to the Navy’s Field Photographic Office. His assumption of command of the Maritime Unit coincided with the arrival of Swimmer Group 1 under the command of LT William Horrigan, USNR, with thirty swimmers and assorted support personnel. Group 1 was followed in August with the arrival of Swimmer Group 2 under Lieutenant Junior Grade John Archbold, USNR.

Prior to the arrival of the forces and his own departure, Howe began to look for a more suitable site for the training and operations of the unit. Training of native agents



initially took place twelve miles outside Trincomalee at a small outpost called "Camp Y." In June 1944, the MU moved across the island to the southwest corner and established a base at Galle, about seventy miles south of Colombo. This became the central training facility for the MU, where native agents were introduced to basic demolitions training, the use of the folboat (a collapsible kayak-type craft), infiltration, and intelligence gathering. The natives were recruited from throughout the theater, and the MU personnel trained Chinese, Burman, Thai, Malay, and Sumatran agents, few of whom spoke English. Galle remained the primary training center for the MU for the remainder of the war.

The facilities at Galle were inadequate for the fleet of surface ships that the MU acquired. To provide access to the British repair facility at Trincomalee, the MU prepared a small facility adjacent to the main harbor, known as Dead Man's Cove. From here the ships of the MU fleet set sail on their various missions to the Arakan Coast, thirteen hundred miles across the Bay of Bengal.

The earliest missions out of Ceylon involved the infiltration of native agents trained at Camp Y. For these missions, the OSS depended on the use of British Royal Navy submarines or Catalina PBY flying boats to carry the agents to the coast of Burma or Indonesia for insertion. Between 1 January 1944 and 23 May 1945, thirty-six missions were run against the coasts of Burma, Thailand, Sumatra, and the North Andaman Islands, half of which used submarines for insertion. The British Navy proved to be willing partners in the various OSS projects, although its shop-worn fleet of submarines often experienced mechanical difficulties in reaching the Burmese coast.

While in support of Operation DURIAN 1, the long haul from Trincomalee across the Bay of Bengal proved too much for the aged HMS *Severn*. Eighteen hours out of port, the port engine on the submarine died, shortly followed by the refrigeration and air conditioning systems. As a result, the temperature inside the submarine soared, spoiling the ship's food and roasting the occupants. Stormy conditions on the surface kept the vessel submerged and when it finally arrived in position, three of the four motor launches failed to operate and the fourth capsized. At this point, the captain of the *Severn* scrubbed the mission and the vessel limped back to Trincomalee.

When missions did not have to be aborted, the common practice of submarines was to surface near the coast. The operational teams positioned the rubber rafts manned by the native agents and their OSS handlers on the forward dive planes. The submarine then dove and held its position offshore until a previously determined rendezvous time when the OSS operatives would return.

During one such mission, Ripley II, as the submarine cruised on the surface a large native prau was sighted. To prevent compromising of the mission, the submarine gave chase and overtook the vessel, which proved to be a fishing boat. The crew was taken into custody and proved to be "five Sumatrans and one large monkey. . . . The five Sumatrans were not intelligent and no information was obtained except that the monkey was trained to pick coconuts and was capable of gathering six hundred in a day."


The use of the Catalina PBY Flying Boats extended the range and speed of infiltration at the expense of the size of the teams and amount of cargo. By the fall of 1944, the Maritime Unit recognized the need to move its base of operations closer to the Burmese coast and, with this in mind, Pier orga-



*The Catalina PBY-5A "Flying Boat" was used extensively to infiltrate agents and OSS personnel along the Burma coast. The aircraft could cover greater distances more quickly than submarines or surface vessels, though at the expense of a greatly reduced payload.*




*The three eighty-five-foot Air Rescue Boats formed the heart of the Maritime Unit fleet. Despite inadequate range and noisy operation, the boats were the principle craft for infiltrating agents and OSS personnel on the Arakan coast.*



*One of the three 85-foot Air Rescue Boats in the Maritime Unit P-564 operated out of Akyab after moving across the Bay of Bengal from Dead Man's Cove. When the OSS Maritime Unit ceased operations in the Spring of 1945, P-564 with P-563 returned to Calcutta and passed into the service of the British.*



*This diagram depicts the organization of the Maritime Unit in December 1944. Operations were centered in Ceylon and spread across the Bay of Bengal to Akyab on the Arakan Coast of Burma. P-565, under Lieutenant Anderson, ultimately joined the unit.*



nized a reconnaissance mission to the Mergui Archipelago, a collection of islands south of Akyab, in September 1944.

Two PBYs from British Special Duty Squadron 628 supplied the aircraft to land an OSS team on Chance Island. Pier accompanied the team comprised of First Lieutenant Gregory Coutopoulos, Second Lieutenant James Fine, and "Chee Chee" the Chinese radio operator. The PBY touched down in a quiet cove at Chance Island and the team cautiously began to prepare the rubber boats for departure. Crewmen armed with submachine guns took up positions on the wings and scanned the shore. The crew prepared to disembark. "At this time, Lieutenant Fine moved one of the submachine guns in the rubber boat, catching the trigger, with the result that five or six shots were fired before the gun could be freed. Fortunately, the bullets passed under the tail section of the airplane and no harm was done." After waiting a nervous two hours, the boats were launched and the Catalina flew safely back to Trincomalee.

The displacement across the Bay of Bengal shortened the approaches to the Burma coast and coincided with the advance of the British 15th Corps into Burma. The second Arakan campaign saw the British move south along the coast and eventually overcome the Japanese defenses that blocked the advance. From this point on, the MU depended largely on its own fleet of fast surface boats to insert agents and deliver operational groups to the various islands and coves along the Arakan coast.

The first two vessels arrived in December 1944. The Army Air Rescue Boats, P-563 and P-564, were 85 feet long powered by twin gasoline engines. Later, another 85-foot

"P" boat, P-565; two 63-foot craft, P-721 and P-1011; and P-1012, a 42-foot vessel were added to the fleet. The Air Rescue craft, notably the 85-foot vessels, proved to be less than ideally suited for the mission of clandestine insertion.

Originally designed with efficient Chrysler Royal Crown engines that provided a range of twenty-five hundred miles, the boats arrived with Packard engines that only gave a maximum operating range of five hundred miles. The Packard engines ran on one hundred-octane aviation grade fuel, which tethered operations to ports in the vicinity of airfields or procured from tankers. The boats were noisy and ill designed for use in shallow water. As noted in the unit after action report, "a boat carrying thirty-eight hundred gallons of one hundred-octane fuel is at all times a highly inflammable and dangerous craft to operate as close to enemy shoreline as was the custom in the Arakan. A single incendiary bullet would convert one of these craft into a seventy-ton funeral pyre for all hands on board." Fortunately, this never occurred and all the vessels survived the campaign.

The move across the Bay of Bengal took place in December 1944. "The Arakan Field Unit" consisted of an OSS Operational Group of eight officers and thirty-three enlisted men led by Major Lloyd E. Peddicord, and two members of the MU, Lieutenant Commander Derek Lee, and Lieutenant Junior Grade John D. Archbold. Their objective was to establish a maritime base and gather intelligence for assisting 15th Corps in the advance south. The unit set up a base at Teknaaf near the India-Burma border. The new home was called "Camp Ritchie" in honor of an operational group member, Captain Ritchie,



*The OSS Maritime Unit from the base at Galle, Ceylon, used the "Sleeping Beauty," a manned submersible of British design. Despite no formal training, CPT Lambertsen was able to repair and maintain the vessels and trained the swimmers on deploying the system.*

who lost his life on a training mission in Ceylon. On the 20th of December, Lieutenant Junior Grade John Booth arrived as the commander of Swimming Group 2, whose eight enlisted members closed on Camp Ritchie with Lieutenant Hugh A. McDevitt on 26 December. They provided the necessary operational expertise to conduct the reconnaissance needed of the coves and harbors of the coastline. Captain Christian J. Lambertsen (see sidebar) of the Army Medical Corps, and the inventor of the underwater rebreathing apparatus used by the swimmers, arrived at Camp Ritchie on 7 January 1945. He remained briefly to train the members of Swimmer Group 2 before moving back to the base at Galle in Ceylon. Camp Ritchie proved to be a short-lived home for the MU.

Between 5 and 9 January 1945, the MU and the operational group moved from Teknaaf to the port of Akyab where they established Camp Ritchie II. The remaining members of Swimmer Group 2 arrived on 13 January and over the next month, the boats of the MU fleet arrived and operations were begun in earnest.

In February, a third camp, Ritchie III, was established at the harbor of Kyaukpyu. This move located the MU closer to the action on the southern coast of Burma. Operations against Ramjee Island and along the Burma coast went on continuously throughout February and March. Camp Ritchie II at Akyab was then turned over to the OSS Field Headquarters, which had moved from Cox's Bazaar with the 15th Corps. On 15 February 1945, Colonel Ray Peers and Major Robert Farr visited Camp Ritchie III. Peers was the commander of Detachment 101, the primary OSS operational element in Burma. At that time, the operational group and MU were placed under Detachment 101 and designated the 101 Arakan Field Unit. The mission remained essentially unchanged, with the operational groups running missions ashore against the Japanese and the MU conducting beach reconnaissance and harbor evaluations. This continued until mid-March.

On 17 March, the two swimming groups and all the operational group men left Kyaukpyu for Calcutta, leaving behind Lieutenant Commander Lee and three boats: P-101, P-563 and P-721. From this point forward, operations consisted primarily of the insertion of agents at points southward along the coast as the Allied advance moved closer to Rangoon. Lieutenant Commander Lee returned to Calcutta in early April to discuss the future of the MU with the members of



*A Maritime Unit swimmer equipped with the Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU) was capable of penetrating coastal defenses undetected. The design of the LARU prevented the discharge of gases that would mark the trail of the diver.*



the OSS Field Headquarters. In the meantime, the MU vessels were moved on to Rangoon when the city was taken by the Allies, and began operations from that port. As the OSS emphasis shifted from Burma to China and Indochina, the men and equipment of the MU were gradually dispersed to other parts of the Theater. On 15 June 1945, orders disbanding the MU were received in Rangoon, and the remaining boats and personnel withdrew to Ceylon and Calcutta.

The exploits of the Maritime Unit on the Arakan Coast constituted the largest, longest, and most versatile maritime operations run by the OSS. The fall of Rangoon and the shift in the strategic and tactical picture in the theater brought radical changes to the OSS operations in the China-Burma-India Theater and precluded the type of shore operations that were the specialty of the Maritime Unit. ▲

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*Kenn Finlayson has been the USAJFKSWCS Command Historian since 2000. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.*

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## Endnotes


- 1 Geoffrey Charles Evans, *Slim as Military Commander* (Batsford, UK: Angus and Robertson, 1969), 86.
- 2 The remainder of this article is taken from Files 8, 9, 11, and 13 of The OSS-Lambertsen Collection, Box 7, Stack 5, Section 3, Shelf 2, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.

## Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen

**THE** Father of Army Underwater Operations, Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen served in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. During his service with the OSS he perfected and fielded the Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU), a closed-circuit underwater breathing apparatus, that became the standard for Army underwater operations. Stationed in Ceylon at the OSS Maritime Unit Base in Galle, Dr. Lambertsen trained the Maritime Unit swimmers with his rebreathing apparatus and in the use of the British submersible, the *Sleeping Beauty*. At the end of the war, he remained in the Army Medical Corps until his discharge in 1946.

After the war, Dr. Lambertsen returned to his *alma mater*, the University of Pennsylvania, and joined the faculty of the Medical School. He was a Professor of Pharmacology from 1953–1990. At the university, he founded the Institute for Environmental Medicine, one of the world's premier centers for the study of human physiology. He remains active today as the Director of the Environmental Stress Data Center of the Institute.

In his sixty-year career, Dr. Lambertsen has worked with the Department of Defense, the National Air and Space Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He has served on numerous advisory councils dealing with manned space flight and undersea operations. His work with the Department of Defense has been recognized with the Distinguished Public Service Medal, the Department of Defense Citation, the U.S. Special Operations Command Medal, and the U.S. Special Forces Green Beret Award. United States Special Operations Command recommended Dr. Lambertsen for the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005.




*Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen received the U.S. Special Forces Green Beret Award in May 1996.*

*The Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU) was invented by Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen and was the standard underwater breathing apparatus for the OSS Maritime Unit. The unit recirculated the air through a container of chemicals that removed carbon dioxide, eliminating telltale bubbles.*



# Camp Mackall 1943–1945

by Cherilyn A. Walley



**CAMP** Mackall began its ongoing life as a training center for the U.S. Army's elite in 1943, amidst the excitement and turmoil of World War II. Carved from the pine forests of the North Carolina Sandhills, just miles away from bustling Fort Bragg, the spacious installation was the ideal place for training airborne and glider infantrymen. Built in a record six months, Camp Mackall boasted a mind-boggling array of facilities: more than seventeen hundred buildings, sixty-five miles of paved road, sixteen post exchanges, twelve chapels, two large guest houses, five movie theaters, a twelve hundred-bed hospital, and enough barracks to house twenty-five thousand troops.


While initial parachute training took place at Fort Benning, Camp Mackall was where newly minted paratroopers came for advanced parachute infantry training and airborne maneuvers. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions trained at Fort Bragg, and the 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne divisions trained at Mackall, all preparing for battle in the Pacific and Europe. The famous "Triple Nickel" 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the first all-black paratroop unit, also trained at Camp Mackall before they deployed west in May 1945 as "smoke jumpers," fighting forest fires started by balloon-borne Japanese incendiary bombs.

When peace came in Europe and then the Pacific, Camp Mackall's heyday as an airborne training center came to an end. The Airborne Center and support troops transferred to Fort Bragg in November 1945, and the camp was placed on inactive status in December. Because the camp had been built according to contingency standards, it would cost some \$56 million to make the camp suitable for a permanent base. By mid-1946, Camp Mackall had transitioned from being one of the largest military installations in the United States to serving as a sub-camp of Fort Bragg. By the late 1950s, Camp Mackall was being used for selection and training of U.S. Special Forces soldiers, a role it fulfills to this day.



*Camp Mackall riggers kept busy performing pre-jump checks for the hundreds of training jumps conducted at Camp Mackall in its two years as an airborne training center.*





*Camp Mackall was the site of hundreds of training jumps, with both men and equipment being dropped from a variety of planes, including the C-47 shown here.*

*Camp Mackall was named for Private John Thomas Mackall of E Company, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, who was one of the first paratroopers killed in North Africa as part of Operation TORCH, the U.S. Army's first combat airborne operation.*




*This 1944 orientation booklet provided information about camp facilities and activities, as well as long distance telephone rates—a three-minute weekday person-to-person call from Camp Mackall to Los Angeles, California cost \$4.75.*





*With jumps occurring almost daily, paratroopers in training at Camp Mackall had plenty of opportunities to perfect their pre-jump routine. Notice the large size of the old static lines attached to the soldiers' parachutes.*





As part of the Army's airborne program, Camp Mackall became the center for glider operations. Waco CG-4A gliders carried soldiers, equipment, and even vehicles, and were an integral part of Operation MARKET GARDEN in 1944.



World War II barracks were utilitarian buildings and constructed of wood. Drafty in the winter and hot in summer, the barracks were also always in danger of catching fire, requiring each barracks to designate a "fireguard" twenty-four hours a day.



While paratroopers took jump training at Fort Benning, they came to Camp Mackall for advanced airborne infantry training. The hunting rifles used in the former game preserve upon which the camp was built quickly gave way to carbines, artillery, and mortars.





*Camp Mackall was home to three airborne divisions—the 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne—and their component units, including the 542nd Parachute Battalion.*



*Hundreds of white parachutes dotting the sky over Camp Mackall became a familiar sight to residents of nearby towns during World War II. Early T-4 and T-5 static-line parachutes were even less maneuverable than today's T-10 parachute, causing some locals to meet paratroopers sooner than later.*

*Camp Mackall Station Hospital boasted twelve hundred beds and more than ten female nurses, the latter being the more significant statistic to the soldiers. American Red Cross volunteers (shown at right) supplemented the hospital staff, which also included approximately one hundred Army (male) medical personnel.*



#### Notes:

Special thanks to Lowell Stevens and Tom MacCallum for gathering so much of the history of Camp Mackall. Other illustrations: Airborne Command shoulder patch, officer's airborne cap badge, 13th Airborne Division shoulder patch, 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion shoulder patch, 17th Airborne Division shoulder patch, and 11th Airborne Division shoulder patch.



# Prisoner for a Day:

## A First Special Service Force Soldier's Short-lived POW Experience



by Robert W. Jones Jr.

ANZIO 1944

*First Lieutenant  
T. Mark Radcliffe  
of The First Special  
Service Force.*

**THE** First Special Service Force (FSSF) landed at Anzio on 1 February 1944 and moved into defensive positions within twenty-four hours. Their mission was to protect the right flank of the beachhead, about thirteen kilometers of the fifty-two-kilometer salient that had become the Anzio beachhead. To the front of the FSSF position was the Mussolini Canal, a drainage project started in 1926 to drain

the marshes and turn the swampy Littoria Plain into farmland.<sup>1</sup> At its widest point, the canal was about sixty yards across and deep enough to form an effective antitank barrier. In order to keep the Germans from launching a significant attack, Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick, the FSSF commander, ordered an aggressive patrolling regimen with squads and platoons harassing the enemy every night. Sometimes these patrols simply disrupted enemy activities by cutting communications lines, while others conducted raids and sometimes prisoner snatches. For the most part, these patrols were extremely successful and caused the Germans to believe a much larger force opposed them; however,

one such patrol went awry for a Forceman and led to a classic escape and evasion.

On the dark evening of 14 March 1944, the commander of 3rd Company, 3rd Regiment, FSSF, First Lieutenant (1LT) T. Mark Radcliffe, led a five-man ambush patrol across the Mussolini Canal. In the course of the patrol, Radcliffe stopped to investigate a suspicious noise and was pounced upon by four or five German soldiers, who quickly bound and gagged him. Unaware of his capture, Radcliffe's patrol continued with its mission, only discovering their leader's absence much later. In the morning, the Germans took their prisoner to the town of Littoria for interrogation, but failed to blindfold him, allowing 1LT Radcliffe to take mental note of various German positions and troop locations, something that he hoped would help him at some future point.

1LT Radcliffe was introduced to his interrogator in the semi-basement of a damaged house with windows about four feet from the ground, maps on the wall, and full of German troops. Clad in the uniform of the elite Herman Göring Panzer Division, the interrogator was one Captain Ulrich, who claimed to have been a stockbroker in Philadelphia before the war, which accounted for his proficiency in English. Per his training, 1LT Radcliffe offered only his name, rank, and service number in answer to all of Captain Ulrich's questions. The interrogation continued unabated for about twenty minutes, at which point, apparently frustrated from his lack of success, Captain Ulrich suddenly struck Radcliffe across the right side of his throat with a solid rubber truncheon. The blow paralyzed Radcliffe's vocal cords, and he lost the ability to speak in anything above a whisper for four weeks.

As if by providence, the interrogation came to an abrupt halt when an Allied artillery barrage hit the area. The Germans hurried to protective shelters, leaving a lone guard on




Photo courtesy of CHM



watch. The guard was rightfully nervous and continually checked the effects of the barrage, peeking through the door and window, paying little attention to his prisoner. 1LT Radcliffe saw his chance: grabbing a piece of wood, he hit the guard on the side of the neck, knocking him out. The next few minutes were a whirlwind of frantic activity. After first grabbing a map, Radcliffe freed two other prisoners and then ran through the waning moments of the artillery barrage in search of concealment. 1LT Radcliffe knew they had only minutes before the Germans discovered their escape and began to look for them. At last, they found concealment in a large evergreen tree. Climbing up into the branches, Radcliffe and his companions stayed there all day as the Germans searched the ground nearby in vain, never looking up.

Under cover of darkness, the escapees finally descended from their hidden perch and made further plans. The two soldiers Radcliffe had freed, one British and the other French, decided to attempt to reenter Allied lines in another area, one they were more familiar with, so they parted ways with their American liberator. Radcliffe was determined to head to his former sector, where he knew the terrain, and more importantly, how to navigate through the extensive minefields. Traveling through the night and dodging German patrols, he gradually moved closer to Allied lines. Closer to safety, but not close enough, Radcliffe was spotted by a German mortar crew, which opened fire and wounded him. Losing blood and in pain from shrapnel wounds in his left foot and near his eyes, Radcliffe was barely able to find a hiding place for the next day.

Map of the Anzio beachhead on 21-27 February 1944. Radcliffe was taken prisoner on 14 March 1944.





By now, 1LT Radcliffe had been missing for three days, but his comrades in the Force had not given up on him. Several patrols from 3rd Company had been continuously searching for their company commander. Finally, the patrol led by Sergeant “Big Swede” Erickson, an original member of Radcliffe’s patrol, chanced upon the wounded officer. He was alive, though weak with blood loss. A noted character within the Force, Sergeant Erickson lived up to his reputation once again. Instead of greeting his wounded commander in relief, Erickson grabbed Radcliffe by the ears and excitedly started to pound his head into the ground, yelling “You little son of a bitch! Where ya been?”<sup>2</sup> No one knows how long the enthusiastic greeting would have continued, because a group of Germans soon spotted the patrol and opened fire. The rescuers grabbed Radcliffe and returned across the Mussolini Canal to the safety of their own lines.

At the 3rd Regiment command post, 1LT Radcliffe was given a preliminary debriefing by the Regimental Intelligence Officer, 1LT Bill Story. This was a somewhat difficult undertaking for Radcliffe, since he was still in rough shape. He was weak from his three-day evasion and blood loss, and he still could not speak above a low whisper because of the blow to his throat. Radcliffe and Story overcame the challenge by passing notes for the few minutes they had before Lieutenant Colonel Walker, the 3rd Regiment commanding officer, arrived at the command post to welcome Radcliffe back and to take him to the field hospital. In spite of his poor condition, Radcliffe was able to convey to 1LT Story the intelligence that he had gathered during his journey to the interrogation in Littoria.<sup>3</sup> This information was used to target the areas with artillery, resulting in the destruction of several ammunition dumps and enemy positions.<sup>4</sup>

In need of medical care, Radcliffe journeyed to the aid station and then to the field hospital in the Anzio beachhead. It was determined that the shrapnel wound to his foot had to

be operated on at the 36th Combat Hospital near Naples, so he was transported there for further care. After the operation, Radcliffe had recuperated for twenty-two days when he heard that soldiers at the hospital were being sent to the replacement depot for reassignment. For many soldiers, especially those assigned to special units like the FSSF and the Rangers, being reassigned was not only considered a demotion, but they also lost the camaraderie and friendship forged through training and the early campaigns in Southern Italy. Rather than run the risk of being assigned out of the FSSF, Radcliffe left the hospital without orders. Intent on rejoining his unit, he began his second escape and evasion in less than a month—this time from American forces.

While the “escape” from the hospital was relatively simple, getting from Naples to Anzio posed a bigger problem, since Radcliffe had no official access to transportation. As befitted a resourceful first lieutenant, Radcliffe solved the problem of the return to Anzio with unconventional thinking and ingenuity. By chance, he ran into a friend from Salt Lake City who was flying an L-19 spotter plane in and out of Anzio as a courier service. Radcliffe was able to convince the friend to take him along on his next flight to Anzio, but the friend feared being court-martialed for taking an unauthorized passenger. So they worked out a compromise: Once the L-19 landed and was taxiing toward the parking area, Radcliffe would roll out of the plane undetected and make his way back to FSSF headquarters. The plan was executed successfully and with efficiency. In less than thirty days, 1LT Radcliffe had successfully conducted two escapes and evasions (through both enemy and “enemy” territory), and had reunited with his unit. He had little time to rest from his exploits, however. He was soon summoned to BG Frederick’s headquarters for a special mission: he was to lead the first U.S. patrol into Rome. ▲

*To be continued in a forthcoming issue of Veritas . . .*

*Only a few days before Radcliffe was taken prisoner, this patrol from 4th Company, 2nd Regiment, returned from a night patrol with its own prisoners—the captured enemy fowl were of little intelligence value, but were delicious for dinner.*





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## Endnotes

- 1 Robert D. Burhans, *The First Special Service Force* (Dalton, GA: Lee Printing, 1947), 173.
- 2 T. Mark Radcliffe, *First Special Service Force*, interview by Robert W. Jones Jr., 28 April 2004, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Joseph A. Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade. The True Story of the First Special Service Force* (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History, 2001), 189.
- 3 William Story, *First Special Service Force*, conversation with Robert W. Jones Jr., 27 April 2004, Fort Bragg, NC, transcript, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 Burhans, 191; Story conversation.

## First Special Service Force

IN the spring of 1942, the British Chief of Combined Operations, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, introduced General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to a concept entitled "Project Plough." As envisioned by eccentric British scientist Geoffrey Pike, Project Plough entailed the development of a special force to parachute into German-occupied Norway and attack enemy installations and infrastructure critical to the German war effort, such as hydroelectric plants and railways. Using a newly created snow vehicle called the "Weasel," the force would move over the snow to execute the attacks, and the resulting chaos would tie up large numbers of German soldiers.

The envisioned unit would be made up of North Americans, a combined force from the United States and Canadian armies. General Marshall recruited Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick to form and command the new unit, and on 20 April 1942, the First Special Service Force (FSSF) was organized at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana. The specially selected men, of whom approximately one-third were Canadian, were organized into three 600-man regiments (each with two battalions) and a service battalion. After fifteen months of intense training in winter combat, mountaineering, airborne, demolitions, and close combat skills, the 2,300 Canadian and American soldiers were ready for combat.

Even as the Force finished their training, the Allied Command was having second thoughts about the unit's mission into Norway. The FSSF was initially ordered to disband in order to provide infantry replacements to other units, but now-Colonel Frederick convinced the Army to keep the well trained FSSF intact. Capitalizing on their winter combat skills, the first FSSF combat mission consisted of invading and securing Kiska Island in the Aleutian chain on 15 August 1943. Shortly after the Aleutians Campaign, the unit was assigned to the 5th Army in Italy. As they fought their way through Sicily and up the Italian coast from November 1943 through June 1944, the FSSF endured sustained combat and pitched battles at such places as Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea.


At Anzio, the FSSF became so feared that the Germans dubbed them "The Devil's Brigade." The FSSF led the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, which facilitated the capture of Rome. Soon after Rome was taken, the First Special Service Force left Italy to fight in southern France, and was finally disbanded in December 1944. The Canadians returned to their own Army, some going to their former units and a sizeable number joining the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion. About 350 Americans went to airborne units in need of experienced replacements, and the remaining FSSF soldiers formed the nucleus of the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) along with the 99th Infantry Battalion (made up of Norwegian-Americans) and saw service in Germany and Norway.

When the 1st Special Forces Regiment was constituted in June 1960, the First Special Service Force was recognized as an official part of the regiment's lineage.



*Robert T. Frederick commanded the First Special Service Force for the majority of World War II. As he served with the Force, he advanced from the rank of lieutenant colonel to brigadier general. After the capture of Rome, Frederick became commander of the 1st Airborne Task Force and planning began for the invasion of southern France.*






*Howitzer tube with muzzle and breech covers,  
lifting bar = 229.0 lbs.  
Total weight = 339.5 lbs.*

# Of Mules

## The 612th and 613th Battalions (Pack)

*by Cherilyn A. Walley*




*Wheels and breech block = 217.5 lbs.  
Accessories = 32.0 lbs.  
Phillips Cargo Pack Saddle = 94.5 lbs.  
Total weight = 344.0 lbs.*

*At Muskogee, OK: "One morning, several days after our arrival, we were marched down to a railroad siding, located near the camp entrance. A group of sergeants and a few officers were there to greet us. (If you could call it a greeting.) They were standing by a long line of cattle cars parked on the rail siding. Coming from inside these cars was a lot of banging and strange, unfamiliar sounds. We were all standing there looking at one another, wondering, "what is going on?" Needless to say, we soon found out. Then men who had arrived before us were handing each of us a piece of rope, about six feet long. This rope had a snap fastener attached to one end of it. It didn't take us very long to become familiar with this item, called a halter shank."—Ken Laabs (B/612)*



# and Men:

## Field Artillery in Burma



**WHEN** MARS Task Force was formed in November 1944 to combat the Japanese in Burma, it comprised not only infantry and quartermaster troops, but also the 612th and 613th Field Artillery Battalions (Pack). It had been noted that the Merrill's Marauders could have used considerably more firepower during their campaign, so when the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional) formed, it took along 75mm Pack Howitzers and the men and mules needed to transport and fire them.


In organizing pack artillery units, the Army carefully selected both men and mules for height (minimums 5'10" and 14¾ hands respectively) and sturdiness (not dead and one thousand pounds respectively). By the time the 612th and 613th arrived in Burma, all members had been thoroughly trained—the men in mule packing and the mules in . . . walking. The men were intimately familiar with the strengths and foibles of their four-legged companions, and the mules had developed a reasonable tolerance for the men—especially around feeding time.

By the end of the task force's trek, men and mules had walked hundreds of miles, crossing streams and rivers (one particular stream almost fifty times in one day), climbing and descending mountains, hacking through jungle undergrowth, and slogging through rice paddies. They had routed the Japanese and reopened the supply line to China. Though often forgotten in the trek's recounting, the mountain artillery boys, their 75mm Pack Howitzers, and their trusty mules were key to the entire campaign's success. Here are a few glimpses of what it was like to be in the pack artillery in Burma.




*The 75mm Pack Howitzer was designed to be disassembled and packed on seven mules. Phillips cargo pack saddles were customized to carry each gun component, with braces and straps designed for maximum stability and minimum maintenance. Weight and size restrictions required iron wheels to be used instead of the rubber tires used in stateside training.*

*Cannoneers could assemble or disassemble the gun in five minutes, mule to firing position. "To load this small Howitzer, the mules who carried a piece of the gun were placed in a circle around the gun. There were seven mules for the job. As the mule handler received his portion of the gun he would move clear, and when the wheels were placed on the last mule, the gun was ready to be moved to its next firing position."—Ken Laabs (B/612)*




*Bottom sleigh with recoil mechanism, one lifting bar, two oil cans, one oil carrier = 224.6 lbs.  
Total weight = 330.7 lbs.*



*Rear trail, trail hand spike, axle, sight = 248.0 lbs.  
Total weight = 341.9 lbs.*



*Cradle, top sleigh, one lifting bar = 228.5 lbs.  
Total weight = 334.6 lbs.*



*Front trail and one lifting bar = 243.0 lbs.  
Total weight = 341.9 lbs.*



*Pioneer kit: tools, picket line, ropes = 144.5 lbs.  
Total weight = 239.0 lbs.*



*"I was just a muleskinner. I led a mule most of the time. I was responsible for it. Always had to be sure the load on the mule was right. In the Army, if you had an animal, and you let that animal get a big bloody mass, they could just about court martial you. So we had to be careful. When we would come in from a march, we'd take the mules first and water them. We'd feed them. We'd get them taken care of, and then we'd take care of ourselves." —Gilbert McNeill (C/613)*

*"Some days a march would go on for fifteen to twenty-five miles, even after dark if the commander thought it was necessary. . . each battery had to set up their picket lines. At times the bamboo and other jungle undergrowth was very thick; we had to cut this out of our way with out machetes in order to make room for the mules and ourselves, so that we were off the trail." —Ken Laabs (B/612)*

*"Picture a dirt trail soaked with days of tropical downpour over which hundreds of men and mules traveled one behind the other and then down and down over a rather steep incline. It was pure mud. Men had to try to keep the mule from going too fast to prevent mules with their heavy loads from going tail over head down the slimy trail." —Alton Knutson (B/613)*

*"As we were going up hills, we would hold the tails of the mules ahead of us and get pulled up. The sergeants would always come by and say 'let go of those tails.' 'Yes, Sergeant.' We'd let go, and as soon as he was by, we'd pick them up again." —Bob Illson (B/612)*

*"En route to present location, [the] battalion encountered on many occasions almost impassable terrain. Many times paths had to be constructed so as to allow the traffic of animals. Animals and loads were lost. Gun loads that had been so lost had to be retrieved under very difficult circumstances, and much time was spent doing so. The battalion marched long into the night and were finally forced to rest in place to await daybreak, since the repairs of such impediments were impossible in darkness. The battalion rested from 0430 to 0615, then continued on to present location."—16–17 January 1945, 612th FA Battalion Daily Journal*





"Our tube mule fell over the side of the mountain. So [the] Sergeant came by and said 'Colvin, you take four men and go down and see what's happened, and bring that tube back up.' It was a tube mule, and we had to have the tube anyway. So I picked out three or four men and we went down there. And the mule was still laying down. We took the tube off the mule and left the saddle on him, and he got up. So I told one guy to 'take that mule back up on the trail.' So he took off. We had the two lifting bars, and we put one at each end. There were four of us, and we started back up the mountain with that tube. Well, we were within about a hundred yards of the trail when we just couldn't go any further. So we hollered up there where they had ropes. They threw the ropes down, we hooked them on the tube, and they would pull while we would push. So we finally got back up on the trail, got the tube back on the mule, and started off." — Randall Colvin (C/612)

Gun crews became close on the march through Burma. Each man knew his job and performed it quickly and professionally. Gun crew from C Battery, 613th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Burma, 1945 (at right): Edgar Bayless, Carl Dolwise, Emery Pustejovsky, Robert Molina, Carl Harper, Leon Polley, Georgae Haefeale, Harry Scheer, Edward Jenulevies/ Jenelvicz, Mike Kardrac, Alphonse Stefanovich.

"Day after day the trail became more difficult. When we were not wet with sweat, we would be wet from rain. . . . Many a G.I. ended the day coming into the encampment at night hanging onto the tail of the mule ahead of him." — Alton Knutson (B/613)



"A mule could go with that load anywhere that you could go without getting on your knees." — R.V. Woods (B/613)

## Sources

The information, photos, and quotations for this essay came from the following sources. Many thanks to the men (and mules) of the Mountain Artillery Association, especially those named below.

1. Ken E. Laabs, "MARS Task Force, 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pk)," unpublished manuscript, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
2. Alton Knutson, "He Took My Hand: Memories of a Minnesota Farm Boy," unpublished manuscript, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
3. 612th FA Battalion Daily Journal, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
4. Interviews with Randall Colvin, Bob Illson, Gilbert McNeill, and R.V. Woods, conducted by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, copies in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
5. Photos provided by Bob Mills, Randall Colvin, R.V. Woods, and the National Archives.



# The UN Occupation of P'yongyang

by Charles H. Briscoe



**P'YONGYANG**, the capital of North Korea, fell to Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. forces on 19 October 1950. Five weeks after the In'chon landing, United Nations (UN) forces had broken out of the Pusan perimeter and Seoul had been recaptured. With ROK forces already across the 38th parallel in pursuit of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), General Douglas MacArthur received permission to conduct UN offensive operations to destroy the NKPA threat. That launched the race to the Yalu River. P'yongyang became an intermediate tactical objective along the way and logical site for the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) advance command post. As expected, tactical UN and ROK commanders were focused on the continuing fight. Neither the strategic commander nor tactical commanders anticipated controlling large parts of North Korea, let alone two of its largest cities, including the capital.

Why is this relevant today? U.S. and coalition leaders had much the same priorities for Afghanistan and Iraq. President George Bush chose the capture of Baghdad to mark the end of hostilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In 1950, the newly created UN did not want military government established in North Korea and the phrase "Civil Assistance" was coined to cover the P'yongyang mission. Fifty years later, U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams are conducting civil military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq just as Military Government teams did in North Korea in 1950. And, similar to recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, the North Korea civil assistance campaign plan and the organization to carry out Phase Four activities (as they are now called) were approved after the perceived end of combat hostilities. In the midst

of the ensuing chaos, North Korean citizens were denounced by neighbors as communists in order to steal their property. Is that any different than people reporting somebody as a *Taliban* or *Fedayeen* in order to take possession of a truck, car, or house in Afghanistan or Iraq?

Not until after the capture of P'yongyang did General MacArthur approve the creation of a UN Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) for all of Korea. It was a State Department-driven action that resulted in a "paper" organization containing more than one hundred personnel. UNCACK was created in Tokyo to help rehabilitate Seoul, provide humanitarian and civil assistance to refugees in the south, and to reestablish government, law, and order throughout North Korea. UNCACK stood up in Seoul just in time to organize its own evacuation to Taegu.

Despite the lack of attention by the strategic command, the small Civil Assistance (CA) Team accomplished great things in P'yongyang, Chinnampo, and in Pyongan-Namdo Province during its short thirty-seven day tenure from 29 October to 6 December 1950. The successes must be attributed to Colonel (COL) Charles R. Munske, Field Artillery—probably the most



*Kim Il Sung, Premier of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)*



*Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of Republic of Korea (South Korea)*



*General Douglas MacArthur, commander of UN Forces in Korea, 1950-1951*



Major Policy Decisions Affecting Civil Affairs in Korea <sup>1</sup>	
27 June 1950	U.S. military forces committed to action in Korea
6 July 1950	Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC) advised of pending civil affairs directive
31 July 1950	UN Security Council asks U.S. to provide machinery for relief and support of civilian population in Korea
7 September 1950	Interim civil affairs directive issued to CINCUNC
29 September 1950	President defines responsibilities of Army and Economic Cooperation Agency for economic aid to Korea
1 December 1950	UN Assembly creates UN Korea Relief Agency

experienced Military Government officer in the Far East Command at the time. A veteran of both world wars, COL Munske had organized and run military governments in the Philippines, and had served as Military Governor of Kyushu, Japan, for two years. Having just returned to the Pacific theater in mid-October 1950, Munske was rushed to Seoul to organize civil assistance in South Korea. That mission was short-lived—his experience was critically needed in P’yongyang.

What follows are the experiences of COL Charles Munske and his team in P’yongyang and the surrounding towns and villages, told primarily in his own words. The information and excerpts are from Munske’s letters, notes, papers, and documents. As “the Civil Assistance man in P’yongyang,” who better to tell the story? [Direct quotes from COL Munske are indicated by *italics*.]

Early in the morning of 24 October 1950, COL Charles Munske received a terse order from the EUSA G-3: “Organize a small military government team and proceed at once with the advancing troops to P’yongyang. Set up the local governments, prevent sickness, starvation, and unrest among the inhabitants and do what you can in the line of quick rehabilitation. Remember this is a United Nations effort and you will not actually set up military government. You will be known as a Civil Assistance Team and will act as such. The legal currency north of the 38th parallel will be North Korean *won* and no South Korean political activities will be allowed until further instruction.” The G-3 concluded with: “Remember this is a United Nations occupation.”<sup>2</sup>

Munske’s proposed military government team table of organization and equipment reflected *what was required to perform the mission competently*, but *per usual it was cut by two-thirds*. Weapons and ammunition were readily available, but everything else was in short supply. Military government equipment and supplies, DDT, drugs,



Photo courtesy of Judy Munske

*Colonel Charles R. Munske led UN Civil Assistance Command Korea efforts in P’yongyang, and played a key role in UNCACK activities in Seoul.*

and medicines were virtually nonexistent. From available personnel, Munske organized a team of four officers, two UN civilians, one enlisted clerk, four enlisted drivers, an enlisted cook, and two Korean interpreters:

1 Team Commander	Colonel, Artillery	COL C.R. Munske
1 Public Health Officer	American civilian, WHO (World Health Organization)	Dr. F.K. Cassel
1 Sanitarian	English civilian, WHO	Mr. S.A.C. Lord
1 Public Welfare Officer	Captain, Infantry	CPT T.C. Vangen
1 Public Safety Officer	Captain, Infantry	CPT W.F. Gerard
1 Civilian Supply Officer	Captain, Infantry	LT W. Stack

Mr. S.A.C. Lord, Major (MAJ) E.H. Davies, Captain (CPT) Davidson, CPT E. Ellingson, and First Lieutenant (1LT) Bruce Fisher joined the team on 10 November and were followed by Dr. A.K. Lee, preventive medicine physician, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Livingston, and MAJ T.J. Cook. First Lieutenant John Golden, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) Finance Officer, was also detailed to assist COL Munske in P’yongyang.<sup>3</sup>

Only two officers in North Korea had any military government experience: CPT Terrance Vangen had served in the post-WWII Korea occupation, and the Chinnampo Sub-team chief, CPT Loren E. Davis, had held a military government assignment in Okinawa, Japan.<sup>4</sup> A few of the enlisted men had also served in military government companies. Munske’s

team was composed of *real good men, who were “Jacks of All Trades,” excellent convivers, and experienced midnight requisitioners—without which a lot of the work accomplished could never have been contemplated*. Three ROK legal officers with their sergeants were also attached. *The ROKs got plenty of training, but in addition they were very helpful.*<sup>5</sup>

The CA team scrounged

*Shortly after the Pyongan-Namdo Civil Assistance Team arrived in P’yongyang, ROK President Syngman Rhee visited the North Korean capital. His strident reunification speech in downtown P’yongyang reverberated all the way back to Washington and the United Nations in New York.*





### Capture and Evacuation of P'yongyang, North Korea, 19 October–5 December 1950

This map illustrates the military operations around P'yongyang, North Korea, from October 19 to December 5, 1950. The city of P'yongyang is centrally located, with the Taedong River flowing through it. The map shows the ROK 7th Division and ROK 1st Division advancing from the north, indicated by large blue arrows. The 5th Cavalry is shown advancing from the east, also indicated by a large blue arrow. A 'Civilian Evacuation Route' is marked with a dashed line, leading from the city towards the southeast. The map includes various geographical features such as the Pot'ong River, Ch'ungmu River, and Taedong River. It also shows the locations of several airfields, including K-23 East Airfield and Mirim-ni. The map is based on Army Map Service L751 Series sheets 6330 I, 6330 IV, 6331 II, and 6331 III (1950). Supplemental information from Army Map Service L851 Series sheets 6330 IV NE, 6331 II SW, and 6331 III SE (1950) is also included. The map is titled 'Capture and Evacuation of P'yongyang, North Korea, 19 October–5 December 1950'.

Based on Army Map Service L751 Series sheets 6330 I, 6330 IV, 6331 II, and 6331 III (1950). Supplemental information from Army Map Service L851 Series sheets 6330 IV NE, 6331 II SW, and 6331 III SE (1950) is also included. The map is titled "Capture and Evacuation of P'yongyang, North Korea, 19 October–5 December 1950".

Map created by Cherilyn A. Walley





*UN troops encountered similar scenes to this friendly welcome in Chinnampo in each village and city they liberated during their drive into North Korea.*

south, also had considerable traffic—empty trucks and loaded ambulances, and occasionally a truckload of prisoners.<sup>7</sup>

People were in the streets and South Korean flags were everywhere in Kaesong. Every house seemed to have a flag. One officer said, “Either the 1st Cavalry Division or 2nd Infantry Division must have a flag vendor with them. How else could North Koreans get ROK flags so quickly?” As they crossed the 38th parallel, signs were everywhere—courtesy of various units. Munske added a UNCACK sign. In Jonghyon-ni, Munske’s group saw bodies in the streets, houses burned down, and civilians being held prisoner by vigilantes. They witnessed a runaway detainee killed. Anyone could denounce another as a Red and have him arrested and his property confiscated.<sup>8</sup>

Early the next morning, 29 October, the CA team resumed its movement north at maximum speed. As the group wound through mountain passes, knocked out tanks stared at them from vantage points. Sariwon, a large city on the edge of the mountains, had been severely damaged in the fighting. Beyond the city was a large flat plain. Battle-damaged vehicles and artillery pieces littered the flanks of the road and stood skeleton-like in the cotton fields and rice paddies. Empty artillery shell casings, small arms debris, and ammo boxes and crates were everywhere. Large sections of rail track had been ripped up. Bomb craters pocked the ground. Trains were lying on their sides with the locomotives and cars riddled by thousands of bullets. Others stood burned on the tracks. Only the blackened walls of stations remained. Few bodies were seen despite heavy fighting just a few days previously. That changed in P’yongyang.<sup>9</sup>

Divided by the Taedong River, the west side of P’yongyang contained most of the population, government and municipal

three jeeps, a 1¼-ton truck, and a 2½-ton truck with ½-ton trailer. Then, they sat and waited for orders—which came nearly two days later. As the convoy rolled out of the Seoul University gate, the acting first sergeant surprised Munske with a dilapidated civilian truck pulling two ½-ton trailers loaded with equipment. The extra trailer was hooked to the 1¼-ton truck. Then, the trip—which turned out to be full of work, happiness, despair, and pathos—began.<sup>6</sup>

*The day was beautiful, sunny, and warm, with a cold twang in the air. The road north was crowded with vehicles. The ground was dry and the road had about six inches of powdered dust on it. Every wheel that turned would raise the dust up into a cloud that settled on the vehicles and the occupants until everything was grayish. Everyone wore a scarf or a handkerchief tied around his face, trying to cover the nose and mouth, making it almost possible to breathe. It was out of the question to stop, and because our group was small and light, we weaved in and out of the long lines of slow moving vehicles headed north. The other side of the road, going*

*United Nations Command units took great pleasure in marking their journey north across the 38th Parallel, many leaving signs such as this one created by the ROK 3rd Division.*







*LTC Ralph Foster, seated at Kim Il Sung's desk, and members of TF Indianhead searched government offices in P'yongyang for documents and information regarding American POWs.*



*Members of TF Indianhead set up their kitchen in front of the North Korean capital building in P'yongyang, shown here in defensive camouflage. This building became Eighth Army Headquarters.*

## Task Force Indianhead



**T**ASK Force (TF) Indianhead, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Foster, 2nd Infantry Division G-2, was given the mission to capture Russian and Chinese military advisors, collect documents of intelligence value left behind in government offices of Kim Il Sung, and to rescue American POWs reportedly being held in P'yongyang. Comprised of two half-tracks, seven 2½-ton trucks, five medium tanks, two light tanks, a reinforced demolition squad, a doctor and two medics, two anti-aircraft artillery half-tracks, military policemen, Counter-Intelligence Command agents, and a team of interpreters, TF Indianhead convoyed north from Chuoc-Myon toward P'yongyang on 17 October 1950.<sup>1</sup>

When Lieutenant Colonel Foster pulled his TF Indianhead convoy serial into a P'yongyang school yard on 19 October, he found more than one thousand NKPA prisoners being tried by a ROK Army military tribunal. Ignoring the ROK forces, the TF members began searching the school yard. In one of the classrooms they discovered that the names of sixty-five Americans had been written on a blackboard. "I remember the last name was Galvin. The school, I assumed, had served as a holding area for American POWs . . . but, I do not remember any barbed wire nor bars on windows or doors," stated Corporal Mario Sorrentino, demolition specialist.<sup>2</sup> The task force encountered no opposition in its searches. After failing to find any American POWs or Russian and Chinese advisors, they focused on collecting documents in the abandoned military and government offices of the North Korean capital. On 25 October, TF Indianhead was disbanded, and the POW search and rescue mission handed over to the 187th ARCT.

## Notes


- 1 Lieutenant Clark C. Munroe, *The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-1951* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1952), 51.
- 2 Donald Knox, *The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 400, 413.

buildings, cultural centers, churches, numerous schools, and hotels. The east side of the city was mainly industrial, but a large housing project was nearing completion. Entering the eastern outskirts of the capital, the CA team drove by badly damaged factories. One was the American Corn Products Refinery Company. An American mobile army surgical hospital had already been erected nearby. Near the airfield (designated K-23) on the northeast side of the capital were signs pointing to Division and Corps command posts.<sup>10</sup>

The impressive, dual-span railroad bridge crossing the Taedong had suffered extensive damage in the fighting. Lone pilings stood bolt upright in the river where bridge sections had collapsed. The highway bridge had suffered a similar fate. The viaduct running from an island in the river to the mainland had been broken, and a large water pipe hung precariously over the water. By the time Munske's team arrived, Army engineers had constructed a sizeable pontoon bridge to handle the heavy traffic. Troops and military police were everywhere. After crossing the bridge the CA group turned left along the river toward the city center. The journey took them past neatly stacked ammunition left behind at NKPA defensive positions, and streets filled with people wandering aimlessly. The drivers had to navigate through the numerous bodies of dead NKPA soldiers that lined the roads.<sup>11</sup>

While the CA team set up in the courtyard of an abandoned Japanese house for the night, COL Munske visited the city proper. He saw little damage from bombing or shellfire, but signs of heavy looting were everywhere—doors broken in, windows smashed everywhere, and household effects lying out in the streets. In the center of the city, he encountered more troops milling around, mostly American GI stragglers.<sup>12</sup> *Dead bodies were lying in side streets and in the*





parks, and nightly shootings, rapes, and robbery were common.<sup>13</sup>

At the City Hall, COL Munske encountered some I Corps officers that he knew, one of whom was the military government officer, COL Melchoir. He briefed Munske on the situation, showed him on a map where the command posts of EUSA (Advance), I Corps, and IX Corps were located. The North Korean government was located in a former Presby-

terian Missionary compound, the largest in Asia, and this is where Eighth Army set up its headquarters. Melchoir also informed Munske that his CA team would be attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) for logistical support. A tactical CA team from the 2nd Infantry Division had just taken over from the 1st Cavalry Division.

COL Melchoir ended by providing a list of *supposedly good*



dependable citizens that could be counted as noncommunists. One of them had already been appointed city mayor. Munske could only muse: *This was really rushing it, for there certainly had not been enough time to investigate the background of any of these people. However, it was now our problem.*<sup>14</sup> He quickly discovered that the city government set up by I Corps was simply going through the motions. Lacking money, it could only hire people on the promise of future payment, and without vehicles, the

various departments—i.e., sanitation, public works, health and welfare, etc.—were inoperative.<sup>15</sup>

Unaware of the Louis Heren article in *The Times* (London)<sup>16</sup> [see box] lambasting him and his colleagues, COL Munske entered City Hall and established UNCACK headquarters on the second floor. He reported to UNCACK in Seoul that the constant shifting of responsibilities was not conducive to good civil assistance management, especially since the tactical teams had ideas of their own.<sup>17</sup> Later, he conceded that in spite of the changing unit boundaries and command responsibilities, the final outcome of the combined efforts of all CA activities could be considered satisfactory.<sup>18</sup>

During the team's first night in P'yongyang, an NKPA soldier was killed by ROK MPs. Afterwards, they threw his body into the CA team yard—a warning from ROK Provost Marshal "Tiger" Kim, who wanted to be the military governor and did not want the Americans interfering with him.<sup>19</sup> However, Munske's orders were explicit that the Koreans would have no military government functions in North Korea nor were they to have any control over the civilian populace. They were not authorized to try civilians in courts; appoint town, city, or provincial leaders and officials; seize

homes, property or businesses; nor interfere in any way with normal civilian activities. This was the function of the Civil Assistance Team or Military Government, by whatever name you called it.<sup>20</sup>

COL "Tiger" Kim had a reputation as a tough gangster, but being a close associate of President Syngman Rhee, he was immune from arrest. *I had my troubles with him but they were minor*, recalled Munske.<sup>21</sup> He had much bigger problems: public utilities in poor shape; no water,

Correspondent Louis Heren of *The Times* (London) reported conditions in the North Korean capital in mid-October. Effective politics of the Southern occupation of North Korea consisted mostly of the National Police and the rightist youths who trundled along with it. Cho Pyong-ok, Home Minister, announced that National Police controlled nine towns north of the 38th parallel and that a special force of thirty thousand Koreans was being recruited for occupation duty. Heren called the U.S.-South Korean occupation a disgrace. American Civil Affairs officers were "pathetically few" and inexperienced.

"The recruitment of a provisional city council for P'yongyang would have been farcical, if the implications were not so obviously tragic. It was rather like watching an Army sergeant selecting men for fatigue duty. As a result, weeks after the fall of the city there were no public utilities, law and order was evident only on the main streets during the hours of daylight, and the food shortage due to indifferent transport and distribution had assumed serious proportions."



*While the Highway Bridge (right) across the Taedong River had been destroyed, U.S. Army engineers quickly erected a pontoon bridge (left) to reconnect East and West P'yongyang until the Highway Bridge could be repaired.*

lighting, or electricity; and no public transportation.<sup>22</sup>

Planning and operations had to be done simultaneously since there was no time for long range planning. Based on his available officers, COL Munske established four sections: Public Health, Public Welfare, Public Safety, and Civilian Supply. The team leaders were responsible for organizing local and provincial governments assisted by the three ROK legal officers. Public Works, Finance, Transportation, Warehousing, Labor, and Billeting functions were also parceled out to the CA officers and enlisted men as the need arose. The situation was continually updated by team visits, conversations with any and all native Koreans willing to talk, and information from local Counter-Intelligence personnel, which included Major Moffat, who was from an old American missionary family that had served in Korea.<sup>23</sup>

Anyone not in complete sympathy with the Communist regime had disappeared in the last days before the North Korean government and troops evacuated. Some had been

*Mounted South Korean soldiers "ride herd" on a prisoner as he is marched through a P'yongyang street to a prisoner-collection point. A bicycling North Korean citizen, wearing an armband that identifies him as an anticommunist, joined the parade.*







*The 2nd Infantry Division was responsible for hundreds of POWs after the fall of P'yongyang. Makeshift holding areas were established in streets and in open areas, such as the basin in front of Eighth Army Headquarters in northern P'yongyang.*

executed and others had been taken north. Some simply disappeared on their own. These were the ones Munske wanted to contact. Of the estimated 625,000 people living in P'yongyang in early 1950, only 300,000 remained.<sup>24</sup> One positive aspect of the Communists' flight was the predominantly anti-Red feeling among the populace.<sup>25</sup>

Based on problems he encountered in the initial days of his administration, Munske soon established his objectives: set up a city government; start provincial governments, appoint mayors and governors, repair power plants because water was needed for sanitation and firefighting, simultaneously rebuild the water works, get the trolleys and trains operating, gather food, find North Korean *won* money plates, set up hospitals and welfare agencies, move ROK military squatters out of private homes, eliminate the thousands of ROK deserters, prevent the nightly looting and burning of buildings, and post proclamations effecting all of the above.<sup>26</sup>

Some of the other major issues Munske faced included:

*The UN Civil Assistance Command was the primary agency for managing and administering aid to refugees. In P'yongyang, it also served as a the military government and helped establish a new civilian government in the city.*




Photo courtesy of Judy Munske

land reform, the looting of banks (ROK soldiers carrying off large rice bags of five-*won* notes made it difficult to obtain operating currency), and a prison fire.<sup>27</sup> In a 1 November 1950 letter home, he described the bank situation: *Every vault was dynamited and blown up. Money was scattered all over the floors. In a Russian bank the manager had started a fire in the vault before locking it and it was still burning. I have to gather up all of this money as it is the only available. Trying to pick the money out of the rubble is a job, but we are getting to it.*<sup>28</sup>

While Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen Jr., 187th ARCT commander, assumed responsibility for Civil Assistance in P'yongyang on 2 November, COL Munske was there to make it happen. Bowen attended the first police school graduation and ordered that the five Japanese sake factories be dynamited.<sup>29</sup> Those were Bowen's major contributions to the CA effort in P'yongyang. Munske, writing to his wife by flashlight in his house (no lights, heat, water, or toilet facilities) in the missionary compound, and wearing multiple layers of clothing, revealed his frustrations: *Everybody lives like pigs. No progress has been made. This is the worst situation that I have ever faced, and it is very depressing. We are trying to organize governments, get electric power and water back into the city, set up police and fire departments and do a million other things. Ironically, he concluded on a positive note: It doesn't seem that we will ever get anywhere with this setup. One of these days all the pieces of this puzzle will fall into its proper place and we shall lick it.*<sup>30</sup>

After working at City Hall all day, Munske and his small team routinely traveled to EUSA headquarters to eat and attend updates. The only safe nighttime activity was to chase fires. On 6 November, the NKPA prisoners of war set their prison on fire. Hundreds among the several thousand prisoners there died. While surveying the damage afterwards, the CA team discovered more than two thousand bodies buried in the prison yard.<sup>31</sup> An estimated three thousand partisans and stay-behind NKPA being hunted by UN troops (primarily the 187th ARCT) during the day were responsible for most night fires and sabotage.<sup>32</sup>

*These are very hectic days trying to establish law and order here. The whole sky is red with fire. A really big one is burning in the pouring rain. We have no way to stop fires here since we have no fire engines. The Commies took them all north. Even if we had some*



Courtesy of Judy Munske

*Vital to restoring order to P'yongyang was a competent police force. The first class from the Police Training Camp graduated on 12 November 1950, with speeches given by BG Bowen of the 187th ARCT, the mayor of P'yongyang, and COL Munske.*



# Rakkassan Assault on Sukch'on and Sunch'on



**DELAYED** by heavy rain at Taegu, South Korea, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT—"Rakkassans"), did not conduct parachute assaults on Sukch'on and Sunch'on until late morning 20 October 1950. The drop zones were adjacent to the railway lines going north from P'yongyang, the North Korean capital. The primary mission of the 187th was to cut off and then contain two North Korean divisions as part of the Eighth US Army and ROK offensive into North Korea following the successful UN landing at Inch'on and the breakout from the Pusan perimeter. A secondary mission was to rescue approximately two thousand American prisoners of war that were being shipped north to serve as future "bargaining chips" in UN negotiations.

The Sukch'on/Sunch'on airborne assault was the first time that heavy equipment was para-dropped in combat, and the first use of C-119 Packet transports

for a combat parachute operation. On 20 October and the days afterward, about four thousand troops and six hundred tons of equipment and supplies were dropped at Sukch'on and Sunch'on. This included twelve 105mm howitzers, thirty-nine jeeps and trailers, four 40mm antiaircraft artillery guns, four ¾-ton trucks, and 584 tons of ammunition, gasoline, water, rations, and other supplies.<sup>1</sup>

The Rakkassans arrived too late to contain the North Korean divisions and rescue the American POWs. The trail elements of the enemy units were a full day ahead on the north side of the Chongchon River. Communist Premier Kim Il Sung and his government had fled P'yongyang on 12 October for Manpojin on the Yalu River. Far East Command intelligence was seven to ten days old. When the Rakkassans were ordered to P'yongyang on 23 October, they had accumulated thirty-eight hundred prisoners, killed between two thousand and three thousand North Korean soldiers, and suffered a hundred casualties. Unfortunately, the remaining UN prisoners had been taken from their train and machine gunned by their guards before dawn on 20 October—at the same time the 187th was preparing for the parachute assault.<sup>2</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Roy E. Appleman, *US Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 656–57.
- 2 Edwin P. Hoyt, *On to the Yalu* (New York: Stein & Day, 1984), 242–43.

*we have no water in the city since they destroyed the entire water system. The CA team stopped the spread of that fire by using their trucks and cables to pull adjacent wooden buildings down. A few days afterwards, the team found three fire trucks twenty miles north of the city, where they had been strafed and bombed by UN fighters. Though all were in very bad condition, they were towed back to the city in hopes that one usable truck could be built from the three wrecks. That was accomplished and a Fire Department was established at the end of November 1950.<sup>33</sup>*


On 9 November, Munske's toughest problem was handling the ROK troops and South Korean youth groups who were causing a lot of trouble. They were *out and out 'carpetbaggers,' taking what they wanted and shipping it South. The 'kangaroo courts' held by these South Korean patriotic youth groups made the local populace resentful.*<sup>34</sup> *They are treating the people here as though they are still Commies and are robbing and shooting them. If I could get them moved out of here, at least half of our troubles would be over.*<sup>35</sup> The five thousand ROK military personnel (including ROK Air Force personnel without airplanes and Navy without boats) scrounging food and supplies, caretaking houses for their commanders, and stragglers and deserters, were causing mayhem. They took rice, millet, vegetables, machinery, clothing, and medicine, and shipped it south on trucks confiscated from the villages. Two rice mills were operated by the 8th Regiment, 7th ROK Division. When an ROK Air Force officer demanded the first one thousand bags of rice harvested in Mirim-ni, seven miles east of P'yongyang, Munske figured that they would have to look for a new mayor shortly.<sup>36</sup> With the ROK military having a three week headstart on foodstuffs, Munske's team struggled to collect rice and millet to put in central storage for emergencies.<sup>37</sup>

As the central UN supply agency for North Korean *won*, the UNCACK team was stringently doling out money to American units, while

*The 187th Regimental Combat Team of the 11th Airborne Division made a parachute assault on Sukch'on and Sunch'on the morning of 20 October 1950. Although the jump was a success, faulty intelligence caused the Rakkassans to miss both cutting off the North Korean divisions north of P'yongyang and rescuing American POWs.*



*The Sukch'on/Sunch'on parachute assault was the first time that C-119s were used for a combat parachute operation. They dropped a total of four thousand troops and six hundred tons of supplies that day.*





ROK Army units were discarding what they had stolen earlier because they could buy nothing with it. To keep repairs and reconstruction going, COL Munske was spending between one and two million *won* per day.<sup>38</sup> All the factories had either been systematically sabotaged by the Reds or looted by the ROK military. Money was essential to rehabilitation. The coal miners would not work without pay or rice and they were critical to restoring electrical power for lighting and to operate the water pump system for the city.<sup>39</sup> The CA team recovered forty-six million *won* in five- and ten-*won* notes. Payments to contractors were usually stuffed in large rice sacks and carried away in oxcarts. Despite its illegality, South Korean *won* brought north by the ROK military, Seoul officials, and railway personnel complicated the situation.<sup>40</sup>

NKPA forces still controlled the northern half of Pyongan-Namdo Province and the I Corps divisions were still fighting. Munske revised his initial estimate that the war was practically over. He now saw that it could drag out for a long time.<sup>41</sup> On 11 November 1950, IX Corps troops passed through the North Korean capital on their way to the front to prepare to continue the EUSA offensive.<sup>42</sup>

On the positive side, Dr. Kassel found no signs of serious illness, malnutrition, or other health problems in P'yongyang, Chinnampo, and the surrounding villages. But, as Mr. Lord noted, sanitation was always deplorable everywhere. Six hospitals were made operational in the CA team's short tenure in P'yongyang.<sup>43</sup>

The city police department was also functioning, and a police school, organized by MAJ Lee, 2nd Infantry Division, was conducting accelerated training classes. A cadre of South Korean national police had been requested to officer the several hundred policemen.<sup>44</sup> On 15 December 1950, the city police force was to be increased to three thousand effectives.<sup>45</sup>

P'yongyang was being governed as a "special city," separate from the provincial government. The CA team later consolidated bureaus in the city government to eliminate redundancy.<sup>46</sup> *Our first plans are to follow the governmental system in use since the occupation of North Korea. Colonel Mun-*

*A single working fire "truck" (actually a motorcycle) was available to fight fires in P'yongyang in late 1950. This demonstration of the pumper's power took place in front of the damaged City Hall, which can be seen in the center background.*




ske made it clear to the *Stars and Stripes* that the system was not a military government. *We allow the newly-appointed local officials as much of the burden of administration as they possibly can handle, with our officers serving only as advisers.*<sup>47</sup>

While Korean custom normally dictated that an elder male scholar be used in the higher echelons of government, it was felt that if such a man was not available to handle the demands of forming a new government, a younger man ought to be selected. Records of numerous persons were carefully scrutinized for capable leaders. Underground sources helped them find personnel acceptable to the majority. Then, a public meeting was set in the city auditorium to discuss the gubernatorial candidates in a democratic forum. Public Notices of decisions, authenticated by COL Munske's chop (seal), were posted afterwards.<sup>48</sup>

Munske and his team were making good progress by mid-November. Pyongan-Namdo Province officials were installed on 13 November. An interim governor, Kim Sung Chu, nominated by President Syngman Rhee, had actually served for a week. Nonpotable water was now being pumped into the systems on both sides of the Taedong River, and limited lighting was available on the east side. One nearby coal mine was operating, but it only furnished enough coal to run one power plant. Several local citizens requested permission to print newspapers. In an interim report to Seoul dated 12 November 1950, COL Munske stated that *generally, things have been in a chaotic condition, but slowly we are beginning to see slight changes for the better.*<sup>49</sup>

By mid-November, COL Munske thought that they were beginning to get control of the crime wave in the city, though



*UNCACK issued various notices and proclamations as it reestablished law and order in P'yongyang. Posted instructions were often authenticated by COL Munske's "chop," or seal, with his name in both English and phonetic Korean.*





*Bob Hope's USO Tour was always a raving success, and the show in P'yongyang was no different. Shown here with President and Mrs. Syngman Rhee in Seoul, Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell headlined the wildly popular show.*

nightly rapes persisted. Conditions outside the city were still tough. Guerrillas operated at will, daily attacking military convoys and running rampant in the small villages. To the south of P'yongyang, strong enemy attacks were being made against the UN forces, which included Turks and Filipinos.<sup>50</sup>

In the north, the Americans and British were preparing for the final push to the Yalu. Still, *increasing contact with Chinese soldiers is still unresolved. Everyone is holding his breath. However we are not greatly worried. We are just damned sore. We had expected the fighting to be over by now.*<sup>51</sup> Despite growing tactical evidence in the form of several hundred Chinese POWs, denial of a Chinese threat by Tokyo sufficed, especially since extremely cold weather reduced active patrolling by troops lacking winter clothing.

In the meantime, the senior UN Civil Assistance advisor was plagued by law and order challenges. After meeting with ROK Commander in Chief MAJ Ly, the Counterintelligence

Division commander, and MPs the night before, COL Munske joined a 20 November raid on a gang of racketeers. Youth groups became black marketeers under the guise of South Korean patriotic organizations. They had been robbing everything they could. After their operation raid on the gangsters, Munske investigated a cave twelve miles outside the city where a big guerrilla arsenal had been found. The UNCAK team got an unexpected bonus from the counter guerrilla operations: two captured Russian trucks and a Russian jeep.<sup>52</sup>

In mid-November, UN soldiers enjoyed an unexpected treat: "The greater portion of the day was spent patrolling, attending [winter] clothing classes, and enjoying the Bob Hope Show. The two-hour comedy show was thoroughly enjoyed by everyone." "No one who saw the show could forget Marilyn Maxwell's sweater, the acrobatics of the Taylor Maids, the wit of Jerry Colona, the music of Les Brown, and, most of all, the great man himself. It was hard to imagine that Bob Hope was actually in P'yongyang," said Private First Class Jimmy Marks, A Battery, 61st Field Artillery Battalion.<sup>53</sup>

COL Munske was too busy to attend the show. He was escorting official visitors throughout the city, explaining and showing what the CA team had accomplished. After dinner with Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Munske was called back to Seoul to talk with U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio about conditions in the North Korean capital. This was prompted by a *Christian Science Monitor* article noted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In Seoul, COL

## The Sunch'on/Myongucham Massacre

**CAPTURED** by North Koreans along the Naktong River in early August 1950, Private First Class Lloyd Kreider, a 34th Infantry Regiment medic, was marched to Taejon and then taken by train into Seoul. About the time of the Inch'on landing, approximately three thousand prisoners of war were being held at a school house in Seoul. Shortly after the landing, about seven hundred of those still capable of walking were marched north. Prisoners unable to keep up were taken off to the side of the road and shot. "The road to P'yongyang was the real death march. As soon as a man fell out, he was shot or bayoneted. We were never given any food or water. Very few of us had any clothes, just some rags around the waist. I think about three hundred and fifty of us finally reached

P'yongyang," recalled Krieder.<sup>1</sup>

The POWs had been housed in a P'yongyang school for about a week when they saw flares at night over the city. They knew that meant the UN forces were close by. The North Koreans quickly herded the prisoners out of the school house. At least a third of the prisoners were killed—the invalids. The rest were marched to a train bound north via Sunch'on. The train traveled only at night, hiding from UN aircraft in tunnels during the day.

On the morning of 20 October, the steam engine was stoked to the maximum in an effort to asphyxiate the prisoners in the tunnel with smoke. When that effort proved too slow, the guards began taking groups of forty off the train to execute them with their machine guns. Private Kreider survived by falling

down just as the shooting started and then playing dead. After the prisoners were shot, another group bayoneted the bodies. Kreider was stabbed in the knee, but managed not to scream. At nightfall, once convinced that the guards had left, he crawled away from the dead. While searching for a good hiding place Kreider discovered another POW still alive—a master sergeant. The two hid in some bushes. In the morning, Kreider hailed a passing young North Korean boy for help. He returned with an old man who took the two escaped prisoners to his home and fed them. Then he loaded the two men on a cart and carried them to Sunch'on, where he turned them over to an ROK unit, which in turn transferred them to the 187th ARCT.<sup>2</sup>

"We'd heard rumors about a death march, where the NKPA herded this



Munske found the UN Civil Assistance Command Korea well ensconced in the Bonto Hotel. The UNCACK was concerned about guerrilla activities affecting work throughout Korea. Perhaps to make up for a busy Thanksgiving, in Munske's absence, CA team sergeants found the Russian ambassador's old desk and some nice leather chairs, which they set up in their chief's room in P'yongyang.<sup>55</sup>

When Munske returned from Seoul on 27 November, he was accompanied by Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, MacArthur's Chief of Public Health and Welfare. General Sams wanted to visit city hospitals and clinics before going

"Around Thanksgiving, word came up that the Eighth Army was going to launch a general attack all along the front. We were told that theater intelligence believed the Chinese in the area would fall back into Manchuria . . . It looked like this would be the final stage of the war, and that we'd all be home by Christmas. That same night, the night the UN offensive was supposed to be in full swing, all hell broke loose. All that night we were engaged almost continuously in firefights." CPT Sherman Pratt, B Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division.<sup>65</sup>

up to the front where fighting was heavy. The night before, "Bed Check Charlie" (see story on page \*\*\*\*) had bombed K-23 airfield and everyone had been put on alert to defend the city.<sup>56</sup> Although Lieutenant General Walton Walker had formally told everyone that extremely large numbers of Chinese were breaking through Eighth Army lines, Munske calmly reassured his wife, *Don't worry*

## Colonel (Retired) Walton H. "Buck" Walker II

COL(R) Walton H. "Buck" Walker II, the Chief of Strategic Planning, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, is the grandson of General Walton H. Walker, Commander, Eighth U.S. Army in Japan and Korea. His father, General (Retired) Samuel Sims Walker, a company commander in the 24th Infantry Division in Korea, served under his dad and secured the Taedong Highway Bridge during the withdrawal. As a third generation West Pointer, Buck retired after thirty years of service having commanded airborne infantry, Special Forces, and a joint force in Haiti.



*about the Reds shoving us out of P'yongyang. We have British, Filipino, ROK, and American troops here. I'm not worried. UN troops are moving north now. The 7th Infantry Division has reached the Manchurian border and is sitting there.*<sup>57</sup>

The uncertainty of the situation enabled COL Munske to survive an assassination attempt by guerrillas. *It happened about the time of the big UN push to the Yalu River in the northwest. The mayor, police chief, and I were supposed to discuss contingencies in the event a withdrawal became necessary. A group of Communist guerrillas figured to kill all of us. Fortunately, the ROK Counter Intelligence Corps discovered the plot and arrested the ringleaders. The group was 'loaded for bear,' the eleven were packing rifles, pistols, and grenades. One was a trusted police lieutenant.*<sup>59</sup>

Despite most of the heavy fighting taking place in the northern part of Pyongan-Namdo Province, COL Munske and his CA team tried to conduct *business as usual* in order to dispel any thoughts of panic. But, local officials and medical personnel were getting very jittery because when they accepted positions

big group of American prisoners along, trying to get them into China, and shooting and killing them all along the way. Then, we discovered evidence that it was true. We were sent up to help gather evidence for war crimes trials later on. We dug up the American POWs who were shot in the Sunch'on tunnel massacre," related Sergeant William Chambers of EUSA Graves Registration. Fortunately, Lloyd Krieder was not among them.<sup>3</sup>


*The North Koreans force-marched American POWs north, ahead of the UN advance in October 1950. Hundreds died along the way and in temporary prisons, but the remaining POWs taken from Seoul were killed in a tunnel near Sunch'on, north of P'yongyang. War crimes investigators later found mass graves and unburied bodies at the site of the massacre.*



## Notes

- 1 Lloyd Kreider, "Into the Tunnel," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 57–59.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 William Chambers, "Death All Day," in Tomedi, 48–49.





in the government established by us, they automatically signed their death warrants with the Communists. Witness to the long line of troops coming back through P'yongyang, beaten, haggard, and dirty they knew that the Chinese Army had hit U.S. hard and practically destroyed the ROK army. Evacuation was only a matter of time.<sup>60</sup>

On 1 December, during his visit to 8th Army headquarters, COL Munske was told that the 2nd Infantry Division had been "cut to pieces;" only forty percent of the division survived. The 9th Infantry Regiment that had been in P'yongyang had lost sixteen hundred of its assigned two thousand men. General Sams discovered that his son-in-law, a battalion surgeon in the 9th Infantry, had been killed when his aid station had been overrun. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Cavalry Division was hit hard and the U.S. units began to fall back. Munske was told that the EUSA advance headquarters was reestablishing itself east of the Taedong, effectively cutting P'yongyang in half. He was instructed to handle the refugees ("Keep the people out of the Army's way"), to insure that repaired facilities were

On 27 November, UN forces began a costly withdrawal across the Ch'ong-ch'on River. While covering this retreat, the 2nd Infantry Division of IX Corps suffered roughly five thousand casualties and lost most of its artillery as it fought its way through large numbers of Chinese to reach the river and then through the mountain passes south of Kunu-ri.<sup>58</sup>

destroyed, and to use his judgment as to when to leave.<sup>61</sup>

COL Munske gathered the city and province government officials and told them to assemble everyone who worked for the UN governments and UN forces and tell them to prepare to move.<sup>62</sup> Medical and public health personnel, the few remaining Christian missionaries, and the police force were

included. The next day, 2 December, American unit after unit was rushing "pell-mell" through the capital to cross the pontoon bridges while CA was told to stand by. *Military government is a peculiar thing*, observed Munske.<sup>63</sup>

Bed Check Charlie bombed the airfield again that night. On Sunday, 3 December, COL Munske assembled the "official" group of more than two thousand North Korean refugees and personally escorted them across the pontoon bridge to the east side of the river Taedong, and installed them in the old American

Corn Products factory near the railway station. Another one hundred thousand people gathered along the river were warned that the Filipinos guarding the crossing site would



shoot them if they attempted to use the pontoon bridge. The CA team delivered several tons of rice to the factory to feed the "official" group while it waited for its train to safety.<sup>64</sup>

Back at City Hall, COL Munske issued destruction and distribution orders to his team. The two newly built power plants, water system and machinery, printing presses, and Radio P'yongyang, were to be destroyed. Ninety-six crates of South Korean currency plates seized by the Communists in Seoul were loaded aboard trains heading south. The underground weapons factory found hidden in an abandoned lead mine between the towns of Sinchon and Yonam-Ni on the Pallyu River (BV 6346) was destroyed by combat engineers from the 187th ARCT. All freight cars on the west side of the river were rigged for demolition. Rice and millet in the UNCACK warehouse were distributed freely to the city's residents; two tons were placed on the steps of City Hall for people to help themselves.<sup>66</sup>


Shortly after lunch, COL Munske was surprised by an unexpected visitor. Captain Loren E. Davis, chief of the CA Sub-Team at Chinnampo, reported to Munske for instruc-

tions. He had just driven forty miles through guerrilla-controlled territory to collect medical supplies and planned to spend the night in P'yongyang. Munske quickly explained how precarious things were in the city and ordered him to return immediately with his medicines. He was not to await

any further orders from him—leave when the U.S. troops (3rd Logistical Command) left the port. Captain Davis remembered, "I jumped back into my jeep and we set a speed record getting back. Burning up the engines was the least of my concerns."<sup>68</sup>

After making another tour of the deserted city in his jeep, COL Munske had his team pack up in the missionary compound and moved across the river to safety.<sup>69</sup> That night, 3 December, the CA team occupied a hospital building with intact windows, sheltering from the below-freezing conditions. About 2130 hours, the sentry reported a large fire nearby. *Within an hour, they heard small arms begin to pop and explosions became progressively louder until the team realized that mortar and artillery shells were exploding. The nearby ammo dump was on fire. Fragments of iron and steel fell ringing on the roof like*

The 1st Cavalry Division troops charged with the security of P'yongyang had begun to dream of the joys of garrison life in Japan and were more concerned with the proper arrangements for the "Homecoming Parade" in Tokyo than with the persistent stories of Chinese intervention.<sup>54</sup>






## Radio P'yongyang

WHILE COL Munske worked civil assistance in P'yongyang, and CA officers with the divisions and corps dealt with tactical issues, the Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division of G-2, EUSA in Seoul wanted to counter daily Russian and Chinese radio broadcasts into North Korea. Major Tom O. Matthews (pictured) and Captain Max W. Dolcater of G-2 Psywar, UN Command, Tokyo, were dispatched to North Korea. These officers would single-handedly get Radio P'yongyang operational. Intelligence reported that Radio P'yongyang had one Japanese and one Russian transmitter. Both had water-cooled tubes. When Matthews and Dolcater arrived in early November they discovered that key parts of the

Japanese transmitter had been wrecked and little remained of the Russian machine. With some inquiries, they were shown where elements of the Russian transmitter were buried and told that the other parts had been shipped north by rail. Major Matthews flew to Tokyo to scrounge essential parts. While he was gone, Captain Dolcater found the necessary Russian radio parts on some abandoned railway cars near Sunch'on.<sup>1</sup>

A bigger problem was electrical power. A nearby coal mine had supplied fuel for the main P'yongyang power plant, but the miners refused to work without rice. Matthews and Dolcater got themselves appointed official rice officers by COL Munske, and worked with his team to get coal delivered to



MAJ Thomas O. Matthews (pictured) and CPT Max W. Dolcater managed to begin Radio P'yongyang broadcasts shortly before Thanksgiving 1950. In the course of obtaining power for the transmitter, they also restored electricity to the waterworks and a hospital.



This North Korean 100-won note was legal currency during UNCACK's administration of P'yongyang, though five- and ten-won notes were much more common denominations.

heavy hailstones while those hitting the streets shot off sparks.

Suddenly, there was a terrific explosion, far worse than any before, and then all the windows, frames, and sashes blew into the room. The explosion knocked everyone down, and the glass and flying debris

struck, inflicting cuts and bruises, and overturning a heating stove to start a fire. While Dr. Kassel administered first aid, the stove was dragged outside. But, before anyone could recover, the building was racked by another explosion, louder and bigger than before. Colonel Munske and CPT Stack were physically lifted off the floor and tossed into the makeshift kitchen area. That caused Munske to yell, *Let's get out of here!* and lead everyone out the back door. *The brick buildings across the street were falling down, whole walls were collapsing, so we kept going down deeper into the Korean village. We finally stopped and huddled up, cold as hell, freezing, weather below zero, and a sorry looking lot.* About 0500 hours, a few men went to check the trucks. *Miraculously, not one of our vehicles was touched.*<sup>70</sup>

After dawn, the cold and very disheveled group returned to its old building. The walls were pockmarked with shell craters and splattered with bullet holes. The yard looked like an iron scrap yard, bent and twisted iron all over the place,

including some whole [mortar and artillery] shells which had not exploded. The only visible casualty—a dead dog.<sup>71</sup> A couple officers were sent to the American Corn Products factory to tell the “official” North Korean refugees that no train was coming for them. Only seventeen of the two thousand were still there. The officers told them to leave.<sup>72</sup> The P'yongyang city CA team chief had reached a decision point.

Colonel Munske crossed back over the Taedong to make a final reconnaissance. There was only a British tank company securing the bridgehead. At City Hall only the custodians remained. The building in the missionary compound that housed the EUSA advance headquarters contained only four Signal Corps soldiers awaiting final orders from the Signal Officer. Since there were no telephones and no one else around, COL Munske told them to leave. After burning all the papers in his office that he could not carry, the CA Team chief told the remaining policemen to seek safety across the river. CPT Vangen escorted them across the pontoon bridge while Munske mused.

*I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave. I had completed my mission, but was worried about the other three hundred thousand people still left in the city.* About 85 percent of them were Christians, the largest number being Presbyterian, second largest Methodists, and third were the Catholics. He concluded that he could do nothing more for them and drove to the pontoon bridge, where the final calamity awaited him.<sup>73</sup>

At the bridge, MAJ Sullivan, commander of the POW military police detachment, stopped him to say that a train for the “official” North Korean refugees and the remaining eight hundred political prisoners in the jail had just arrived to take them to Chinnampo. Captain Gerard was dispatched to the prison where he found that the guards had run away with



the city power plant. To their surprise, these efforts to get Radio P'yongyang on the air also restored electricity to the waterworks and a hospital.<sup>2</sup> A few days before Thanksgiving 1950, Radio P'yongyang began broadcasting on 855 kilocycles (kc), but its signal varied from 830 to 880. By then Radio Seoul had also resumed broadcasting on 860 kc.<sup>3</sup>

The UN Command broadcast themes for Radio P'yongyang in November 1950—"Relief, rehabilitation, unification for Korea," "Democracy, how it works, and ROK Constitution," "Soviet Obstruction," and "Stragglers"—fell off after the Chinese attacks. By the end of November, they had been replaced by themes that emphasized "Chinese Intervention," "Soviet tyranny, lies, and oppression," "Refugees," and "UN determination and ultimate victory."

Limited electricity reduced the North Korean broadcasts to nightly thirty and sixty-minute periods: 2200-2230 hours, 2300-2400 hours. Essentially, the second period was a rebroadcast of "North Korean News and Commentary."<sup>4</sup>

#### Russian Daily Broadcasts to Korea

0800 to 0830 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)  
0900 to 0930 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)  
1130 to 1200 hrs on 10 frequencies (6 short-wave)  
1245 to 1315 hrs on 13 frequencies (9 short-wave)  
1500 to 1530 hrs on 13 frequencies (9 short-wave)  
2100 to 2130 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short-wave)  
2230 to 2300 hrs on 8 frequencies (4 short wave)

#### Radio Peking Daily Broadcast to Korea

One hour in Korean (short-wave)<sup>5</sup>

### Notes

- 1 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960): 91.
- 2 Ibid., 83-84.

3 Ibid., 91.

4 Dolcater, 31-32, 39-40. Long-range and short-wave frequencies were different for each broadcast to preclude enemy jamming. This tactic created major problems for the listener who had to constantly change frequencies every half hour. As Major Tom Matthews and Captain Max Dolcater worked to get Radio P'yongyang operational, the 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, recently arrived in Tokyo, sent officers and soldiers throughout recently repatriated South Korea to rebuild stations. Captain Robert A. Leadley, lieutenants Ernest H. Luick, William Eilers, and Robert J. Morris, and corporals Devere D. Doerr and Arnold Tepfer covered South Korea, getting stations back on the air and then back into the network. Hansen, 85.

5 Captain Max W. Dolcater, "Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations," Undated Report to Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section, GHQ, Far East Command in Murray Dyer, *Strategic Radi Psywar in FEC, ORO-T-4 (FEC)* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 31 January 1951): 26-27.

the keys. As a parting gesture, CPT Gerard and the police delivered bags of rice to each cell for the inmates and helped the few remaining "official" refugees aboard their train. During Munske's last check of I Corps Headquarters, two civilian assistance officers asked to join him. Then, he met a patrol that told him that the Chinese were only four miles from the city. With only a British tank company between them and the approaching Communists, COL Munske led his convoy out of the city on the afternoon of 4 December 1950.<sup>74</sup>

The UN civil assistance to P'yongyang ended when COL Munske and his CA convoy joined the thousands of refugees headed south along the main P'yongyang-Seoul road. The Chinnampo CA team did not depart North Korea until 6 December, when a naval covering force of two Australian, one American, and three Canadian destroyers escorted the ammunition ships and the landing ship tank carrying the CA team out of the river estuary.<sup>75</sup> Since the I Corps Advance at Sinmak had no wire or radio communications to contact the CA Sub-Team at Haeju, a light airplane was sent to tell them to withdraw to Seoul.<sup>76</sup>

The CA team made quite a caravan when it departed P'yongyang. The October convoy of three jeeps, one 1¼-ton truck, one 2½-ton (six-by-six) truck and a Korean civilian truck had grown to five jeeps, two 1¼-ton trucks, one 2½-ton truck, and four Russian trucks—loaded down with equipment plus rice, gasoline, clothing, refugees, and two geese. We had to leave the horse behind—couldn't get him on the truck. We looked like Delaney Street on the move. No one had washed or shaved for three days. All vehicle side curtains had been removed and the windows knocked out. Every officer, soldier, and civilian had their weapons pointed out as they 'ran the gauntlet' through guerrilla-held territory. It was quite a 'gypsy' caravan.<sup>77</sup>


At 1500 hours on 5 December 1950, Radio Tokyo (Broadcast-

ing Corporation of Japan) announced the official UN abandonment of P'yongyang. This was not broadcast on Psywar radio because it was not an official communiqué. Instead, on the night of 5 December, Psywar radio, limited to the UN Command directives, reported that "United Nations forces continued to consolidate defensive positions south of P'yongyang."<sup>78</sup>

Sometime on 7 December 1950, COL Munske and his team reached Seoul. His team was disbanded and the officers sent to handle refugee problems. Colonel Munske was sent to Taegu on 9 December because *if the Eighth Army retreats any further, this city will become the headquarters, and that is why I am here. I was ordered to set up a rear echelon head-*

*I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave.—COL Charles R. Munske, P'yongyang, 4 December 1950*

Photo courtesy of Judy Munske





"When we withdrew through P'yongyang, the company passed a railroad spur where I counted thirty-two new Pershing tanks on flat cars. Soldiers were thrusting thermite grenades down their gun muzzles. It made me sick! And, when my first sergeant, Mitchell, and Sergeant Jim Huber were confronted by the major responsible for burning a heaping pile of winter clothing, they held a carbine on him while they loaded the truck, and were gone before reinforcements arrived." CPT Norman Allen, I Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.<sup>67</sup>



*U.S. and South African Air Force F-51 Mustangs were flying out of P'yongyang's East Airfield (K-23) by mid-November 1950. The F-51 squadrons had just completed their move to K-23 on 22 November when the Chinese offensive forced them to displace south after only ten days in the north. The F-51s never missed a day of air strikes, but the squadrons did destroy and abandon considerable equipment when they left P'yongyang.*



*As UN troops withdrew from P'yongyang in the face of the Chinese offensive, they were forced to leave behind valuable equipment and supplies. In order to keep resources out of enemy hands, units destroyed vehicles, burned fuel, and generally followed a "scorched earth" policy during the evacuation.*

*quarters, and to write a report on the evacuation of P'yongyang. Truth be known, I think I got too much publicity, and they are shoving me into the background for a while. I was outdrawing the general in newspaper articles, and that's not good.<sup>79</sup>*

Later (14 December 1950), in a letter to his son Richard, COL Munske confided that *despite the excitement at the end I wish that we could have stayed in P'yongyang, for we were really doing a swell job getting things going. Always an optimist, Munske concluded, Now that the whole city has been burnt down, it is going to be much harder to get things going if we ever go back.<sup>80</sup>*

What did the P'yongyang and Pyongdan-Namdo province Civil Assistance Team accomplish during their thirty-seven days in North Korea?

1. By 14 November, one trash truck had been rebuilt from several destroyed ones and was hauling refuse to the dumps. By 1 December, four oxcarts and four horse carts were also in service. Collection of city night soil was restarted with a "honey wagon brigade." Volunteer youth groups cleaned the streets.
2. 3,500 people were immunized against typhus, while 4,000 received smallpox vaccine.
3. Generally speaking, by the time the city was evacuated, law and order was fully established in the city and complete cooperation was being had from all units in the area.
4. Police in Chinnampo were fairly well organized and under the control of the city team.
5. Non-potable water had been brought into the water system and pipelines from wells on the Taedong River islands, but on a strict rationed basis. A CA team "alert detail" with jeeps would rush to the valves in order to allow water to flow into the proper sector when a fire was discovered. One fire engine was rebuilt from the wrecks of three, and a Fire Department was established in late November 1950.
6. North Korean, Russian, Japanese, and American medical supplies and equipment were collected and stored in a central warehouse for distribution throughout the capital and Pyongan-Namdo Province.
7. At Kaesong, Dr. Kassel set up a DDT dusting station. Local health officials were instructed to establish check points along the railroads and highways to dust and inoculate refugees. They agreed to provide certificates to each person processed.
8. Mr. S.A.C. Lord and Dr. A.K. Lee organized the capital into five medical districts with North Korean health officers (one per 10,000 people) charged with the prevention and control of infectious diseases. Almost thirty male and female indigenous DDT dusting teams were organized and equipped to dust people; fumigate suspect homes; and inspect barbershops, restaurants, cafes, food-preparing premises, and bath houses.
9. The buried machinery for the Central Water Works was located, recovered, and reinstalled about the time the two rebuilt local thermal power plants began producing electricity. The overhead viaduct and pipeline to carry water from the island pumping station



was reconstructed the day before the evacuation.

10. All the personnel in the six orphanages in P'yongyang (245 children) were DDT dusted on 14 November, and medical and food supplies provided to all. Before evacuating, each was given a one month supply of food.
11. Food was plentiful. Insufficient transportation to distribute coal and salt was the biggest issue.
12. Two standby power plants were put into operation: one at the Sandong Coal Mine by U.S. Air Force engineers (822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion assigned to the 20th Air Force) and the other at the American Corn Products Refinery Company plant. A U.S. Navy power barge was brought to provide electrical power at Chinnampo.
13. The P'yongyang streetcar system had been repaired and only lacked power.
14. The railway bridge across the Taedong was to be completed by 15 December.
15. The local telephone system was ready for operation when the evacuation was ordered.<sup>81</sup>

Communist forces retook P'yongyang on 5–6 December 1950. Much of the city infrastructure and stockpiled military supplies had been dynamited or burned by U.S., British, and South Korean troops. The British liaison officer at Far East Command reported back to London on what he called “the unusual situation:” U.S. troops having to fight their way back through guerrillas while being harassed by Chinese from the North.<sup>82</sup>

Despite all their frustrations in the process, COL Charles R. Munske in P'yongyang and CPT Loren E. Davis in Chinnampo managed major civil affairs feats in these two North Korean cities, with minimal assistance. Unfortunately, the tide of war radically changed with the massive intervention of the Red Chinese armies. Virtually all signs of progress were explosively demolished as the Eighth U.S. Army withdrew to the 38th parallel and then further south to regroup. Still, this is a tribute to the capabilities of CA officers and soldiers who were tasked to *make civil assistance happen* in North Korea in late 1950, and to today's Civil Affairs soldiers “making it happen” in Afghanistan and Iraq. ♠

*The P'yongyang article would not have been possible without the assistance of Ms. Judy Munske, daughter of COL Charles Munske, who granted me access to her father's papers and family correspondence. Excerpts from his letters and reports enabled this experienced Civil Military Government officer to describe the numerous challenges of restoring order, rebuilding the infrastructure, and caring for the people in the North Korean capital and to share the small triumphs and myriad of frustrations while retaining his optimism.*

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Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. He earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina, and is a retired Army special operations officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and Colombia.

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



*During the retreat from P'yongyang, Army engineers were confronted with the disheartening task of destroying bridges they had so recently repaired or rebuilt. Engineers rigged this bridge near P'yongyang with explosives on 1 December, preparing to blow it once UN troops had passed. This is the bridge guarded by CPT Samuel S. Walker, 24th ID.*



## Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Ernest K. Tabata

USASOC's very own Ernest K. Tabata remembers attending the Bob Hope Show in P'yongyang as a lowly PFC demolition man with the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. After serving with the 11th Airborne Division in the mid-1950s, Tabata soon transferred his demolition skills to U.S. Special Forces, where he served for twenty years. He retired in 1981 as a Command Sergeant Major, after thirty years of service. Still unable to give up blowing up bridges, he has been teaching engineers at the Special Warfare Center and School since 1984. He still remembers the Bob Hope Show in P'yongyang with fondness; it was almost as fun as watching trains being driven off the Taedong River Railroad Bridge during the evacuation.



Pulitzer Prize-winning photo by Max Desfor, Associated Press.

*The impending Chinese invasion sent millions of North Koreans south. Refugees from P'yongyang streamed across the remains of the Taedong River Railroad Bridge, climbing twisted girders and balancing on broken railroad ties.*

## Endnotes

- 1 C. Darwin Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51* (Department of Army, Operations Research Office, ORO-T-184, 12 May 1952): 23.
- 2 Charles R. Munske, Chief, P'yongyang and P'yong-dan Province CA Team, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea Forward, North Korea, undated handwritten notes, 19 October-5 December 1950, courtesy of Judy Munske, copies in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Papers.
- 3 Munske Papers; Report on Activities of the Pyongan-Namdo Civil Assistance Team (n.d.), copy in USASOC History Office files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Undated Report.
- 4 Loren E. Davis, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 February 2005, digital recording, USASOC History Office Files, hereafter cited as Davis Interview.
- 5 Munske Papers.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Munske Papers.
- 9 Munske Papers.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Munske Papers.
- 13 Undated Report.
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- 15 Undated Report.
- 16 Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 107.
- 17 Interim Report.
- 18 Undated Report.
- 19 Munske Papers.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Interim Report.
- 23 Munske Papers.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 2 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers.
- 27 Munske Papers.
- 28 Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 2 and 3 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers.
- 29 Interim Report; Undated Report.
- 30 Letter, 2 November 1950. Conditions in Seoul were not much better. Munske said their billets were like a refrigerator and the office was a constant icebox. Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 24 October 1950, copy in Munske Papers.
- 31 Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Letter, 3 November 1950; Undated Report.
- 34 Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Team, Pyongan-Namdo Province, APO 301, undated report (presumably the 30 November 1950 monthly activities report promised by Munske in his 12 November 1950 Interim Report), copy in Munske Papers.
- 35 Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 9 and 12 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers; Undated Report; Gordon Walker, "Political Vacuum Jars Pyongyang: Chaos Balks Interim Unit," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 1950: "The EUSA has set up a local civil assistance team of six officers which is now attempting to establish an interim civil government. But it lacks detailed instructions, personnel, and the ability to enforce what orders it puts out."
- 36 Interim Report; Letter, 3 November 1950.
- 37 Letter, 7 November 1950; Undated Report.
- 38 Interim Report; Letter, 3 November 1950.
- 39 Interim Report.



- 40 Undated Report.
- 41 Letter, 9 November 1950.
- 42 Letter, 12 November 1950.
- 43 Undated Report.
- 44 Interim Report; Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Command Public Safety Office, P'yongyang City Police Training Camp, 1st Term Graduation Ceremony dated 0900 12 November 1950; Letter, 12 November 1950; Undated Report.
- 45 Undated Report.
- 46 Interim Report; *Public Notice* dated 13 November 1950, and *Public Notice* #2 dated 26 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers.
- 47 Private Hal Gamble, "UN Government Work Above Parallel," *Stars and Stripes*, 7 November 1950.
- 48 Undated Report.
- 49 Interim Report; *Public Notice*; *Public Notice* #2. The water supply of P'yongyang was obtained from a series of wells on sand bars in the Taedong River. These wells were necessary because the river froze in the winter. Crawford F. Sams, "Medic": *The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartorn Korea* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998): 231.
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*UN Command kept refugees off the main roads for tactical reasons, so millions of North Koreans filtered south through the hills and valleys on cart tracks and footpaths, fleeing the Chinese "hordes" invading from the north.*





# Helicopters in the Korean War:

## The Rescue of Virginia 1

by Kenn Finlayson


**I**N the world of special operations, combat search and rescue of troops requiring evacuation from behind enemy lines is one of the primary missions given to helicopter crews. The rescue of three Americans by Navy helicopters from behind North Korean lines in March 1951 is one of the earliest combat search and rescue missions on record. The rescue of Virginia 1 ended a star-crossed operation with the successful evacuation of three operatives, unfortunately at the expense of one helicopter and the internment of two Americans. Like the mission itself, the rescue was one of great bravery in the face of extreme odds.

One of the primary objectives of the Eighth Army staff in late 1950 was the interdiction of the enemy's southern supply lines. Two major rail networks supplied the Communist forces in the field: one ran from China through P'yongyang and down to Seoul, while the other ran from the Russian port of Vladivostok south along the east coast

to the port of Wonsan. At Wonsan, where the rail lines divided into the main Ch'orwan-Seoul line and had a secondary spur running from Ch'orwan to Ch'unch'on-Wonju. Movement along these rail lines needed to be stopped.

Aerial bombardment by United Nations (UN) aircraft took a significant toll on the movement of supplies from China on the P'yongyang-Seoul route, where long stretches of flat, open terrain provided ample opportunity for the destruction of the rail lines and roads. By January of 1951, only half the supplies and seven of ten replacements that left China were reaching the armies south of Seoul.<sup>1</sup> Air interdiction of the eastern route was markedly less successful.

On the Wonsan to Wonju corridor, steep, angular mountains and deep narrow valleys protected the rail and road networks from direct assault by the UN aircraft. North Korean and Chinese Army engineers were typically able to rapidly repair the small sections the aircraft could access, and the



*The 2nd Platoon, 4th Ranger Company in Korea. Pucel and Watson, who volunteered for Virginia 1 came out of 2nd Platoon.*





*Allied bombardment of rail lines took a heavy toll on North Korean movement of supplies in the west. In the east, air interdiction was less effective.*

flow of supplies was barely interrupted. More than 70 percent of supplies and nine out of ten replacements were able to move down the east coast routes to reinforce the frontline forces.<sup>2</sup> The Eighth Army planners looked for other vulnerable spots to try to slow down the flow of materials to the enemy.

The rail routes out of Wonsan ran through numerous tunnels as the rail line weaved among the mountains on its way south. Several of these tunnels were within striking distance of the coast. An early attempt at attacking the tunnels occurred when Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines accompanied by U.S. Navy underwater demolition team personnel landed south of Wonsan and detonated charges in a tunnel edging the coast. The team returned intact with two prisoners, but within two days a temporary rail line was in place, bypassing the blocked tunnel.<sup>3</sup> A more remote, less easily repaired tunnel was the answer, and the tunnel at Hyon-ni, thirty miles inland, met the criteria. The mission to drop the tunnel fell to the Eighth Army G-3 Miscellaneous Division, where Colonel (COL) John H. McGee was in charge of training partisan forces for operations behind the North Korean lines.

An unexpected by-product of the North Korean and Chinese drive south following the Chinese entry into the war was the large number of anticommunist refugees that fled before the advancing armies. Despite living under Communist rule since 1945, many thousands of North Koreans took advantage of the dislocation and chaos of the war to make their way south. This large pool of manpower enabled the UN Far East Command to expand its ability to conduct clandestine operations behind enemy lines. The program grew from one of small, localized incursions to a comprehensive campaign of sabotage and raids throughout the Korean peninsula.


By July 1951, after six months of superhuman effort, McGee established an organization that ultimately employed several thousand partisans on both coasts. The 8086th Army Unit (8086th AU) fielded partisan forces on both coasts. Leopard Base, which supported fifteen partisan units called "Donkeys," was located on the western islands north of In'chon. The CIA-supported Task Force Kirkland operated offshore on the East Coast, near Wonsan. A third element, Baker Section, was responsible for training air-

borne partisan forces for sabotage behind the enemy lines, and it was to this element that McGee looked to support the sabotage of Hyon-ni Tunnel. Unfortunately, time for proper preparation for this complex mission did not exist.

On 25 January 1951, the Eighth Army initiated Operation THUNDERBOLT—a strong reconnaissance in force against the Chinese XIII Army Group arrayed in front of the UN forces south of Seoul. The operation was designed to push north as far as the Han River.<sup>4</sup> By 3 February, the UN forces had progressed up to the south bank of the Han, where the advance halted short of trying to take the capital city of Seoul. A second phase pushed the advance in the eastern sector further north by mid-February. General Ridgway followed up the success of THUNDERBOLT with Operation KILLER, a methodical advance across a sixty-mile wide sector of the front east of Seoul between Yangp'yong and Ch'angdong-ni. This operation was designed to inflict the maximum number of casualties on the enemy.<sup>5</sup> These operations depended on the Allies slowing the flow of supplies and reinforcements to the Communist forces and necessitated the immediate execution of the plan to sabotage Hyon-ni Tunnel. The plan went by the name Virginia 1.

The concept of Virginia 1 began with an airborne insertion of a team of American and ROK soldiers into the mountains south of Hyon-ni. The team would move up the ridgelines to a position above the railroad tunnel and, after a reconnaissance, set charges at each end of the tunnel, closing it to traffic from both ends. The exit route took the team thirty miles southeast towards the coast. The evacuation plan called for a pickup on the coast by boat. The alternative plan for pickup, code-named Dallas, called for aerial evacuation by Navy helicopters stationed on ships off the coast of Wonsan. The entire mission was supposed to be completed in thirty-six hours.

Colonel McGee realized that the partisan forces in training in Baker Section would not be ready to successfully execute a mission like the sabotage of the railroad tunnel. He turned to the ROK Army Officer Candidate School for volunteers with combat experience for his plan. Forty-four volunteers







*Corporal Edward Pucel with other members of 4th Ranger Company prior to his volunteering to join Virginia 1.*

were selected and the group was divided in half for training in sabotage and airborne operations. The Eighth Army G-3 selected 15 March 1951 as the execution date for the mission, leaving five weeks for Baker section to prepare the Koreans.<sup>6</sup>

Airborne training was conducted at K-3 Air Base in Kijaing on the outskirts of Pusan. McGee's Miscellaneous Section took over the former Eighth Army Ranger training facility and turned it into a site for airborne training. Former Ranger training cadres were retained as instructors, as all were airborne qualified. The training for the section sent to K-3 ended with the first training jump. The pilot miscalculated his approach and the drop zone control party underestimated the force of the winds. As a result, the jumpers landed among frozen rice paddies several hundred yards off the temporary airstrip that was the drop zone. As strong wind gusts blew the jumpers across the uneven ground, eleven suffered broken bones and nine more were seriously bruised. After this incident, this section's training was cancelled and twenty of the twenty-two men ultimately returned to the ROK Army officer candidate academy. Two remained and were later sent on other clandestine missions.<sup>7</sup>

After the debacle with the airborne training, it was determined that the second section would receive four weeks of intensive training in sabotage and demolitions at the center in Pusan and not conduct any airborne training. The director of the sabotage school was British Special Air Service Captain Ellery Anderson, a former Special Operations Executive operative in World War II. During that war, airborne training for partisans was reduced to a day of ground training and then the actual mission jump onto the objective. Anderson adopted a similar program for the ROK volunteers for Virginia 1.<sup>8</sup>

For Americans to lead the mission, COL McGee turned to the Army Ranger companies. The 4th U.S. Army Ranger Infantry Company provided four volunteers on 15 February 1951. The men were interviewed by COL McGee and accepted for the mission. The four men—Corporal (CPL) Martin Watson, CPL Edward Pucel, CPL William T. Miles, and Private First Class (PFC) Raymond E. Baker—possessed a wealth of experience.<sup>9</sup> CPL Watson served with the Rangers in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy during World War II. Captured by the Germans at Monte Cassino, he earned a reputation as a difficult prisoner and an escape threat. Pucel was in the Office of Strategic Services and conducted clandestine operations behind the lines in Yugoslavia and Greece. Baker was a former World War II Marine and a specialist in amphibious landings. He had recently been reduced from sergeant for a fight with an infantry lieutenant. Miles' combat experience stemmed from his time in Korea. Miles and Pucel were demolitions specialists, Watson was a master of escape and evasion, and Baker was a communications expert.<sup>10</sup>

A talented team, the Americans reported on 5 March 1951 to the Eighth Army Aerial Delivery Detachment (an element of Baker Section) at K-3 in Pusan, and began receiving their in-briefings on the target area.<sup>11</sup> They finally linked up with their Korean counterparts when the ROK soldiers returned to K-3 on 13 March from their airborne training, only fifty-two hours before the time designated for execution of the mission.<sup>12</sup> The Rangers initially requested a pathfinder team to prepare the drop zone, but the Eighth Army planners felt this provided too much chance of a compromise, so the night jump would be executed on an unmarked drop zone in the middle of the Korean winter.

On 15 March 1951, the team loaded aboard a C-47 aircraft from the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron. The "Kyushu Gypsies" planned a circuitous route to the target located about 250 miles northeast of Pusan which took three hours to navigate. Due to the removal of the side cargo door for the airborne jump, the team was exposed to the sub-zero wind-chill for the entire flight. By the time they had to jump, the frozen Rangers and their airsick Korean counterparts were only too happy to exit the aircraft.

The team dropped over a mountain meadow misidentified as the drop zone, leaving it several miles away from the correct location. Further complicating its efforts to assemble, high winds scattered the jumpers over a wide area approximately eight miles from Hyon-ni. Miraculously, no one was injured on the jump, but the team was widely dispersed on both sides of the three thousand-foot mountains south of the objective.

*The heavy cruiser USS St. Paul was the flagship of the UN Task Group off the coast.*



*A flight of twelve Corsairs from the USS Coral Sea provided close air support to Virginia 1.*



Gale force winds battered the men as they struggled through deep snow to reach the designated rally point above Hyon-ni.

It took three days for the full team to finally assemble at the rally point. Frozen batteries in the radio prevented contact with the resupply aircraft circling overhead, and the poor visibility nullified the effectiveness of the recognition panels the men emplaced. Despite the difficulties of their situation, the men moved into position on the ridge above Hyon-ni and conducted an initial reconnaissance of the objective.

Dressed in North Korean winter uniforms and carrying Russian weapons, the reconnaissance team moved off the ridge and reconnoitered the tunnel. It quickly became obvious the mission could not be accomplished, as both ends of the tunnel were heavily defended. A Chinese railroad repair battalion was established in the vicinity of the tunnel and sandbagged bunkers guarded both ends. The reconnaissance team quickly returned to the rally point.<sup>13</sup>

Under Watson's leadership, the Virginia 1 team reviewed its options and decided to follow the planned evacuation route to the east coast. Along its route lay the railroad tunnel at Samdae-ri, which offered an inviting target. Movement towards the tunnel was laborious as the team moved through deep snow laden with heavy loads of explosives, radios, and batteries. The team reached the vicinity of Samdae-ri Tunnel on the 23rd, only to find this tunnel also fortified and in use as an air raid shelter. Faced with another impossible target, the team buried its explosives, set a 48-hour time-delay to detonate the cache, and moved on towards the coast for pickup.<sup>14</sup> Despite the length of the mission, a rescue still awaited the team if it could make its way to the rendezvous point.

First Lieutenant Kingston Winget of Baker Section departed Pusan on 8 March aboard a British destroyer that steamed north to join the UN Task Group off the coast near Wonsan. On arrival he transferred to the HMS *Alacrity* and, beginning on the 17th, Winget and a crew spent each freezing night in a small boat bobbing off the beach in hopes of extracting Virginia 1.<sup>15</sup>

The Virginia 1 team moved south to intersect an east-west trail that would take it to its rendezvous at the coast. Over ten miles and two mountain ranges lay between the team and its pickup point, and it was still unable to establish radio contact. Nevertheless, the team made steady progress, and on the 25th it reached the top of the final pass on its way to the coast. It was here that a second severe Siberian storm rolled in and pinned the team in a small hut until the evening of the 27th.

The morning of the 28th saw a change in weather, with a south wind and steadily rising temperatures. The melt-



*The Sikorsky HO3S was the Navy's primary helicopter during the early years for rescue missions in Korea.*

ing snow and overflowing streams prevented cross-country movement, so CPL Miles set the radio batteries out to warm in the sun. On the 29th, he tried to establish radio contact and suddenly raised an airborne Forward Air Controller from the 7th Infantry Division located sixty miles to the south.<sup>16</sup> The Division alerted all frontline units to be watching for Virginia 1 to pass through, and alerted Eighth Army of the contact. Four hours later, Captain Eugene Perry from Baker Section was over the area in a C-47 communicating with Miles.

The extended broadcast required to relay the team's location in code alerted the North Koreans to the presence of Virginia 1. Soon enemy units were moving in from both ends of the ridgeline, cutting the team off from the coast and the awaiting pickup boat. The rescue would have to come by air. On board the USS *St. Paul*, the flagship of the UN Task Group, the message came to execute contingency plan Dallas to rescue Virginia 1.

In early 1951, helicopters and pilots were a scarce commodity on the Korean peninsula. The Navy had six of the early Sikorsky HO3S model aircraft with the UN Task Group. Two of the aircraft were on the carrier *Coral Sea*, two on the *St. Paul*, one on Landing Ship Tank (LST) 799, and one on the Japanese-manned LST Q-007.<sup>17</sup> At the time the call came to evacuate the Virginia 1 team, only three of the birds were available. The two carrier-based helicopters were held in readiness for the rescue of downed pilots, and one of the aircraft on the *St. Paul* was undergoing repairs. With only three helicopters available, three trips each were required to get the entire team out.

The Sikorsky HO3S helicopter was a mainstay in the post-war Navy, and was the primary rotary-wing aircraft in service during the Korean War. With a top speed of ninety miles per hour, three passengers could ride in the aircraft along with the lone pilot. A hydraulically operated hoist provided three hundred pounds of lifting capability using the "horse-collar" sling that was standard for air/sea rescues.<sup>18</sup> However, the altitude of the pickup point and fuel weight restricted the pilots to carrying two Americans or three ROKs in each lift.

LST 799 cruised near the coast and became the launching point for the rescue. The helicopter from LST Q-007 landed



*Corporal Martin Watson volunteered for Virginia 1. He was subsequently captured and spent the war in captivity.*



*The standard method of rescue utilized the horse-collar and hoist depicted in this photo.*

on LST 799 on the evening of the 29th, and the third helicopter from the *St. Paul* joined them at dawn on the 30th. After refueling, the three helicopters lifted off at 7:45 A.M. for the twenty-mile trip to the pickup site on the ridge. The aircraft were joined en route by a flight of twelve F4U Corsairs from the USS *Coral Sea*, which provided air cover and close air support during the mission. Over the pickup site, a C-47 circled and the helicopters made radio contact. It was then that they learned that the team was under heavy attack on the ridge, and that the pilots had the option to abort the rescue attempt if they felt it was too risky.<sup>19</sup> Following a short conversation among the pilots, they elected to continue.

Lieutenant Junior Grade John H. Thornton, the senior pilot, made the first run over the ridge, circling twice to pinpoint the team. The top of the ridge was roughly half the size of a football field and the sides fell away steeply, precluding a landing. Vicious air currents and updrafts swirled around the ridgeline, and on his first attempt Thornton was unable to hold a hover long enough to bring his hoist into operation.<sup>20</sup> He flew off the ridge into a valley and attempted to ride a thermal current up the ridge "like an escalator."<sup>21</sup>

The smooth ascent was abruptly interrupted when he flew through a force of five hundred North Koreans, who, despite the intense bombardment from the Corsairs, had worked their way up to the crest of the ridge. Small arms fire tore through Thornton's helicopter and as it reached the top of the ridge, the aircraft staggered and crashed onto the crest, rolling violently down the slope. Thornton jumped out of the left side window, sustaining broken ribs when the wheel hit him as the helicopter rolled down the slope.<sup>22</sup>

Collecting his bearings, Thornton crawled down the slope to the helicopter and retrieved the horse collar and worked his way back up the slope to the team. The intensity of the small arms fire increased as the North Koreans pressed closer around Virginia 1 and its new arrival. At the top, Thornton found CPL Watson directing his team and talking on a portable radio. As Watson assembled his remaining men for extraction, Thornton directed the second helicopter over the site. A stinging run by the Corsairs raining napalm and cannon fire on the North Koreans temporarily held the enemy at bay, and the helicopter winched up Pucel and then Baker. With no more lift at the high altitude, the bird moved off the site and headed back for the LST with the two Rangers on board.<sup>23</sup>

Once the second helicopter left the area, the remaining helicopter moved over the site and Thornton hooked up Miles in the collar. A fusillade of enemy fire broke out of the tree line as the North Koreans outflanked Virginia 1's defensive perimeter and poured bullets onto the men at the site. Miles was hit in the face and slumped in the collar. Rounds slammed into the hovering helicopter, disabling the winch. Unable to raise Miles on the cable, the pilot abruptly pulled up and headed off down the mountain with the wounded American still dangling on the cable. Flying away from the site, the pilot bravely landed the helicopter deep in enemy territory, unhooked the wounded Ranger and loaded him aboard. His daring act saved Miles' life and enabled him to pass on valuable intelligence gathered during the overland journey.<sup>24</sup>

On the ridge, the North Koreans pressed home their attack and only Watson, Thornton, and five ROK soldiers were able to break out of the encirclement and escape the area. With their radio destroyed in the melee, they could not contact anyone for an alternate pickup. Eventually, the two Americans became separated from the ROKs, who may have felt their chances were better without the two Americans in tow. Two of the ROK soldiers did eventually reach the UN forces, but they were executed by the South Korean Army when it was learned that they had been captured and agreed to spy for the North.<sup>25</sup> After a week, Thornton and Watson also split up and attempted to work their way south to the UN lines separately.

After evading capture for ten days, Thornton was finally caught by the North Koreans about ten miles north of the UN front lines as he made his way along a ridgeline above the town of Yangu.<sup>26</sup> He endured three years of unrelenting torture and abuse at various North Korean prison camps before being one of the last American prisoners of war released on 6 September 1953 during Operation BIG SWITCH.<sup>27</sup>

The village of Yangu also proved the undoing for CPL Watson. Watson was captured less than five miles from the UN frontlines when he bumped into a North Korean patrol



after passing Yangu.<sup>28</sup> During his incarceration by the Germans in World War II, Watson proved an intractable prisoner, constantly attempting escape. The intervening years failed to mellow him in this regard, and the Ranger gained a reputation as the most obstinate of prisoners. As a captured intelligence agent, he suffered horrific torture as the North Koreans tried to break him. He ultimately survived three years as a prisoner of war and was the last American released over the Freedom Bridge during Operation BIG SWITCH.<sup>29</sup>

Virginia 1's mission ultimately proved to be beyond the capabilities of the men of Baker Section. Complexity, lack of intelligence, adverse weather, and a constrained time schedule eventually overcame the bravery and endurance of the team. The heroic efforts of the Navy helicopter pilots did result in the rescue of three of the Americans and the valuable intelligence they had gathered. In spite of Virginia 1's difficulties, the value of helicopters in special operations was assured. ▲

*Dr. Finlayson would like to acknowledge the assistance of COL(Ret) Douglas Dillard in the preparation of this article. COL Dillard has been in the forefront of documenting the contributions of Army Special Operations Forces in the Korean War and in obtaining the recognition due our Korean allies.*

*Kenn Finlayson has been the USAJFKSWCS Command Historian since 2000. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.*



*Lieutenant Junior Grade John H. Thornton survived three years as a POW after his helicopter was shot down during the attempted rescue of Virginia 1. He was repatriated during Operation BIG SWITCH. Thornton later received the Navy Cross.*



*Pucel and Miles on the USS St. Paul on return from the mission. The gunshot wound to Miles face is visible.*

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# “Volunteering” for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea

by Charles H. Briscoe



As an early psychological operations unit, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) fulfilled a unique role in the Korean War. Gerald “Jerry” Allen Rose played a part in this interesting mission as he participated in tactical loudspeaker operations from the fall of 1951 through the summer of 1952. In the course of his ten-month tour with the 1st L&L, Rose rotated from line division to line division across the front every thirty to forty-five days, participated in 253 combat loudspeaker missions, and was awarded the

Bronze Star and two Purple Hearts. While Rose was only one member of the 1st L&L, his story allows us to gain insight into the unit’s activities and its place in history.<sup>1</sup>

Jerry Rose, an Oakland High School graduate with a Bachelor of Arts from the California College of Arts & Crafts, had been drafted in 1951 and sent to Fort Ord, California, for basic infantry training. A college degree and Expert marksmanship ratings with the M1 rifle, the M2 carbine, the .45 pistol, and Browning Automatic Rifle opened Officer Candidate School to the amateur lightweight boxer. However, marching a squad of fellow candidates into the side of a building ended that venture. Rose was quickly back at Fort Ord chasing stockade

work detail escapees, before being shipped off to Japan.

Bored with company clerking at a replacement center in Japan, Private (PVT) Rose, infantryman, volunteered for Korea. Arriving at the embarkation point in early fall, Rose found that the ferry docks in southern Japan were piled high with stocks of winter clothing from wounded and dead Americans. Not having been issued cold weather gear, Rose outfitted himself before getting aboard the ferry to Pusan, Korea.

The crossing to Pusan was uneventful, but “ten miles off-

shore, I got the first whiff of burning feces and trash. It was unforgettable,” remembered Rose, “because that smell was a constant in Korea.”<sup>3</sup> At Pusan, Rose found himself in a holding company with other replacements awaiting transportation at the railroad terminus. Several nights later, PVT Rose was aboard a train traveling north when it stopped “in the middle of nowhere at 3 AM.” The stop proved to be the start of a tactical Psychological Warfare (Psywar) assignment for Jerry Rose.

While the train was at a halt, a soldier entered the darkened railroad car and asked if anyone had training in psychology. Rose, who had taken a basic psychology course in college, said, “I have,” violating for a second time (officer candidate school being the first) the old Army adage, “Never volunteer for anything.” After spending a night at “Fort Apache,” a training and logistics site south of Taegu, the shanghaied Rose was put on a train to Seoul.

Arriving in Seoul, Rose was met by another soldier in a quarter-ton four-by-four truck (jeep), and taken to the 1st L&L headquarters in an old high school on the north side of Seoul. The company clerk of the 1st L&L had his replacement—Rose.<sup>4</sup> Later, Rose discovered that this technique was used by the 1st L&L to get choice replacements, and was why more than half of the enlisted men were drafted college graduates in spite of the company not having priority fill for school-trained Psywar soldiers.<sup>5</sup>

Private Rose was soon introduced to the company commander, Major (MAJ) Donald W. Osgood; the executive officer (XO), Captain (CPT) Jay V. Russell; and the First Sergeant, Master Sergeant Frank L. Reppen. Reppen was a Finn captured in the Russo-Finnish War (1937–38) who had been repatriated by the Germans for service in an ethnic SS (*Schutzstaffel*) battalion. After surrendering to American forces, Reppen elected to join the U.S. Army as a way to get U.S. citizenship.<sup>6</sup> Major Osgood was a WWII veteran of the European theater. Russell, the unit XO and former loudspeaker platoon leader, had commanded ammunition and labor, infantry, and cavalry reconnaissance platoons in the 25th Infantry Division from Guadalcanal to the Philippines, and had graduated from the Alamo Scout school. First Lieutenant (1LT) Richard L.



*“The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company was the first unit of its kind to serve in combat. For almost three years, the 1st L&L provided psychological warfare support to the U.S. Army, Marines, and United Nations forces in Korea.”<sup>2</sup>*





*The 1st L&L used an old high school on the north side of Seoul for its headquarters.*

Keator, the 1st L&L's Loudspeaker Platoon leader, commanded a rifle platoon in Europe toward the end of WWII.<sup>7</sup> Such disparate military backgrounds for personnel assigned to Psywar was typical in the post-WWII period. Few officers and enlisted men had experience or schooling in psychological operations.

The 1st L&L evolved from a Technical Information Detachment (TID) of four officers and twenty enlisted men stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. The TID was the Psywar detachment of Aggressor Force for Army maneuvers countrywide.<sup>8</sup> Shortly after the North Koreans invaded the South, the detachment was alerted for Korea and notified that it would become an Army Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company under Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 20-77 dated 1 September 1950. The TID packed its equipment and left Fort Riley on 9 September. They shipped from Seattle on 15 September aboard a U.S. Navy troopship carrying military families to Japan. Told that their equipment would meet them in Korea, the 1st L&L cadre of twenty boarded the Pusan ferry in Yokohama, Japan, on 15 October, bound for Eighth U.S. Army in Taegu, Korea (EUSAK).<sup>9</sup>

On 4 November 1950, the 1st L&L was activated with an authorized complement of eight officers, ninety-nine enlisted men, three printing presses, twelve loudspeakers, and twenty-seven vehicles. The unit was placed under the administrative control of Eighth Army Special Troops Command and the operational control of the G-2 EUSAK. No special arrangements were made by EUSAK, nor priorities given, for language-qualified personnel or other Psywar specialties and unique equipment.

First L&L cadre spent the next several months locating TID equipment and getting it shipped from Japan to Korea, requisitioning—legally and illegally—TO&E equipment: printing presses, jeeps, trailers, generators, loudspeakers, and tents. They also spent their time recruiting personnel, writing tactical Psywar operating procedures, hiring interpreters from Korean universities, and selling tactical Psywar concepts to the corps and divisions of EUSAK. It was April 1951 before the company was combat effective, and nine loudspeaker teams were dispatched to the divisions on

line. By the end of June 1951, the company had eleven loudspeaker teams in action.<sup>10</sup>

The 1st L&L's general TO&E mission was to conduct tactical propaganda operations for a field army, and to provide qualified psychological warfare specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs. The company's primary tools for tactical propaganda dissemination against the enemy were leaflets, news sheets, and loudspeakers. The 1st L&L was also capable of using propaganda to influence friendly elements (civilians) in enemy-held territory contiguous to the army front.<sup>11</sup>

Psywar operations and requirements during the initial months of 1951 far exceeded the capabilities of the original 1950 TO&E. Change 1 to the TO&E, dated 24 April 1951, authorized a 25 percent enlisted over-strength. By the time Rose joined 1st L&L,

the company headquarters supported three operational platoons: Propaganda, Publications, and Loudspeaker.<sup>12</sup>

The Loudspeaker (L/S) Platoon consisted of four officers and twenty-nine enlisted personnel, although the usual officer complement was three. The platoon officers spent most of their time getting support—administrative, logistics, and maintenance—for the eleven L/S teams spread across the East-West front. Each of the L/S platoon's three sections had three to four L/S teams assigned based on tactical employment in the corps sectors. L/S teams were supposed to be "tightly knit three-man units" consisting of a Team Chief, Assistant Team Chief, and a local civilian employee (Korean or Chinese, depending on the audience) who served as the translator-announcer-linguist. The L/S team mission was to:

1. Persuade isolated groups of enemy personnel in tactically untenable positions to surrender by means of live or recorded, semi-fixed ground, patrol and/or mobile tank-mounted loudspeaker broadcasts;
2. Beam broadcasts, musical, and feature programs by means of platoon's primary psychological warfare medium to enemy front line troops in static tactical situations;
3. Beam warnings and make loudspeaker announcements to civilians in enemy-held territory, in coordination with friendly elements;




*Far East Command*




*Eighth U.S. Army*

*Under oversight of the Far East Command, Eighth U.S. Army was responsible for U.S. forces in Korea during the Korean War*



*Loudspeaker teams were equipped with a Public Address Set AN/UIQ-1 or a Beachmaster loudspeaker, a Recorder-Reproducer RD74/U (in lieu of a RD 31C/U), a Multimeter TS-352/U, a spool dispenser for a reel of WD-1 wire, a quarter-ton four-by-four truck (jeep), a quarter-ton trailer, a Generator PE-75, a small wall or Arctic "hex" tent and stove (tent or Coleman), and whatever else they could scrounge. Air mattresses were commonly used to cushion the fragile broadcasting equipment.*

Photos courtesy of Jay V. Russell





4. Broadcast news, make announcements, and participate in other consolidation psychological warfare operations under the direction of Psychological Warfare and/or Civil Affairs/Military Government agencies, as directed.<sup>13</sup>

Clerking at the 1st L&L headquarters, supplemented by occasional Korean culture classes, soon bored Rose the infantryman. The only threat was an occasional small harassment bomb or leaflets dropped after midnight by “Bed Check Charlie” (see page 61), also known as “Piss Call Pete,” a slow (70–90 knots) propeller-driven aircraft that flew low-level missions out of Sariwon Airfield. Rose quickly realized that the L/S teams were the only teams seeing combat.<sup>14</sup> With the knowledge that L/S team members needed no special training, PVT Rose once again formulated a plan to escape clerking.

After being repeatedly badgered by Rose for a field assignment, CPT Russell finally sent now-Private Second Class (PV2) Rose to join Corporal (CPL) William E. Johnson’s L/S team in early December 1951. Johnson’s team was supporting the 24th Infantry Division (24th ID) dug in along the East–West railroad line. PV2 Rose quickly advanced in the three-man unit and became the jeep driver, generator operator/mechanic, and assistant team leader in a matter of days.<sup>15</sup>

The civilian interpreter on each L/S team read the typewritten English scripts and broadcast in Korean and/or Chinese.<sup>16</sup> A 1953 story in *The Stars and Stripes* provided an excellent account of how one Korean interpreter performed his mission:

*The strenuous nightly climb to work was made a little easier for Mr. Kim on this rainy night as three searchlights on the next ridge cast an eerie light. Mr. Kim could barely distinguish the last few steps, but as he gained the top of the mountain, he could see more clearly. He started to set up for the night’s work. First, the generator. Good, he thought, as it started without difficulty. He checked the dial to insure that there was enough power, then connected the “mike,” placed a harmonica to his lips and began the first broadcast of the evening. From a loudspeaker unit, some 300 yards in front of the*

*MLR (main line of resistance), came the strains of a soulful harmonica solo, followed with a resume of the current news in flawless Chinese for the news starved Communists. Thus, an obscure bunker on an isolated mountain once again became the final link in the Psywar chain.<sup>17</sup>*

Security during the broadcasts was provided by the L/S team leader and assistant. They were usually armed with an M2 carbine or M3A1 submachine gun, because access to pistols—.45 caliber automatics—was limited.<sup>18</sup> In his security role, expert sharpshooter PV2 Rose proved himself in combat on his first mission with the 24th ID.

After watching WWII hero Audie Murphy in *The Red Badge of Courage* at an open air theater, CPL Johnson, PV2 Rose, and their interpreter moved to the Combat Outpost Line on Hill 1062 to broadcast into the Chorwon Valley. The combat outpost position had already been overrun several times, and they were to broadcast well in front of it. Wires ran back to the generator in the jeep trailer near the outpost bunker. To enhance their security, CPL Johnson and Rose set up “early warning devices” (wire-suspended C-Ration cans containing small rocks) well in front of their foxhole. With such precautions in place, the interpreter began the broadcast.

The Chinese attack came early in the morning. Alerted by the noise of a rattling can, Rose fired his M3A1 “Grease Gun” at a looming figure charging toward him. As the enemy soldier fell backward, the hand grenade he was carrying exploded. This episode marked the beginning of a major firefight. Artillery and mortar illumination enabled the defenders to drive off the determined Communist attackers. While serving as a Psywar soldier, PV2 Rose had finally attained the status of a “blooded” combat infantryman.<sup>19</sup>

Unbeknownst to the novice Rose, special efforts were being made by the Chinese and North Koreans to capture broadcasting loudspeaker teams. “When they do that [send Hunter Teams to stop the Psywar broadcasting],” one EUSAK official in Seoul observed, “we know we are hurting them.”<sup>20</sup> That rear area assessment provided

*A Chinese or Korean interpreter was part of every loudspeaker team and was responsible for reading prepared scripts addressed to enemy troops or nearby civilians. The American (or two) on each team acted as Team Chief, and was responsible for everything from security to generator repair. In this photo, PFC Wilson, SGT Lawrence O’Brien, and Yang Yunn (left to right) broadcast to the Chinese near Munye-ri.*







Photo courtesy of Jay V. Russell

*As the Main Line of Resistance stabilized, the frontline divisions dug in and established prepared positions. This relative permanency allowed loudspeaker teams to broadcast from one location for several days at a time, a heretofore unknown luxury.*

little consolation to the L/S teams on the front lines.

Loudspeaker broadcasts increased significantly in January and February 1952, "largely due to the more widespread use of prepared positions" by the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) divisions. As the MLR stabilized across the Korean front, L/S equipment could be used for several days at one location.<sup>21</sup> Because only nine to ten of the eleven loudspeaker teams in the 1st L&L were available, L/S teams shifted every three to four weeks from division to division as the infantry moved forward to the MLR. To support this practice, L/S personnel served on thirty-day temporary duty orders with each division.<sup>22</sup>

When CPL William Johnson rotated home to the States, PV2 Jerry Rose was reassigned to CPL John "Jack" H. Dudley's L/S Team Nine supporting 25th Infantry Division (25th ID). Promoting Psywar and tactical loudspeaker employment were constants for all L/S personnel because few staff officers and commanders in Korea had used loudspeakers in combat.<sup>23</sup> Dudley was a top salesman and sold the 25th ID on an interesting way to utilize the L/S team's unique capabilities.<sup>24</sup> The G-2's top priority was capturing enemy soldiers from the 223rd and 224th Chinese Infantry Regi-



*Loudspeaker Team Nine consisted of Jack Dudley, Jerry Rose, and their interpreter. Jack Dudley was known for his enthusiastic and creative ideas for loudspeaker missions, including one that scared both sides into retreating.*


ments, and the L/S broadcast team was to be the bait.<sup>25</sup>

"Dudley was a real crazy guy, but very ingenious. He had gone to the rail yard in Seoul and recorded tanks being unloaded from the flatcars and all kinds of locomotive noise," remembered Rose. "With infantry patrols lying in ambush to 'snatch' prisoners, Jack wanted realistic sounds that would prompt enemy scouts to investigate. That Jack Dudley idea—'The Phantom Army'—worked out real well for a couple of weeks. A good number of enemy soldiers were taken."<sup>26</sup> Even CPT Russell had supported using L/S teams to draw enemy fire when he served as the L/S platoon leader.<sup>27</sup>

Prisoner of war interviews provided "grist" for the L/S teams on line. Broadcasting names of those recently captured was helpful, but better still was the recorded plea of a prisoner entreating his former comrades to surrender. When it was discovered that a newly captured Chinese artillery officer spoke Japanese, Sergeant Nagano, a Hawaiian Nisei, was brought to interrogate him. Nagano learned that the Chinese artilleryman had served with General Chiang Kai-shek during WWII. After being captured by the Red Army during the civil war, he "volunteered" to join the Communists.<sup>28</sup> Many of the Chinese prisoners who agreed to broadcast for the United Nations (UN) were former Nationalist Army soldiers that had been pressed into service by the Communists.

In their broadcasts, the prisoners of war emphasized the good treatment provided by UN troops, reinforcing the promise that had been printed on the airdropped and artillery-delivered surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes.<sup>29</sup> The safe conduct passes were effective, and most enemy deserters carried these paper tickets to freedom. Desertions multiplied when L/S broadcasts preceded artillery fire and air strikes, and several L/S teams even had groups of enemy soldiers surrender to them.<sup>30</sup>

In an effort to further increase the L/S teams' effective-



*Chinese prisoners of war were recruited to broadcast propaganda messages and surrender appeals to their comrades still at arms. The broadcasts reinforced the promises printed on leaflets and safe conduct passes, and increased the enemy desertion rate.*





Photo courtesy of Jay V. Russell

*Safe conduct passes, airdropped and delivered inside artillery shells, promised good treatment by UN troops. As a sign of their effectiveness, safe conduct passes were found in the possession of most enemy deserters.*

*The North Koreans were known to use safe conduct passes against UN troops, as well. In this pairing, one side has altered and copied the other side's pass to distribute as counterpropaganda. The question is, which came first?*

ness, the division G-2 suggested that the loudspeaker be mounted on an M24 Chaffee light tank. This idea had several advantages: the engine could power the loudspeaker; the tank could travel farther into no-man's-land forward of the combat outpost line because its three machine guns provided more protection; and the noise made by the M24 tank moving into position would considerably heighten enemy curiosity. Corporal Dudley, PV2 Rose, and the interpreter Lee conducted five of these very dangerous missions before the tank crew of the M24 finally balked at being such a vulnerable target of enemy fire.<sup>31</sup>

In reality, the negatives outweighed the positive points used by the division staff to sell the idea. The M24 engine had to be constantly running to power the mounted loudspeakers. As a result, the highest broadcast volume had to be used to drown out the tank engine noise. Because the tank crew could not hear approaching danger, they "buttoned up" inside their tank for self-protection, which meant that the L/S team was forced to communicate with the crew using the outside telephone. "But, really that didn't matter anyway, because we couldn't hear a thing over the running tank engine and broadcast noise. Pinpointed by the


noise, instead of being bait we became magnets—just sitting ducks, to tell the truth," said Rose. "But, I got promoted to PFC [Private First Class] and was awarded a Bronze Star."<sup>32</sup>

These tactical risks did not preclude a Far East Command observer team from emphasizing the success of M4 and M24 tank-mounted loudspeakers, nor 3rd Infantry Division from using a loudspeaker on an M39 armored utility vehicle (AUV). The AUV enabled the team to stay up with 15th Infantry commander leading Task Force Burrell in a tank. Along the same lines, Sergeant (SGT) Lawrence O'Brien's L/S team with the 7th ID was given an M20 light reconnaissance vehicle. Fortunately for Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh, 7th ID commander, SGT O'Brien came upon his ambushed command vehicles, treated the wounded, and effected a rescue of the general, his aide-de-camp, and driver.<sup>33</sup>

As a first lieutenant, Jay V. Russell had researched the mounting of loudspeakers on a variety of armored vehicles,

*Loudspeaker teams experimented with mounting public address systems on a variety of armored and unarmored vehicles—including the personnel carrier shown here—with mixed results. While mounted loudspeakers could generally approach closer to enemy lines, the proximity to enemy artillery was not always worth the risk to personnel and equipment.*

*This M4A3 Sherman tank was modified for loudspeaker use.*







*24th Infantry Division provided the first U.S. Army ground forces in the Korean War. The division's first mission was to slow the North Korean advance southward.*



*The 25th Infantry Division entered the Korean War in July 1950. The division built on its WWII reputation as "Tropic Lightning" and successfully executed a number of important offensive actions in Korea.*



*The 45th Infantry Division, Oklahoma Army National Guard, deployed to Korea in December 1951. During its 429 days in combat, the division fought in and around such infamous locations as Pork Chop Hill, Old Baldy, and Heartbreak Ridge.*



*The famed 1st Marine Division entered the Korean War on 15 September 1950, when it made a surprise amphibious assault on Inch'on and went on to recapture Seoul.*

after the 1st Marine Division on the Wonju-Hongch'on axis had attached an M4A3E2 "Super" Sherman tank to an L/S team in March 1951. Russell, like 1LT Fred Wilmot from EUSAK G-3 Psywar Division, also evaluated the M39, the M29C Weasel Cargo Carrier, and the British Universal (Bren Gun) Carrier.<sup>34</sup> One of Russell's recommendations regarding mounted loudspeakers was that close coordination was needed to keep UN troops from being "shocked" by innovative Psywar techniques.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the risks associated with innovative loudspeaker employment, the enthusiasm of the resourceful CPL Jack Dudley was not dampened. Noting the effects achieved by the Chinese in using bugles, drums, and war calls during attacks, and remembering the chills he got watching WWII films of screaming Nazi Stuka divebombers, CPL Dudley went back to Seoul.<sup>36</sup> This time he went to the zoo, where

he recorded hungry, growling lions and tigers just before feeding time. "Especially proud of himself, Jack kept this recorded broadcast 'close hold.' Youn Myong Chong's broadcast was totally forgotten the night when Dudley turned on the growling lions and tigers. Everybody—the troops in the outpost behind us and the Communist scouts in front of us—started running away. It caused one hell of a commotion. Attacking wild animals were the excuse for abandoning positions. Knowing that the next thing coming our way would be artillery, we got out of there as fast as we could, too," recalled Rose, laughing. "Fortunately, we were rotating to the 45th Infantry Division [Oklahoma Army National Guard], because Dudley's dramatic production of 'Lions on the Loose' didn't go over too well with the 25th ID."<sup>37</sup>

Broadcast scripts and recorded messages provided by the Propaganda Platoon in Seoul were not much better. When L/S teams supporting the Republic of Korea Army units broadcast nostalgic themes in Korean to the enemy, the intended effects sometimes backfired. South Korean troops began weeping, and their officers were visibly affected. Thereafter, the substance and purpose of the latest campaign was passed down through the chains of command before broadcasting.<sup>38</sup> Scripts and tapes were approved by Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division, EUSAK before distribution to L/S teams by the Publications Platoon.

Scripts followed an indirect path to the L/S teams. Normally translated into Chinese and Korean, mimeographed copies in English with Chinese and Korean characters alongside, were distributed to the teams. Produced by college-educated writers in the comfort of Seoul, most scripts were too sophisticated for the vast majority of the target audience—illiterate conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants. Practical solutions to the communication problems were needed.<sup>39</sup>

After visiting several prisoner of war compounds before assuming command in April 1952, CPT Herbert Avedon instructed that each sentence in the broadcast be spoken slowly and repeated several times in order to improve understanding among illiterate soldiers. To correct printed products, he directed the use of ideographs or pictographs instead of advanced characters, because many Chinese children were taught to read and write (through second grade) using phonetic symbols or ideographs. Avedon managed to convince EUSAK G-3 Psywar to use Chinese phonetics on all leaflets aimed at Communist Chinese Forces. This practice was eventually adopted by Far East Command Psywar in Tokyo.<sup>40</sup> Still, interpreter Youn thought Psywar products produced in Seoul were "Numba 10."<sup>41</sup>

According to Rose, "most of the time we wrote our own broadcasts based on what we found on the bodies and got from regimental S-2s. These were very basic messages identifying enemy KIA [killed in action], using Chinese and Korean vulgarities. After all, we weren't talking to white collar people."<sup>42</sup> This direct approach met 1st L&L guidance to focus on the lowest possible unit personalities by name, physical characteristics and appearance, and habits. The "contingency" broadcast scripts prepared by "insufficiently trained and untalented" L/S team chiefs were criticized by CPT Avedon, but seemed to be effective nonetheless.<sup>43</sup>



The written job description of an L/S team chief was nowhere close to the realities of his responsibilities. CPT Avedon's ideal candidate would fit the following description:


*Writes loudspeaker scripts and programs and broadcasts to tactical audiences [in accordance with] the principles of Psywar. Has some knowledge of history, politics, sociology, psychology, customs, traditions or culture of enemy against whom he operates, and knows something of the language and dialects of principal enemy population groups and of the media of mass communications. Has knowledge of enemy leaders, military and civilian.*

To this was later added a requirement for previous combat experience.<sup>44</sup> Though L/S team chiefs—usually corporals or PFCs—rarely possessed the above skills and knowledge, they functioned well in the circumstances they actually found themselves in. By the time an L/S team chief completed his combat tour, he knew combustion engines well enough to repair a motor generator, and could to fix an amplifier or tape recorder-reproducer in the field. He had also earned a CIB (Combat Infantryman Badge), for the enemy regularly shot back during his broadcasts.<sup>45</sup> It was practical knowledge, common sense, and combat savvy that kept L/S teams operational, rather than the academic qualifications Avedon desired.

During Rose's attachment to the 45th ID, where tank-mounted loudspeakers were used again, the "dirtiest" aspect of Psywar—searching the enemy dead for any items of intelligence value—inspired a lucrative, money-making enterprise for L/S Team 10. Since they routinely worked in no-man's-land, the newly-arrived Oklahoma National Guard soldiers who watched them at work constantly badgered the team for war souvenirs. This inspired interpreter Youn. "We be rich selling war trophies," said the enterprising North Korean refugee. After making some arrangements with a nearby orphanage, Youn established a cottage industry creating enemy "battle flags." Bed sheet remnants were spattered with chicken blood, shot full of holes, and emblazoned in paint with Chinese characters. Because few Americans read Chinese, "Mao Tse-Tung is a Fat Faggot" was Youn's favorite battle flag slogan.<sup>46</sup> The enterprise was flourishing when L/S Team 10 moved to the 1st Marine Division, after broadcasting from the notorious Old Baldy (Hill 266), Porkchop (Hill 255), and White Horse hills (Hill 395).<sup>47</sup>

L/S Team 10's souvenir business prospered until the sandbagged team bunker received several mortar hits. Fortunately, the 60mm rounds did not penetrate the mounded earth, sandbags, and timber that covered the dugout, but the concussions collapsed the bunker. No one was killed, but the "battle flag" stocks were buried. PFC Rose crawled from the debris with blood coming out of his ears, nose, and eyes, and was evacuated—earning the first of two Purple Hearts.<sup>48</sup> The 14 April 1952 edition of *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk* provided this account of the incident:

## Sergeant Lawrence O'Brien



**SERGEANT** Lawrence O'Brien's story is prime evidence that the heroes of Psywar in Korea were found on the ground and in the air, executing psychological operations missions in the face of enemy fire.

Sergeant O'Brien, the loudspeaker team chief with the 7th ID, received the Silver Star for gallantry in action near Ch'unch'on, Korea, in May 1950. Moving forward in his M20 reconnaissance vehicle (restored example shown below) to join a tank task force, he came under heavy enemy fire but continued forward nonetheless. Coming upon the overturned guard jeep of the 7th ID commander, Major General Claude Ferenbaugh, he found beneath it the bodies of two military policemen who had been killed by enemy fire, and a third who was seriously wounded. Sergeant O'Brien sent his driver back with the vehicle for assistance and remained to aid and protect the wounded man against the concentrated fire of the enemy. When a rescuing tank force arrived two hours later, they were taken aboard, and Sergeant O'Brien guided the tanks in a further search for Major General Ferenbaugh, his aide and his driver, whom they found and rescued from enemy ambush.<sup>1</sup>

### Notes

- 1 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 194–95.







*As depicted in this painting by 1st L&L artist Dick Zayac, loudspeaker teams often worked forward of the front lines, risking harm or capture by the enemy. True to life, this painting shows Communist troops demolishing loudspeaker equipment abandoned by a loudspeaker team fleeing to safety.*

*A bunker enclosing PFC Gerald Rose was partially destroyed by four rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire. Rose was broadcasting when the enemy began firing. He ducked into the bunker just before it was hit. The subject of his broadcast was "The Futility of War."<sup>49</sup>*

The broadcaster was actually Youn, and Rose, providing security, was far enough away from the generator and public address system set to hear the telltale "plump" sound made by mortar rounds leaving the tube. After spending Easter 1952 in the hospital, Rose returned to the 1st L&L in Seoul to receive his next assignment, and there encountered a completely new chain of command.

Normal overseas rotations had brought in a whole new group of officers and senior noncommissioned officers. In April 1952, MAJ Osgood was reassigned to the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. CPT Herbert Avedon, Signal Corps, replaced Osgood as the commander of 1st L&L. He had been a WWII Ranger signal officer from Sicily to Anzio, as well as an Office of Strategic Services Psywar veteran of Burma. 1LT Joe Roberts, the former Propaganda Platoon Leader, had succeeded CPT Russell as XO. Only CPT Avedon had attended the officers Psychological Warfare course at Fort Riley, Kansas, where military occupational specialties (MOSs) 9305, Psywar Officer, and 9306, Psywar Staff Officer, were awarded to graduates. The 1st L&L did not receive enlisted Psywar school graduates from the States either.<sup>50</sup>

To correct Psywar training shortfalls, CPT Avedon intended to start formal training for the L/S teams, and to change the L/S team MOS 0320, Interrogator/Linguist—an intelligence specialty that the Army had difficulty filling—to one more satisfactory based on 1st L&L experience in Korea. Avedon submitted a TO&E change to reduce the L/S team from three to two personnel, and to change the

Team Chief MOS to 1636, Intelligence Analyst, and the Assistant Team Chief to MOS to 3174, Public Address System Mechanic. The changes were finally affected in 1954.<sup>51</sup>

In an effort to overcome the dearth of school-trained L/S personnel, Avedon instituted a seven-day course on Psywar principles and training on loudspeaker equipment. However, increased field requirements for L/S teams across Korea, personnel rotations, combat casualties, and inexperienced enlisted instructors minimized the effectiveness of this solution.<sup>52</sup>

Operational training detractors prompted the Propaganda Platoon to print (mimeograph) a ten to twelve page handout entitled *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*. According to CPT Avedon, "a lack of adequate specialized training by L/S personnel" made a continuing instruction program mandatory for the teams in combat. *Team Talk* contained "instructional material, tactical information (such as lists of enemy vulnerabilities), leaflet drop schedules (coded K for North Korean and C for Chinese units) and programming lessons, as well as a sprinkling of entertainment features."<sup>53</sup> Intramural sports stories and a "Horning-In" section explained what L/S teams were doing in the field and who they were supporting—with names and team numbers provided.<sup>54</sup>

The *Team Talks*, though labeled "Restricted Security Information," were not classified. Operational security, as it is known today, for Psywar activities was not taken seriously. Because the Propaganda Platoon prepared the EUSAK Psywar leaflets, as well as air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts in order to exploit enemy psychological vulnerabilities, *Team Talk* quickly became the primary means to get broadcast scripts to L/S teams in the field.<sup>55</sup> With hardly any security measures protecting 1st L&L products, the Communists knew exactly where the major UN tactical Psywar was emanating from, and did not hesitate to demonstrate their intelligence. When a six-by-six truckload of leaflets was captured by the enemy,



a “Bed Check Charlie” pilot returned them a few nights later—showering them over the 1st L&L compound in Seoul.<sup>56</sup>

In spite of Avedon’s detailed standard operating procedures, among the men of the 1st L&L, the unspoken rules were: log as many missions as possible (front line time accrued the most points for overseas rotation), don’t report contacts with the enemy—especially with the Hunter Squads, don’t get captured, and don’t report friendly fires.<sup>57</sup>

Friendly fire was a constant threat because the L/S broadcasts routinely drew enemy fire. The nervous infantrymen behind them also wanted “combat points” to shorten their overseas tours, but did not want to get killed in the process. Sandbagged log bunkers and deep trenches provided protection against small arms and machine gun fire, but enemy artillery and mortar attacks were risky.<sup>58</sup> The last thing the infantry wanted was to have the enemy direct fire against the L/S teams, because that would obligate the infantry to respond and lead to an escalating fire fight. “Friendly” fire from the rear, loudspeakers stuffed with snow, and cut wires were strong warnings from the American troops on line that the L/S teams were being too effective.<sup>59</sup> When caught in crossfire Rose’s team played its “Ace in the Hole”—Doris Day:

*For some reason, the Americans and Chinese loved listening to Doris Day. So, when our efforts had really stirred them up, resulting in artillery and mortar barrages and machine gun fire being directed at us, and in turn from the American lines, we quickly switched to Doris to quiet things down. We once tried the chaplain’s church music, but “Onward Christian Soldiers” didn’t have much impact on the Chinese nor the American GIs. Only Doris Day worked.<sup>60</sup>*

The situation was different for L/S teams supporting artillery forward observers trying to pinpoint enemy firing positions. The forward observers wanted the L/S teams to draw fire to direct counterbattery fire against the enemy artillery and mortars. Since 1st L&L officers rarely accompanied the L/S teams on night combat missions, the enlisted Psywar soldiers developed practical mission parameters of their own: get as close as possible; talk as long as possible; when you receive fire, get yourselves and the equipment out as quickly as possible.<sup>61</sup> Getting as close as possible was important because the range of the AN/UIQ-1 public address (PA) set was “a mile, if the wind was blowing right.” Psywar doctrine said, “Statements read over a PA set sound more ‘authoritative’ than those coming from a radio or printed in a newspaper or leaflet. The announcer’s voice has a super-human volume; it commands attention as no radio broadcast can ever do.”<sup>62</sup> Ignored was the reality that broadcasts from the front line “drew fire like a magnet” and served as homing beacons for enemy Hunter Squads and searchlights,<sup>63</sup> as shown by this *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk* story:

*Team #12, consisting of Team Chief Preslesnik and interpreters, visited the Company this past week. Preslesnik played the part of “Bring ‘em Back (but not Alive) Buck” when he toted in a badly damaged generator that the Chinese used*



*In a line stretching across the peninsula, UN troops battled fiercely for a series of hills and ridges whose nicknames still resonate with the tragedies that played out in their midst.<sup>65</sup>*

*as a target for their guns. He also brought back three small pieces of what originally was a speaker that once belonged to PVT Joseph (Combat Story) McSheffrey. If the Chinese keep hitting our equipment the way they have been, we’ll have to start indoctrinating them about supply economy.<sup>64</sup>*

Once under enemy fire, recovering equipment was not that easy—especially the communications wire connecting the generator in the jeep trailer to the forward location of the loudspeaker site in the steep mountainous terrain of Korea.

*Popular singer and actress Doris Day was a favorite among frontline troops—on both sides.*



## ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

FORT RILEY, KANSAS



### Graduation Exercises

for

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE NONCOMMISSIONED  
OFFICERS' CLASS NO. 1

Auditorium, Patton Hall  
Fort Riley, Kansas

21 November 1951  
1100 Hours



*The U.S. Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, offered the Army's Psychological Warfare course, which produced Psywar Officers and Psywar Staff Officers (MOSS 9305 and 9306). Of the personnel assigned to the 1st L&L in Korea, only Captain Herbert L. Avedon had completed the course.*

Rose had to devise a simple "deadman" winching system to get the jeep and trailer in place on a steep ridgeline. To further add to the difficulty, infantry units commonly laid minefields beyond the outpost line. As a result of geography and war, abandoning equipment was not uncommon for the L/S teams. SGT Nick Soter from Team 9 lost his jeep after driving up Hill 854 for a night broadcast. Before the L/S team could start broadcasting, Hill 854 was attacked from three sides. The team barely got away, and had to leave its jeep, trailer, generator, and public address system set behind.<sup>66</sup> A common sense refusal to retrieve their WD-1 wire at night led to the rapid transfer of CPL Dudley, PFC Rose, and Youn from the 40th ID (California Army National Guard) to the British 1st Commonwealth Division.<sup>67</sup>


By May 1952, the Chinese were conducting effective counterpropaganda against UN forces. It was quite easy to accomplish, since operational security was nonexistent; Koreans were everywhere doing everything. Few Americans questioned where the locals went or what they did. The majority of classified destruction was done by Koreans using fifty-five-gallon burn barrels. Even loudspeaker teams had Korean houseboys who arranged laundry, cooked meals, scrounged rare commodities on the black market, and worked on the jeeps. In Seoul, it was not uncommon for members of the 1st L&L and the Psywar Division of EUSAK to keep female consorts, many of whom were North Korean intelligence agents. The majority of the secretaries at EUSAK headquarters were also Korean, and EUSAK security checks were cursory at best. "These people were our allies, after all," was the common response.<sup>68</sup> There was little wonder that the Communists were well informed.

Nevertheless, enemy knowledge about the 1st L&L and L/S team identities and assignments was disconcerting. Chinese counter-Psywar broadcasts "welcomed" L/S teams by number and the members by name when they arrived at their frontline divisions. "The Chinese portable loudspeakers were as good as ours," said Rose. "We had those used by the U.S. Navy beach masters in WWII."<sup>69</sup> Chinese patrols left personally addressed "skull and crossbones" notes tied to bushes in no-man's-land for the L/S teams. The leaflets threatened to hang L/S team members if captured, and advertised the \$10,000 gold bounty to Hunter Squads for capturing any of them.<sup>70</sup> "For this reason, we had contact with Hunter Squads about every three missions by mid-summer," remembered Rose.<sup>71</sup>

During his second assignment with the 1st Marine Division, the division's Psywar staff officer concocted a scheme much riskier than being captured in no-man's-land. As a result of this misguided plan, PFC Rose's second tour with the 1st Marine Division in June 1952 proved to be short-lived. Hav-

## WEEKLY LOUDSPEAKER TEAM TALK

14 JULY 1952



1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Co.

*Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk provided 1st L&L personnel in the field with training materials and news from the rest of the company. Team Talk also quickly became the primary means of distributing tactical information to the loudspeaker teams, including broadcast scripts and leaflet drop schedules.*




ing done tank reconnaissance probes into the Chinese lines around the Punch Bowl, the Marines were anxious to repeat the practice at Panmunjon. To enhance these probes, the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer “promised to make the broadcast team famous.” He proposed the construction of a simple raft that would hold the 10th L/S team jeep and trailer. PFC Rose, the team chief, and Youn would simply broadcast to the Chinese Soldiers as they floated down the Injim River. This was notwithstanding enemy fire being concentrated on them.<sup>72</sup>

*Some very accurate artillery fire eliminated that ‘hare-brained Huckleberry Finn’ scheme. My team consisted of Youn and me. I didn’t have another American. We were in a foxhole setting up to broadcast when a Marine full colonel in starched utilities brought a Red Cross volunteer up to the COPL for a battlefield ‘tour.’ The two ‘tourists’ silhouetted themselves on the ridgeline, taking turns with the colonel’s binoculars. You could see the sun glinting off his silver eagles. When we tried to warn them away because they would attract artillery fire, they waved back, ignoring our shouts to go away. Less than a minute after they drove off in their jeep, we were hit by artillery. The impact was so close that Youn and I were blown out of the foxhole by concussive impact. The first thing that I saw was my mangled bloody hand. A large piece of shrapnel had ripped it apart. Our jeep sitting behind the COPL was our only means of escape. Just as I drove away, a second round hit the COPL. It was just like a war movie—a series of artillery rounds exploding in orchestrated sequence behind us as we raced down the road. Luck was with us. I made it to the MASH at X-Ray Bridge. A helicopter carried me to the USHS Hope,” said Rose. “That second Purple Heart was a real doozy. I never saw Youn again.”<sup>73</sup>*

It was several surgeries and considerable physical therapy later before lately-promoted CPL Jerry Rose was shipped to the United States and discharged in the summer of 1953. Thus, in less than a year, Rose completed 253 tactical loudspeaker missions, the majority at night, while supporting 24th ID, 25th ID, 45th ID, 40th ID, 1st Marine Division, the Commonwealth Division, Turkish Brigade, and the Republic of Korea 9th Division (White Horse). In the course of his tour, he was awarded the Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.<sup>74</sup> “No other sergeant in the Eighth Army shoulders greater responsibility than the chief of a loudspeaker team,” was the fitting tribute accorded the tactical field arm of the 1st L&L by Lieutenant Dale Story in a 1952 *Combat Forces Journal* article on Psywar in Korea.<sup>75</sup>

During CPL Rose’s tour with the company, no 1st L&L personnel were killed in action, but numerous L/S soldiers were wounded.<sup>76</sup> In May 1952, CPT Avedon accepted the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L at a ceremony in Taegu. The unit was also awarded two U.S. Army Meritorious Unit Citations for Korean service. The citation awarded by EUSAK General Order #245 dated 28 February 1953 read:

*... The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the only unit of its kind in the combat zone, performed their duties*



*Korea’s steep ridgelines presented the loudspeaker teams with some logistical challenges. Rose’s winching system, as illustrated by his own hand, was simple, but got the job done—repeatedly.*



*The British 1st Commonwealth Division comprised troops from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, and New Zealand.*



*The 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard, arrived in Korea in February 1952 to replace the 24th ID on the battle line. The division participated in the fighting on and around Heartbreak Ridge, and at one point in 1953, had an artillery battery almost seventy miles north of the 38th parallel.*

with determination and aggressiveness. Equipped with bulky public address systems best adapted to vehicular use, the loudspeaker teams hand carried their equipment to isolated peaks on the front in order to render close psychological warfare support to infantry line units.<sup>77</sup>

Psychological warfare was still a fairly untested tool when Rose joined the 1st L&L in Korea. Though frontline combat is not in the Psywar soldier's job description, life on a loudspeaker team was everything Rose the infantryman could have hoped for in terms of excitement. In spite of the trials and dangers of L/S duty, Rose reflected that:

*Life in Korea wasn't all bad. We hunted golden pheasant in the Chorwon Valley. And I acquired a nice collection of Chinese and North Korean weapons. I got to see a Bob Hope USO show with Jerry Colona, some pretty girls, and listened to the Marine Band. Tins of Fosters ale were the highlight of supporting the Aussies in the Commonwealth Division. We got to see the latest movies—albeit in pretty cold and austere theaters. I managed to get copies of the Oakland Tribune occasionally. Selling enemy “battle flags” was a real hoot. And then . . . there was R&R in Tokyo.<sup>78</sup> ♣*

*Special notes of appreciation are due to retired LTC Jay Russell, former Loudspeaker Platoon Leader and Executive Officer, and to former CPL Gerald Rose, Loudspeaker Team Leader, 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company, Korea, for sharing memories, old photographs and memorabilia, documents, and providing the words to explain tactical Psywar loudspeaker operations during the Korean War*

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## Endnotes

- 1 Gerald A. Rose, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 13 October 2003, Oakland, CA, tape recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose Interview 1.
- 2 “PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” *The Stars and Stripes*, 20 May 1953; Herbert A. Friedman, “American PSYOP Organizations During the Korean War,” <http://www.Psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html>, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Rose Interview 1.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Gerald A. Rose, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 October 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose Interview 2. Getting school-trained Psywar soldiers to the 1st L&L in Korea was not an Army priority judging by the Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) graduation roster. All forty-five graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS, site of the Army General School. The Psywar Division was in the department of Resident Instruction. Psywar NCO Class No. 1 Graduation Roster, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 6 In 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Republican senator from Massachusetts, authored Public Law 597 as a means of incorporating select members of Europe's displaced persons population into the U.S. Army. Popularly called the “Lodge Act,” PL 597 offered the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship in return for five years of enlisted service in the U.S. Army. Passed by the 81st Congress in June 1950, the “alien enlistment program” received its first recruits at the 7720th Replacement Depot, Sontheofen, Germany, in 1951. Kenneth Finlayson, “The Lodge Act and the Early Days of Special Forces,” *Special Forces: The First Fifty Years* (Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2002), 92–93.
- 7 1st L&L Company Thanksgiving Dinner Menu, Korea, 1951, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose Interview 1; Jay V. Russell, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Russell Interview.
- 8 Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, *Psywar in Korea* (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 26. Major Homer Caskey took the Technical Information Detachment overseas. After the TID was expanded to become the 1st L&L Company, it was subsequently commanded by Majors John T. Dabinett and Donald W. Osgood, and Captains Herbert Avedon and Oliver W. Rodman.
- 9 Department of the Army, Operational Research Office, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3 (FEC); George S. Pettee, *US Psywar Operations in the Korean War* (n.p.: 23 January 1951), 29; “PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most”; 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, EUSAK, APO 301, Seoul, Korea, *Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)* dated 10 August 1952, hereafter cited as 1st L&L SOP.
- 10 Pettee, 29; Russell Interview. When war broke out in Korea, Major (MAJ) Alfred L. DiBella from the G-2 Psywar Branch (“Special Projects Division”) of the Supreme Command Allied Powers (General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters) in Tokyo was dispatched to Seoul. In January 1951, General Mathew Ridgway transferred responsibility for Psywar from G-2 to G-3 in EUSAK, where it became a division of the G-3 Operations section rather than a special staff section. He increased the manning to eight officers and nine enlisted men, and named MAJ DiBella acting chief. MAJ DiBella, MAJ Edwin Rios, First Lieutenant Fred W. Wilmot, and a master sergeant conducted the tactical Psywar campaign for EUSAK until the 1st L&L Company was combat effective in April 1951. Airborne and ground loudspeaker efforts were experimental. Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two airborne loudspeakers had been in service. The 1st Cavalry Division occasionally lent its loudspeaker trailer to the 25th Infantry Division in the summer and fall of 1950. The Marines used loudspeakers throughout the fall. Attempts to use them at the Chosin Reservoir in winter were unsuccessful. With the temperatures from -10° to -20° F, the generator would not start. Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 November 2004 and 29 November 2004, digital recordings, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Wilmot Interview 1 and 2 respectively; Pettee, 2, 7, 23–24; Hansen, 26, 194, 196.
- 11 TO&E 20-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, 1 September 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter TO&E 20-77.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Russell Interview; 1st L&L SOP. First Lieutenant Russell escorted five Chinese interpreters from Pusan to Seoul. They were former professors from the Pusan University. HQ, 2D Logistical Command, APO 59, AG 300.4, “SUBJECT: Letter Order No. 2-40,” dated 7 February 1951, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC. The L/S Platoon was definitely combat effective by 1 May 1951. When an L/S team with the 27th Infantry Regiment, northeast of Seoul, encountered three Chinese prisoners of war being escorted to the rear, the team sergeant and interpreter obtained their names, units, and names of officers and friends. The interpreter then made surrender appeals with this current information. Twenty-four Chinese soldiers surrendered that day. The next day another fifteen surrendered. “Some Psywar Operations Highlights,” RG 319, Section 338, Box 4, 1951–52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
- 14 Stephen E. Pease, *Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950–1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 131–32; Rose Interview 1; Hansen, 313–14, 316.
- 15 Rose Interview 1. Private First Class John Squicciarini's Loudspeaker team supported a Republic of Korea Army division in Operation RATKILLER from December 1951 through January 1952. Large bands of guerrillas and bandits had taken refuge in the mountains northwest of Chinju after the Communist retreat from the south. General James A. Van Fleet assigned Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup two Republic of Korea Army divisions to eliminate this potentially dangerous threat. 1st L&L loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals to surrounded groups. By the end of January 1952, nearly twenty thousand bandits and guerrillas had been killed or captured. John A. Squicciarini, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Squicciarini Interview; Matthew D. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 191.
- 16 “PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most.”



- 17 Ibid.
- 18 TO&E 20-77; Rose Interview 1.
- 19 Rose Interview 1.
- 20 "War Without Weapons," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 17 March 1951, 3.
- 21 Major Donald W. Osgood, Commander, 1st L&L Company, Korea, letter to Captain Jay V. Russell, Fort Benning, GA, dated 14 March 1952, Russell Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 22 TO&E 20-77; 1st L&L SOP; Captain Herbert L. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18," June 1952, Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, 300; Rose Interview 1; EUSAK, Office of the Commanding General (CG), APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951 had Captain Jay V. Russell; First Lieutenant Hillard J. Trubitt, 062034, Armor; Second Lieutenant Quillian D. Clements, 02263454, Artillery; and twenty-four enlisted men (including Corporal William E. Johnson, RA16249927; Corporal John H. Dudley, US56050526; and Private-2 Gerald A. Rose, US56141578) temporary duty from 1 Dec 51 to 31 Dec 51 in connection with Psywar activities. They were authorized travel by train, but no per diem. Loudspeaker platoon officers and team members had thirty-day temporary duty orders issued monthly. EUSAK, Office of the CG, APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 12-197 dated 28 December 1951, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; EUSAK, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 23 Captain Jay V. Russell, "Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack," U.S. Army Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class #2, 1952-53, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Russell Interview.
- 24 "Corporal Jack Dudley was a 'legendary character' among the loudspeaker men in the 1st L&L. But, he got things done. Dudley was an eccentric who wore an Australian Army bush hat, a heavy Chinese padded cotton overcoat with his British battle jacket, and Korean overboots. His team jeep sported a UN flag and UN markings, so no one hassled him," related a bemused John Squicciarini, another original loudspeaker team leader in the 1st L&L. Squicciarini Interview.
- 25 Rose Interview 1; Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 25 May 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Gerald A. Rose, undated letter to parents, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The 1st L&L Company Propaganda Platoon had little access to the enemy Order of Battle in Seoul. This severely handicapped the scope and focus of the loudspeaker broadcast scripts and leaflets. Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 Rose Interview 1; Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994; Rose letter to parents, undated.
- 27 First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, 1st L&L Company Report, "SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps," dated 16 January 1951, Russell Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 28 Gerald A. Rose, letter to parents, May 1952, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 29 "War Without Weapons;" Hansen, 59.
- 30 Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report dated July 1951, Entry 1, Box 91, RG 337, National Archives, Washington, DC.
- 31 Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 12 July 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose Interview 1.
- 32 Rose Interview 1.
- 33 Hansen, 194-95.
- 34 Wilmot Interview 1; Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report; Russell, "Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack," 10-11, 13; First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, "SUBJECT: Operation of Loudspeaker Teams with Attached Tank," n.d., USASOC History Office files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, 194. On 15 February 1951, Task Force Burgess flanked the 150th North Korean Division on Hill 191 and raked its positions with the combined firepower of numerous twin 40mm antiaircraft guns, quad .50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and 76mm tank guns. Then, the Loudspeaker (L/S) team broadcast a surrender appeal three times with positive results. However, the best use of the L/S team was against a village south of the Han River. The L/S team sergeant convinced the task force commander that the L/S could reduce the risk of assaulting the village and minimize collateral damage to the civilians. When the villagers began running toward the L/S, they were halted until the headman came forward. The villagers were told to come out of their homes to help move wounded North Koreans out to the road. The task force commander held his fire to give the enemy an opportunity to respond to the surrender appeals. "As a result of the broadcasts, thirty North Korean soldiers surrendered and no villagers were injured. Thus, a North Korean division was effectively destroyed by combining all direct action weapons available to the 15th Infantry."
- 35 Russell, "SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps."



*Loudspeaker teams were responsible for carrying and positioning their equipment in the most strategic location possible—often on top of a steep, craggy hill that could only be accessed by foot.*

- 36 "War Without Weapons," 3.
- 37 Rose Interview 1.
- 38 Hansen, 205. In June 1952, seven of the eleven loudspeaker teams were supporting Republic of Korea Divisions. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
- 39 1st L&L SOP.
- 40 Herbert Avedon, interview by Dr. Stanley Sandler, 14 September 1994, Rockville, Maryland, transcript in Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Avedon Interview.
- 41 Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 1st L&L Co. SOP; Captain Herbert Avedon, O&T Branch, Propaganda Division, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, "Memorandum For Record, SUBJECT: Psywar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea—A Study," 28 August 1953, 23, Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 44 Hansen, 187–88. This was a considerably summarized job description based on the one prepared by Captain Avedon during his four-month period of 1st L&L Company command. Though his was only a single sheet of paper, it was single-spaced. His inflated description of duties and idealistic requirements far exceeded the qualifications of a corporal or sergeant. It is doubtful that any serving Psywar officer, including Avedon, possessed the requisite leadership, tactical skills, and capabilities. He wanted Assistant Loudspeaker Team Chiefs (corporals and privates first class by TO&E) to be highly intelligent, have platoon sergeant experience, academic education in psychology, sociology, anthropology and/or oriental history or culture, and possess the ability to write. Ironically, the majority of enlisted personnel in 1st L&L were drafted college graduates, though not with the specializations Avedon sought. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18;" Rose Interview 2.
- 45 Hansen, 187–88.
- 46 Rose Interview 1; Gerald A. Rose letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 8 October 1994, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Avedon Interview. The 40th and 45th were National Guard divisions that were sent to relieve the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division in the winter of 1951–1952. The two active divisions returned to their prewar occupation duties in Japan. D.M. Giangreco, *War in Korea 1950–1953* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 205.
- 47 Rose Interview 1; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994.
- 48 Ibid.; Avedon Interview.
- 49 Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952, Major Alan J. Dover Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC;
- 50 1st L&L SOP; 226th Signal Service Company photo, Seoul, Korea, 1-3126-3/FEC-52-11116, dated 18 April 1952; Avedon Interview; U.S. Army General School, Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) Roster, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. All 45 graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS.
- 51 TO&E No. 33-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, dated 13 September 1954. This TO&E superseded TO&E 20-77A, 30 October 1952, including Change 1, 30 December 1952. ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 52 1st L&L SOP; Captain Avedon's seven-day Psywar and loudspeaker operation course in reality was "four days crammed into seven days." Ten personnel completed the course in June 1952. The number assigned to operational loudspeaker teams was not specified. Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
- 53 1st L&L SOP.
- 54 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952; Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952, Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 55 At least 143 copies of the *Loudspeaker Team Talk* were distributed weekly: two per loudspeaker (L/S) Team for twenty; two per L/S Section Leader for six; four to L/S Platoon headquarters; four to 1st L&L Company headquarters; two to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) L&L Company; three to the 1st Radio Broadcast & Leaflet Company; two to Psywar Projects, G-3 EUSAK; one copy to Psywar Operations, G-3 EUSAK; one copy to Psywar School; eight copies to the eight Division Psywar officers (one each); four copies to the Corps Psywar officers (one each); seven copies to the ROKA Division Psywar officers (one each); one copy to the airfield; fifteen file copies; and sixty-five copies minus the news items and translations to 1st L&L Company personnel. 1st L&L SOP dated 10 August 1952.
- 56 Paul A. Wolfgeher, "Psychological Warfare: The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in the Korean War," <http://www.psyop.com/library/korea/wolfgeher.htm>, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 57 Gerald A. Rose letters to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 10 April 1994 and 7 June 1994, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 58 Hansen, 205; Squicciarini Interview; Lieutenant Beverly Scott, "One Man's War," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 188; 1st L&L loudspeaker team personnel were granted Class "A" time for rotation, four points per month, which meant nine months on the line or a total of thirty-six points made them eligible for rotation to Japan or the U.S.
- 59 Squicciarini Interview.
- 60 Rose Interview 1; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994.
- 61 Rose letters to Sandler, 10 April 1994, 25 May 1994, and 7 June 1994; Rose Interview 1.
- 62 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 14 April 1952.
- 63 "War Without Weapons"; Hansen, 206.
- 64 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952.
- 65 Dvorchak, 237.
- 66 *Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk*, 24 November 1952; Squicciarini Interview; Hansen, 205. Full equipment of three U.S. and three Republic of Korea Army teams had been overrun by the enemy, and in November 1952, another team reported the loss of all its equipment to an allied unit that felt its need was greater.
- 67 Rose Interview 1; Rose letter to parents, 11 April 1952, Chorwon, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 68 Colonel John Sadler (attached to the Central Intelligence Agency during the Korean War), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 October 2003, Federal Way, WA, tape recording, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952, Panmunjon, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994. Captain Avedon took command of the 1st L&L in April 1952. Avedon Interview.
- 69 Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
- 70 Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Hansen, 313–14, 316.
- 71 Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994.
- 72 Rose Interview 1. Bearing out Rose's criticism of the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer's ideas, the next loudspeaker team assigned to 1st Marine Division suffered one man killed in action, and one wounded. Captain Herbert L. Avedon, "Command Report No. 19," July 1952, Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 73 Rose Interview 1; Avedon, "Command Report No. 18."
- 74 Rose Interview 2.
- 75 Lieutenant Dale Story, "Psychological Warfare in Korea," *Combat Forces Journal*, July 1952, 15.
- 76 Rose Interview 2.
- 77 226th Signal Service Company, photo of Captain Herbert Avedon accepting Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L Company on 18 May 1952 in Taegu, Korea, U.S. Army Photo 11/869-4/FEC-52, Avedon Collection, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Wolfgeher; Friedman.
- 78 Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Rose Interview 2.




# Bed Check Charlie

**B**ED Check Charlies (as already mentioned in “The UN Occupation of P’yongyang” and “‘Volunteering’ for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea”) operated throughout the war, but low-level flights increased during the last six months, when the front lines were static. North Koreans used the Polikarpov U-2/Po-2, a Soviet biplane dating from 1927; the Yakovlev Yak-18A, a low-wing aircraft; the ancient Blochavidan Mbe-2, a pusher-type seaplane; as well as Lavochkin La-9 and La-11 low-wing aircraft. The Soviets had used them all during World War II as liaison, ambulance, and night raider aircraft. Powered by large exposed radial engines and constructed mostly of wood, they were difficult to track on radar, too slow to intercept with jet aircraft, and noisy enough to harass ground troops. After the Bed Check Charlie flights destroyed an F-86 Sabrejet and several F-51 Mustangs on crowded forward air bases, and some fifteen million gallons of aviation fuel and huge amounts of munitions stored at Inch’on, the intruders became a priority for the F4U-5N all-weather night fighter Corsairs of the 7th U.S. Navy Fleet. Several night fighter Corsairs from VC-3 aboard the USS *Princeton* (CVA-37) were detached ashore to K-6 at Pyongt’aek, Korea, to intercept the Bed Check Charlies, or “Washing Machine Charlies” as the Navy referred to them. Lieutenant Guy “Lucky Pierre” Bordelon, “Detachment Dog,” was awarded the Silver Star and Navy Cross for destroying five Bed Check Charlies. He became “the Navy’s first prop ace in Korea.”<sup>1</sup>

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> [http://www.acepilots.com/korea\\_bordelon.html](http://www.acepilots.com/korea_bordelon.html); LT Guy Bordelon Interview in Donald Knox and Alfred Koppel, *The Korean War: The Concluding Volume of an Oral History: Uncertain Victory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 246–50.



*Navy Lieutenant Guy Bordelon flew an F4U-5N Corsair when shooting down five Bed Check Charlie aircraft, making him the first “propeller ace” in the Korean War.*



*Yakovlev Yak-18A*



*Polikarpov Po-2*




*Lavochkin La-9*



# A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words

by Earl J. Moniz



**I**n our recent research on the Korean War, we uncovered a few pencil drawings. One of the drawings included a faded identification: "Zayac 53 Korea." Through modern technology and some amateur sleuthing, we were able to identify and locate the artist.

Born and raised in Detroit, Michigan, Dick Zayac was attracted to art at a young age. As a teenager, he studied at the Detroit Institute of Arts and the Society of Arts and Crafts. While majoring in commercial art at Cass Technical High School, he received scholarships to the Art Students League of New York and the Pratt Institute in New York City.

In 1950, war broke out on the other side of the world. As world events overtook educational plans, Zayac found himself assigned to the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) in Korea.

The 1st L&L consisted of artists, photographers, scriptwriters, loudspeaker teams, and linguists. They worked together to produce psychological warfare tools designed to shorten the conflict, assure the civilian population that help was on the way, and that the end of the war was just around the corner.

All of the images displayed in conjunction with this article are products of psychological warfare pioneer Dick Zayac. The image depicting a map and routes through the lines to a friendly welcome was actually reconnoitered by Zayac himself. He wanted to assure himself that the map depicted everything in its proper perspective. With modern division of labor and "reach back" support concept, Zayac's recon remains one of those daring feats upon which legends are built.

The 1st L&L was so successful at upsetting enemy plans and encouraging loyalists that





*Working from the trenches, Zayac starkly rendered the realities of war.*



*Psywar artist Dick Zayac (left and below) at his workstation in Korea.*

on 18 May 1952, in Taegu, the unit was awarded the Korean Presidential Unit Citation. It read, in part: "Over one billion leaflets have also been prepared and dropped over enemy troops and civilians in North Korea contributing greatly to the weakening of morale of enemy soldiers and to the improvement of morale of loyal citizens of the Republic of Korea."

Dick Zayac returned home to begin a commercial artist career that continues to flourish today. From his studio in Michigan's North Woods, Zayac continues to paint in the plein air style he has perfected.

Zayac's work is included in private collections from Chicago to Tokyo. ♠

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*In contrast to the dark, harsh sketches of his war years, Zayac's current work consists of peaceful, light-filled watercolor scenes.*








*"Psychological warfare channels the abilities of the artist toward the goal of winning, and thus terminating, war. While he is helping to bring an end to the war, the Psywar artist may perform the added function of recording it to keep its bitter memory alive, so that others may know what it is like."*\*

\* "First RB&L News Special Supplement," 10 April 1955. The artwork used in the 1955 special supplement was borrowed and never returned. If anyone knows the whereabouts of the original artwork, please contact the USASOC History Office so that it can be returned to Dick Zayac.









# Conventional Excellence:

## The 528th Quartermaster Battalion in Vietnam

by Cherilyn A. Walley

*Heavy duty cranes were required to issue heavy ordnance to combat units. In early 1970, combat units north of Hai Van Pass used up to ten times as much heavy ordnance as projected, causing the 295th Ordnance Company at Chu Lai ASP to struggle to keep up with demand.*



**THE** 528th Special Operations Support Battalion is one of the few Army special operations units that has evolved from a purely conventional unit into its current specialized role. Other Army Special Operations Forces units can trace their roots to conventional infantry or aviation units, but only the 528th and the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion can boast that they served in World War II under their own colors (as the 528th and 112th). And of the two, only the 528th has the distinction of having served in Vietnam, as well.

After almost twenty years in mothballs, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) unfurled its colors and on 16 September 1969 again took its rightful place in the U.S. Army's order of battle.<sup>1</sup> Activated under the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM-DNG), the 528th Quartermaster Battalion (528th QMB) found itself struggling to fulfill a role for which it was almost completely unprepared.

The 528th QMB's HHC was organized according to the table of organization and equipment for petroleum supply battalions (TO&E 10-476G), yet the 528th had been specifically activated to provide a command structure for a newly formed ammunition battalion. This discrepancy not only left the company without the proper equipment to perform its mission, but also prevented requisition of personnel with the appropriate military occupation specialties (MOSs)—only twelve of the thirty-two petroleum supply battalion MOSs were transferable to an ammunition battalion, and none of those had anything to do with ordnance.<sup>2</sup>

While the TO&E was inadequate, the 528th did receive all equipment and personnel organized under ammunition ordnance




battalion TO&E 9-86G used by the 274th Fortification and Construction Platoon. The 274th had reorganized itself into the 274th Ordnance Battalion (Provisional) as a stopgap measure between the 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammunition)'s summer departure and the 528th QMB's September activation.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of HHC's problems organizing, the battalion was able to assume the ordnance control mission for I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) through its subordinate companies and detachments, which were already on the ground and trained in ammunition supply functions. At the same time the 528th QMB activated, it inherited three ordnance companies and a transportation detachment from the 274th: the 40th Ordnance Company (Ammunition), U.S. Army Reserve 295th Ordnance Company (Ammunition), 571st Ordnance Company (Ammunition), and the 263rd Transportation Detachment (Crane J B). Within a week, four more units were attached to the battalion, each consisting of one officer and nine enlisted men trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD): the 59th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), the 133rd Ordnance Detachment (EOD), the 287th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), and the 269th Ordnance Detachment (EOD).<sup>4</sup>


The first month of the 528th QMB's tour in Vietnam was consumed with getting itself and its subordinate units organized sufficiently to perform the ordnance control mission. At the same time, as new ordnance detachments were being attached to the battalion, one of its inherited companies handed off its mission to a replacement company and rotated back to the United States. The 661st Ordnance Company (Ammunition) moved from Quin Nhon to Chu Lai and assumed the 295th's mission on 23 September 1969, including all equipment and the more than 50 percent of the company that was not eligible to rotate home with the unit.

The flurry of attachments and detachments and rotations eventually settled down and as of 31 October 1969, the 528th QMB had an assigned strength of 18 officers, 6 warrant officers, and 710 enlisted men.<sup>5</sup> By May 1970, the battalion was receiving personnel with the required MOSs in sufficient quantities to fully man the battalion with ammunition personnel.<sup>6</sup>

The 528th QMB's mission as the ordnance control for ICTZ was to oversee operation of the Army's ammunition supply points (ASPs). By November 1969, the 528th was responsible for six ASPs. The 571st Ordnance Company was responsible for ASP 102 at Camp Evans, ASP 103 at Phu Bai, and ASP 101 at Quang Tri. The 661st Ordnance Company was responsible for ASP 105 at Chu Lai and ASP 106 at Duc Pho,



*The 6,000 pound rough terrain forklift was a vital part of ammunition supply operations. Each ASP relied on the heavy duty machines for loading, offloading, and internal movement of ammunition and heavy ordnance. At Chu Lai ASP, 295th Ordnance Company Private First Class Dennis Schuyler (far left) checked lot numbers before Sergeant Warren Hinzie moved the pallets in January 1969.*



Map created by Cheriyn A. Walley

and the 40th Ordnance Company ran ASP 107 at Da Nang.<sup>7</sup>

The work involved in running an ASP ranged from simple inventory controls to the more complicated business of maintaining lot integrity (keeping all boxes from one lot of ammunition together), to rebuilding boxes in order to protect ammunition from the elements, and the dangerous business of disposing of expired or degraded ordnance.

The 528th QMB was responsible for all Army Class V supply (ammunition and ordnance) in the ICTZ, from the moment it arrived until it was either issued to combat units or shipped back out of theater as surplus. The majority of ordnance shipments came by cargo ship from the United States or by intratheater shipment, usually from Cam Ranh Bay. The cargo ships docked at the Deep Water Port, where ammunition loads were transferred to lighterage (shallow draft vessels) and transported to offloading facilities, either further inside Da Nang Harbor and in the inland stream, or further up the coast at the smaller ports of Tan My and Chu Lai.<sup>8</sup>

By far the most important piece of equipment to the 528th's mission was the 6,000-pound rough terrain forklift. The forklifts were used every time ammunition needed to be offloaded at an ASP, repositioned within an ASP, issued to a unit, received from a unit, or shipped out of an ASP. Even with intensive maintenance schedules, the eight forklifts authorized to each ammunition company under TO&E 9-17G proved insufficient for the battalion's needs, especially when each company was responsible for more than one ASP,

each in a different location. Forklift shortages impacted the battalion's overall mission by delaying ammunition offloads, which in turn delayed ship and convoy turnaround times, which in turn further delayed vital ammunition shipments.<sup>9</sup>

Further complicating the work of maintaining stockage objectives at each ASP were the challenges brought about by monsoon season and the ever-present enemy. The former made it difficult to unload and transport ammunition to the ASPs, and the latter required security measures beyond those usually enacted by an ammunition battalion.

The 528th undertook various plans of action to address seasonal and security challenges. In anticipation of monsoon rains, the ASPs stockpiled as much ammunition as possible so they could handle demands caused by upsurges in enemy activity. Efforts to build up ammunition stocks before projected enemy action related to January 1970's Tet celebrations, however, were hampered by rough seas and a change in combat tactics. Heavy ordnance stocks became severely depleted as units in the northern ICTZ relied on heavy artillery to prevent enemy buildup before Tet. At the same time that units were drawing heavily on the ordnance, choppy seas prevented timely offloading from cargo ships to lighterage, and from lighterage to piers, which curtailed the ASPs' ability to maintain even basic stocking levels.<sup>10</sup>

Heavy ordnance stockage levels continued to fall during February, primarily due to increased use of 8" Howitzer and 175mm Gun shells by the 108th Artillery Group. At times,

the artillery units' consumption was ten times the intense combat rate on which stockage objectives were calculated. In order to supply the required ammunition, USASUPCOM diverted ammunition shipments destined for other ports into Da Nang, tasked shallow draft vessels to move ammunition loads to ICTZ from other places in Vietnam, and borrowed ammunition from the Marine Corps.<sup>11</sup>

Low stockage levels of heavy ordnance continued to be a problem throughout the spring of 1970, requiring extensive cross-leveling between ASPs—moving ammunition lots from one ASP to another, in order to keep each ASP as close

*Cargo ships carried hundreds of tons of ammunition from the United States to the Deep Water Pier at Da Nang. Lacking a dedicated deep water ammunition pier, the loads were transferred from the deep draft ships to lighterage (barges), which in turn offloaded the ammunition and ordnance up stream at Da Nang, or further up the coast at Tan My and Chu Lai.*





to its stockage objective as possible—which tied up considerable transportation assets. The arrival of three deep-draft ships carrying ammunition (the *Del Mundo*, the *Green Cove*, and the *Miller*) in late May and early June finally brought the ASPs back to their stockage objectives for artillery ammunition.<sup>12</sup>

ASPs were common targets for enemy sappers, and the 528th attempted to increase security accordingly. The battalion could only do so much on its own, though, and had to wait on engineer support for some of the bigger tasks, such as clearing adequate perimeters. Battalion troops did the best they could, repairing fences and adding roving foot patrols around each ASP, but lack of manpower and resources retarded their efforts. Security assessments called for perimeter lighting, ground surveillance devices, better weaponry, and sentry dog teams. The dogs were a viable measure for the Quang Tri and Phu Bai ASPs, but kennel facilities were so low on the construction priority list as to prevent even that precaution.<sup>13</sup>

In spite of the lack of assets, the 528th improved ASP security as much as possible. By July 1970, the ASPs at Quang Tri, Camp Evans, and Phu Bai had Seismic Intrusion Detectors (SID IIIs) deployed along their perimeters. The Quang Tri ASP had also added three observation towers and cleared a ten-foot strip along its perimeter. Unfortunately, the ASP lacked enough guards to man the towers twenty-four hours a day, which undermined their effectiveness.<sup>14</sup>

As part of the United States' ongoing efforts to extricate itself from Vietnam and turn over all military functions to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in the process known as "Vietnamization," the 528th QMB (also known as the 528th Ammunition Battalion by mid-1970) participated in "Project Buddy." The 528th sent a small Instruct and Advise (I and A) Team consisting of two officers and three senior noncommissioned officers to the ARVN 51st Ammunition Group. After observing the 51st's ammunition operation, the I and A team prepared a thirty-six-hour program of instruction to improve the 51st's ammunition handling program.<sup>15</sup>

"Project Buddy" became such a success for the 528th that in June 1970, the battalion trained ARVN ammunition units at three different ASPs—Chu Lai, Phu Bai, and Da Nang. In a contemporary newspaper account of the



*Each Ammunition Supply Point consisted of ammunition bunkers specifically designed and placed to reduce spread of fire and to contain explosions. As the ICTZ ASPs attempted to keep enough ammunition and ordnance on hand to meet combat unit demands, they were forced to crowd pallets and minimize safety distances.*

program, instructor Staff Sergeant Alonze Jordan from the 571st Ordnance Company commented, "The students we have here are very attentive and know their business, and they are eager to learn our ways of ammo handling."<sup>16</sup>

As Vietnamization continued and American troops began to withdraw, the 528th QMB was no longer needed. On 11 September 1970, USASUPCOMDNG began reassigning the 528th's subordinate units to general support groups. The 661st Ordnance Company, the 40th Ordnance Company, and the 269th Ordnance Detachment were reassigned to the 80th General Support Group. The 263rd Transportation Detachment and the 571st Ordnance Company were similarly reassigned to the 26th General Support Group. By January 1971, the 528th itself was at zero strength in preparation for its formal inactivation at Da Nang on 15 April 1971.<sup>17</sup>

Thus ended the 528th QMB's first and final tour as an ammunition supply unit. The battalion served well under more than difficult circumstances. It kept the ICTZ Army combat units supplied with ammunition and ordnance in spite of monsoons and enemy attacks on the ASPs. While the 528th's experiences in Vietnam were completely conventional in nature, they certainly provide a worthy heritage for the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion. ♣

## Endnotes

- 1 General Orders 744, 16 September 1969, Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 "History of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), 16 September 1969–31






*1st Logistical Command, under which the 528th QMB ultimately served in Vietnam, provided support directly and indirectly to every U.S. soldier in Vietnam between 1965 and 1970. As a descendent of 1st Logistical Command, 1st Corps Support Command now wears this patch.*

December 1969," Department of the Army, Headquarters Company, 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), 14 March 1970, 2, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

- 3 "Operational Report of 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1969," Department of the Army, Headquarters, 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), 31 October 1969, 1, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 General Orders 766, 20 September 1969, Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang; General Orders 772, 22 September 1969, Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; General Orders 773, 22 September 1969, Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; "History," 9.
- 5 "History," 1.
- 6 "Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 528th Ammunition Battalion (DS/GS), for Period Ending 30 April 1970," Department of the Army, Headquarters, 528th Ammunition Battalion (Direct Support/General Support), 15 May 1970, 1, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 7 "History," 1–2.
- 8 H. D. Smith, "Senior Officer's Debriefing Report," Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, 27 July 1970, E-1, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 9 Smith, E-2.
- 10 "Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), for Period Ending 31 January 1970," Department of the Army, Headquarters, 528th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), 15 February 1970, 2–4, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Hayden, Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition, "Ammunition Service Support," U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, 8 June 1970, 2–3, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; H. D. Smith, "Senior Officer's Debriefing Report," Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, 27 July 1970, E-1, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Smith, E-1.
- 12 "Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 528th Ammunition Battalion (DS/GS), for Period Ending 31 July 1970," Department of the Army, Headquarters, 528th Ammunition Battalion (Direct Support/General Support), 15 August 1970, 2, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 "Operational Report... 31 January 1970," 1–2; "Operational Report... 30 April 1970," 2.
- 14 "Operational Report... 31 July 1970," 2–3.
- 15 Specialist 5 Cres Vellucci Jr. and Specialist 4 Jim Marino, "Project Buddy," *The Northern Log*, 15 June 1970; "Operations Report... 31 July 1970," 2, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 16 Vellucci and Marino.
- 17 Requests for Orders by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Hayden, Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, copies in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; General Orders 8, 10 January 1971, Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

*Each ASP consisted primarily of ammunition and ordnance bunkers, and was surrounded by a defensive perimeter. Enemy sapper attacks against ASPs were difficult to prevent given the few guards and little equipment made available to the ammunition units.*





# Afghan Ambush: ODA 744 in Afghanistan

by Robert W. Jones Jr.



**THE** primary mission of the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) is to provide the full spectrum of Special Forces capabilities in support of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).<sup>1</sup> However, with the events of 9/11 and the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, missions and focus areas have expanded for both the Army and its special operations forces. When Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) began, the soldiers of the 7th SFG, and Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA) 744 in particular, soon discovered that their excellent training and good planning served them just as well in the high deserts of the Middle East as in the lush terrain of Latin America.

Although Afghanistan is 8,000 miles and nine time zones distant from South America, the leadership of 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (2/7th SFG) felt ready and qualified for its new mission. As the battalion conducted an in-depth mission analysis, many similarities between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and insurgencies in parts of Latin America emerged. The “people equation” was similar in both regions: poverty plus drugs plus an insurgency attempting to regain power equals an unconventional warfare environment—whether it is in El Salvador, Colombia, or Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

On 17 July 2002, 7th SFG received the warning order for the deployment of one battalion to replace 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFG in Afghanistan. With a transition date of 1 October 2002, mission planners quickly changed their focus from the SOUTHCOM area to Afghanistan. Units at all levels, from the battalion through the companies to the individual ODAs, initiated a detailed mission analysis to prepare the Special Forces soldiers for the impending deployment.<sup>3</sup>

The next two months became a whirlwind of preparation for the soldiers. Two primary activities consumed the most time: the integration of new personnel and training. All ODAs received new personnel, some fresh from the Special Forces Qualification Course, while other personnel transferred from within the group or battalion. Some ODAs gained as many as five or six soldiers to bring them up to their full strength of twelve soldiers. All soldiers trained with a variety of vehicles and weapons, including emergency close air support, preparing for the Afghan environment.

The 2/7th SFG’s operational area was in the southern Pashtun-speaking areas of Afghanistan, with the command and

control based out of the Forward Operational Base (FOB) 72 located at Kandahar Airfield.<sup>4</sup> Based on its assessment of this operational area, the Advanced Operations Base (AOB) 740 staff determined a new U.S. firebase was required to combat Taliban insurgents in Helmand Province, located about 120 kilometers west of Kandahar.<sup>5</sup>

The southern portion of Afghanistan was virtually absent of coalition personnel, except for one or two ODAs from 20th SFG that ran sporadic missions to the west, east and south of Kandahar. The AOB 740 assessment showed two potential areas west and south of Kandahar Province to place ODAs. Upon arrival of its

main body, AOB 740 ordered ODAs 744 and 741 to establish the new firebase camp at Gereshk in Helmand Province. While Lashkar Gah was the provincial capital, Gereshk was located near both Highway 1—the primary east-west line of communication (LOC) through the province and the entire southwest part of Afghanistan (Iran to Kandahar to the Pakistani border through Spin Boldak)—and along the





Photo courtesy of ODA 744


*Aerial views of Firebase Gereshk, which measured approximately one mile in circumference.*

primary north-south LOC for entry into the central region.

In the last week of October 2002, ODAs 744 and 741 led a convoy of twenty-nine vehicles to the Gereshk firebase site. Heavy construction support for the firebase came from the engineers of the 769th Engineer Battalion (Louisiana National Guard) assigned to Task Force 180. After about three weeks, with the firebase construction completed, the engineers departed. Ultimately, the inner perimeter of the firebase was approximately one-mile in circumference (see Figure 4).

With the establishment of Firebase Gereshk, additional forces were attached to continue the unconventional warfare campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the province. Firebase Gereshk grew from housing the two 2/7th SFG ODAs to supporting a civil affairs (CA) team and a tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) team. Colocated at the firebase via the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), was a civil affairs team from the 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion.<sup>6</sup> The three-man Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT 24) from the 345th PSYOP Company

*Firebase Gereshk was located near the convergence of the two primary lines of communication in Helmand Province, approximately 120 kilometers west of Kandahar.*



was attached via FOB 72.<sup>7</sup> The SF, CA, and PSYOP elements worked together to plan and conduct missions throughout Helmand Province in a balancing act that placed force protection at the highest level. The ODAs conducted a variety of missions from strategic reconnaissance to direct action.

Even as their six-month tour of duty neared conclusion, the soldiers of Firebase Gereshk continued conducting missions. A two-day armed reconnaissance patrol to the Sangin district to show U.S. presence and gather intelligence exemplified a typical mission. In Sangin itself, the Detachment Commander, Captain (CPT) Steve Malloy (pseudonym), made contact with the district chief and the police chief, who expressed interest in getting support for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) projects—most notably repairs to a clinic and a school located in the district.

While CPT Malloy made no promises to the community leaders of Sangin, upon return from the patrol, he coordinated with the CA team leader, Major (MAJ) Jim Bates (pseudonym), to return to Sangin the next day to conduct a civil military operations assessment of the district, establish points of contact, and possibly prepare HA project nominations. All information collected would then be forwarded to the CJCMOTF in Kabul for approval and funding. This was a unique opportunity for the CA team, since threat levels had prevented any assessment in the Sangin district up to this point.<sup>8</sup>

A five-vehicle convoy traveled to Sangin the next day (29 March 2003). The convoy consisted of CPT Malloy and ODA 744, the entire CA team (four soldiers), one PSYOP soldier, and an interpreter. The journey to Sangin, while bumpy, was uneventful.

Upon arrival in Sangin, the CA team met with Hajji Ghul Mohammad, the district chief; Mohammad Wali Khan, the police chief; and the village elders. In the preliminary meeting, the village elders expressed two primary concerns in the district: the condition of schools and a local health clinic. The elders were concerned that other districts had received attention and humanitarian projects, while Sangin had not. In the middle of the meeting, Mohammad Wali Khan excused himself as he received a cell phone call, returning after about fifteen minutes. At the conclusion of the meeting, the group went on an assessment of the nearby school, led by Sergeant (SGT) Bill Nevens (pseudonym) of the CA team.

Midway through the school assessment, CPT Malloy received an urgent radio call from the AOB 740 Commander ordering an immediate return to the firebase in order to prepare to support of an immediate combat engagement in the vicinity of Kandahar. Unbeknownst to CPT Malloy, an operation in another part of Helmand Province had troops in contact. The soldiers hastily concluded the school assessment, apologizing to the community leaders and promising to return to Sangin as soon as possible to complete the mission. The Sangin district chief, Hajji Ghul Mohammad, insisted on escorting the convoy. However, at the edge of town he stopped and made a cell phone call. After what seemed to be a prolonged period of time, he finally said farewell, but before leaving, exchanged cell phone numbers with the CA team leader, MAJ Bates.

The small force began to wind its way back to the pro-




tection of its firebase. After only twenty minutes of driving, several soldiers noticed an Afghani male dressed in green crossing the road from west to east. He did not appear to be in any hurry or overly concerned with the convoy, which was odd, since vehicles usually elicited at least curiosity. Almost instinctively, the soldiers looked in the direction from which the lone Afghani had come and noticed several heads “popping up” on a berm about 150 meters on the right side of the road.

Almost instantly, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) streaked toward the convoy, firing at the lead and trail vehicles. AK-47 and light machine gun fire immediately added to the cacophony of the ambush. An RPG missed the lead vehicle, impacting between the second and third vehicles driven by the CA team, blowing the tailgate from the second vehicle, driven by SGT Thad Santon (pseudonym). The RPG fired at the trail vehicle missed, impacting on a berm next to the road. Meanwhile, the vehicle was hammered with bullets wounding all three of the occupants: Sergeant First Class (SFC) Tim Daniels (pseudonym), Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Jacob Frazier (the Air Force close air controller), and Staff Sergeant (SSG) Orlando Morales. All of the vehicles sustained multiple hits; one of the Hilux trucks had its gearshift shot away, and another truck had over forty separate bullet holes.


Training, experience, and adrenaline kicked in and, per team procedure, the vehicle drivers raced out of the kill zone. Individual soldiers returned fire at the berm with their personal weapons as they sped out of the kill zone. Moving forward about five hundred meters, the convoy stopped, quickly set up an initial security position, and returned fire at the ambush line. As his soldiers returned fire, CPT Malloy attempted to call in a hasty contact report and get immediate close air support from FOB 72. CPT Malloy and the ODA Assistant Commander, Warrant Officer 1 (WO1) Jude Randall (pseudonym), simultaneously realized that the trail vehicle was missing. Within a few minutes of the initial ambush, WO1 Randall and three other SF soldiers reentered the kill zone to assist their comrades.

To gain fire superiority, CPT Malloy knew he had to achieve communications with his higher headquarters. He exited his vehicle, ripping the satellite communications radio from its mounts. CPT Malloy, a prior service 18E Special Forces Communications Sergeant, quickly attached another antenna and attempted to make communication with AOB 740 (ODA 744's only 18E had reentered the kill zone). Unbeknownst to CPT Malloy, AOB 740 could receive the transmission, but return communications from AOB 740 could not be received.


After repeated attempts to establish communications with AOB 740, CPT Malloy rechecked all connections and settings on his radio and reattempted contact with the FOB, unfortunately with the same results. While CPT Malloy inspected his radio and antenna, AOB 740 reported the last known location and direction of movement of the convoy and requested immediate air support. After what seemed like hours in the heat of the fight, “Bushmaster 55” (an Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft flying thousands of feet high somewhere over Afghanistan) suddenly came up on the net allowing CPT Malloy to




*As the five-vehicle convoy enters the ambush area, a lone person runs across the road.*



*One RPG explodes directly behind vehicle #2, breaking its tailgate. A second RPG passes in front of vehicle #5 and strikes the berm to the vehicle's left.*



*Vehicle #5 is struck by fire, wounding all three passengers. Vehicles 1 through 4 race out of the kill zone and rally. Vehicles 2-4 return fire, while vehicle #1 returns to kill zone and returns fire with an M240.*



*Vehicles 2 and 4 continue to return fire, and CPT Murphy attempts radio contact. Ambushers begin to withdraw. Vehicle #3 returns to kill zone with medic and two civil affairs soldiers.*



Photo courtesy of AOB 740

*The mix of ARSOF vehicles in Afghanistan included Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMVs), and Toyota Tacoma and Hilux trucks, all modified for the harsh environment.*

convey the situation to FOB 72. As CPT Malloy worked the communications issue and coordinated for support, the remaining soldiers (two CA, one PSYOP, and two SF) returned fire at the ambushers providing a base of fire.

While CPT Malloy was trying to make communications, the element led by WO1 Randall reentered the kill zone to assist his teammates. Using the largest remaining vehicle in the convoy, the commander's Toyota Tacoma, WO1 Randall, SSG Douglas Rhode (pseudonym), SSG Daniel Crawford (pseudonym), and SSG Samuel Nevis (pseudonym) raced back into the kill zone.

Providing suppressive fire at the ambushers, a second vehicle, a Hilux truck, followed Randall into the kill zone. SSG Vargas (pseudonym), the team medic, and two CA soldiers, bringing an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon and an M203 to the fight, joined Randall's team. Using the Tacoma to block fire at the disabled vehicle, team members continued suppressive fire with an M240 machine gun and multiple antitank AT-4 shots as the medic and WO1 Randall assessed the casualties.

Under heavy return fire and probably realizing aid would soon arrive for the Americans, the ambushers conducted an orderly withdrawal, with the RPG gunners leaving first and then others retreating in pairs through a cut in the hillside and out of the line of sight of the Americans. With the ambush broken, but still receiving sporadic fire, the wounded team members were loaded into vehicles and rushed to the initial security position for further medical aid.<sup>9</sup>

At FOB 72, the operations staff sprung to action with the report of "Team in Contact." The Operations Officer, having just concluded another operation in the area, was almost immediately able to retask air assets to assist the beleaguered soldiers.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, the operations Sergeant Major gathered an eight-man quick reaction force from ODA 751, which was temporarily colocated with FOB 72 waiting for redeployment. The battalion surgeon rode the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopter in order to provide medical support as soon as possible.

Once all soldiers were at the initial security position, CPT Malloy had to balance security with care for the wounded soldiers. While receiving sporadic enemy fire, the team medic, assisted by several others, cared for the three severely wounded soldiers. CPT Malloy quickly determined that they had to move to a secure place to bring in the helicopter. The convoy quickly moved down the road to an Afghani gas station about five kilometers from the ambush site.

As CPT Malloy continued to coordinate for support, WO1 Randall assumed the temporary role of team sergeant and formed a security perimeter by stopping traffic along the road in preparation for receiving the medical evacuation helicopter and quick reaction force. At this point, the casualties included the team sergeant, the attached Air Force controller, and one of the weapons sergeants, all seriously wounded. SSG Crawford and SSG Rhode cleared and secured the Afghani gas station and the occupants, temporarily detaining them until the evacuation concluded.

To provide overwatch for the small perimeter, two CA soldiers secured a small piece of high ground. The lone PSYOP soldier, SGT Jay Hammer (pseudonym), with



the interpreter, used his loudspeaker to conduct a hasty broadcast to curious Afghans who began to congregate, warning them to “clear the area and don’t interfere.” MAJ Bates set up the landing zone panel about fifty meters away from the vehicles, while several team members continued providing medical care to the wounded.

The first sign of assistance came in the form of an AH-64 Apache gunship blazing in from the west. While the Apache conducted a broad sweep of the area, the helicopter came into view. As the helicopter set down, the 2/7th SFG battalion surgeon rushed to the wounded soldiers. With the additional manpower, the wounded were carried forward and placed on the helicopter within minutes and then evacuated immediately to the field hospital at Kandahar Airfield.

Almost simultaneously with the MEDEVAC, two quick reaction forces arrived. The first, ODA 751 on a Black Hawk helicopter, quickly reinforced the small defensive perimeter. Also coming down the road from Firebase Gereshk to the sound of the guns was ODA 741. Upon hearing the contact report, ODA 741 quickly loaded its vehicles and, after receiving approval from FOB 72, traversed the main route as quickly as possible to reinforce the team. After further reinforcing the perimeter, the ODA 741 commander, CPT Raymond Collins (pseudonym), asked CPT Malloy, “What do you need?” During the ambush some equipment was blown off the vehicles. Volunteering to reenter the kill zone a third time, SSG Crawford guided ODA 741 to the ambush site to recover equipment. Unfortunately, both the enemy and the equipment were nowhere to be found, so they returned to the perimeter.

As the commander on the scene, CPT Malloy faced a difficult decision: with three casualties and all of his vehicles damaged, what was the next move? The immediate decision was simple—return to the firebase, refit, and plan a follow-on operation to Sangin. Then, something odd happened. Within the first five minutes of the ambush, several soldiers reported hearing what sounded like a cellular telephone ringing. In between racing in and out of the ambush area, returning fire on the ambushers, and the adrenaline, everyone simply dismissed the sound as a strange aberration. However, after about a half an hour at the Afghani gas station, MAJ Bates realized his cell phone was ringing almost continuously. He answered and on the other end was the Sangin District Chief, Hajji Ghul Mohammad. “I heard there was an accident,” was his initial statement. As the interpreter translated the call, everyone realized that the local officials had set them up.<sup>11</sup>

The Americans loaded themselves into the vehicles and returned slowly to the firebase, wary of another possible attack. Word of the ambush preceded the convoy. Soon double or triple the usual amount of people were standing on the street watching as the group traveled through Gereshk. As one SF soldier put it, “It was [a look of] satisfaction almost. The look on their face[s] wasn’t like ‘I hate you.’ It was just a look of ‘that’s what I thought it’d look like.’”<sup>12</sup>

Once at the firebase, everyone began refitting in preparation for a return mission to Sangin. However, FOB 72 ordered ODA 744 to stand down and move immediately to Kandahar. Two Black Hawk helicopters landed two hours later to fly the ODA from Gereshk to Kandahar. Now at half strength as a

result of the casualties, the decision was made to return ODA 744 to the United States, thus ending its Afghanistan tour. SSG Orlando Morales, ODA 744, and SSGT Jacob Frazier, 169th Air Support Operations Squadron, were declared “killed in action” at the hospital at Kandahar Airfield, having succumbed to their wounds despite the valiant efforts of their teammates. SFC Daniels was stabilized at Kandahar, having sustained injuries to one of his kidneys, a perforated diaphragm, and a punctured lung. Other rounds had gone through his right hand and grazed his head, leaving a cut over the left eye. SFC Daniels required six months of extensive physical therapy and rehabilitation before returning to duty at 7th SFG.

Exactly one week later, on 8 and 9 April 2003, a reinforced SF company (including a large detachment of Navy Special Operations Forces), with the 3-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (of the 82nd Airborne Division) in support, conducted



Photo courtesy of SGT Bill Nevens

*The truck driven by SGT Santon which had its tailgate damaged from a near miss by an RPG fired during the ambush.*

Operation RESOLUTE STRIKE in Sangin to capture the individuals responsible for the planning and execution of the ambush. The operation was a success—a large cache of weapons and ammunition were seized and destroyed. More than fifty Afghans were questioned, with four flown to Kandahar for further questioning. Additionally, the operation recovered the weapon, sights, night vision devices, and soldiers’ equipment lost during the ambush.<sup>13</sup> The remainder of 2/7th SFG followed ODA 744 to Fort Bragg, North Carolina by the end of April, its six-month tour at a conclusion.

The soldiers of 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group left Afghanistan having made their mark in the Global War on Terrorism with sweat and blood. These quiet professionals quickly adapted to the operational environment by integrating new soldiers into ODAs and staff, training on vehicles, and adapting to the Afghan culture, yet at the same time bringing with them the skills obtained from their experience in Latin



Photo courtesy of CPL Keith Klewe, 109th Mobile Public Affairs Det.

*A critical care nurse with the 438th EAES, holds SFC Daniels' (pseudonym) hand while she reassures him on his flight to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany.*

America. As the Global War on Terrorism continues, units within United States Army Special Operations Command will adapt and change to new situations throughout the world. ♣

## Endnotes

- 1 "7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Annual History Review, 2001," 7th Special Forces Group, ARSOF Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Lieutenant Colonel John Donahue, Commander, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (FOB 72), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 May 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 When deployed a special forces battalion establishes a Forward Operational Base (FOB) that is a command, control, and support base using organic and attached resources. (Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, June 2001, 4–5).
- 5 When deployed, a special forces company establishes an Advanced Operational Base (AOB) that is a command and control base using organic and attached resources. In this case Company A, 2/7th SFG is AOB 740. FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, June 2001, page 4–5.
- 6 The 403rd Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion (USAR) is based in Mattydale, NY. A Civil Affairs Team A normally consists of six soldiers. During OEF, about forty soldiers from the 403rd CA Battalion were attached to the 450th CA Battalion and assigned to various locations throughout Afghanistan in support of special operations and conventional units.
- 7 The 345th Psychological Operations Company (USAR) is based in Dallas, TX.
- 8 Civil Affairs Team 10, 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion (Major Jim Bates (pseudonym), Specialist John Mundell (pseudonym), Sergeant Bill Nevens (pseudonym), and Sergeant Thad Santon (pseudonym)), interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 7 August 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 9 ODA 744B (Warrant Officer 1 Jude Randall (pseudonym), Staff Sergeant Douglas Rhode (pseudonym), Staff Sergeant Vargas (pseudonym), and Sergeant First Class Williams (pseudonym)), Company A, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 21 May 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 10 Major Mike Simpson (pseudonym) (S-3) and Captain William Baker (pseudonym) (S-2), 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 28 May 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Civil Affairs Team 10 interview.
- 12 ODA 744B interview.
- 13 Jim Wagner, "Resolute Strike Brings In Ambush Intel, Equipment," <http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2003/a041103e.html>.

# Blast from the Past



*LIBERTY LEAFLETS—Kennedy Center psychological warriors distribute leaflets to Santo Domingo citizens to explain why U.S. soldiers are serving in their country. These leaflets bear a portrait of President Johnson with the caption reading "Enpro de la libertad"—For Liberty. Thousands of these propaganda leaflets have been distributed in the Dominican Republic.*





# Veritas

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BI-WEEKLY

JUNE 23, 1965

## 1ST PSY WAR MERITS HIGHEST USIA AWARD

The highest award of the U.S. Information Agency was presented to the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion (B&L) this week for its service in the Dominican Republic. It marks the first occasion on which the USIA's Distinguished Service Award has been awarded to a military unit.

Presented by Mr. Aldo D'Alessandro, USIA Advisor to the Kennedy Center, on behalf of Mr. Carl Rowan, Director of the USIA, the award was received by Lt. Col. Wallace J. Moulis, commander of the battalion.

With all newspapers, radio and television either destroyed or in rebel hands, the battalion represented the only capability available for mass communication with the embattled and bewildered populace and was among the first Army elements flown into the Dominican Republic.

Working under the direction of Mr. Hewson A. Ryan, Associate Director of the USIA and his hand-picked staff of ex-

perts on the area, elements of the battalion began their task of supporting the efforts of the USIA to inform the populace of the U.S. role even before arrival of their heavy equipment in the country. Within 12 hours, a damaged transmitter had been rehabilitated to rebroadcast the Voice of America and the first mimeographed leaflets had been produced on machines in the 82nd Airborne Division G-5 section.

Expanding rapidly, the psychological warfare elements augmented the initial broadcast station with a 5,000-watt mobile station flown in from Ft. Bragg, installed and put into operation in a record-breaking 60 hours. Leaflets produced on light mobile presses showered from low-flying C-47 aircraft and both aerial and ground-mounted loudspeakers were reaching the target audience.

Working under conditions where other news and information output was either distorted or nonexistent, the psy warriors soon achieved a wide and eager

audience. Vehicles distributing the printed matter were continually surrounded by crowds of several hundreds seeking the news sheet or pamphlet while in Santiago. When leaflets ran out at distribution points, newsboys hawked them on the street corners for a nickel apiece.

Often working under fire, the battalion set up and operated three mobile transmitters and two fixed radio stations for over 2,000 hours of broadcasting time, carried out 192 loudspeaker missions by land and air for a total of 598 hours of operation, and prepared, produced and distributed over 2½ million newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets and posters. It also monitored the rebel radio, conducted research and evaluation and provided intelligence and security activities in support of the combined operation. It also supported the Organization of American States throughout the organization phase of its information program.

**THE** 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company, whose participation in the Korean War is covered earlier in this magazine, is part of the lineage of the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion. This article from the 23 June 1965 edition of the original *Veritas* explains the exemplary accomplishments of the unit during the Dominican crisis in 1965.

With the cessation of hostilities between the Dominican revolutionaries and loyalist elements, civic action and civil affairs efforts focused on emergency humanitarian relief and stabilizing the country to win the "hearts and minds" of the Dominican people.<sup>1</sup> The 1st Psywar Battalion brought mobile printing presses, mobile broadcasting equipment, and loudspeakers to broadcast from trucks and aircraft. Loudspeaker trucks proved the most effective. Wherever L/S teams stopped, hundreds of Dominicans gathered around to hear the latest news and receive leaflets and pamphlets—seventy thousand per day were being produced by the end of May 1965. Leaflets with pictures of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and pamphlets extolling the virtues of the Organization of American States and the evils of communism were standard. On 5 May 1965, the "Voice of the Security Zone" hit the airwaves and was sufficiently powerful to reach into the interior. Overall, the Psywar effort was "remarkably successful."<sup>2</sup>

### Notes

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel Wallace J. Moulis and Major Richard M. Brown, "Key to a Crisis," *Military Review*, February 1966, 9-14; Bert H. Cooper Jr., "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," in Ron D. McLaurin (ed.) *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (NY: Praeger, 1982): 282-285.
- 2 Colonel (Ret.) Wallace J. Moulis, 1st Psywar Battalion, Dominican Republic, interview by Dr. Richard Stewart, 13 September 1992, Falls Church, VA, transcript of tape recording, USAJFKSWCS Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988): 137-138.



# Books

## in the Field

“Books in the Field” provides short descriptions of books related to subjects covered in the current issue of *Veritas*. Readers are encouraged to use these recommendations as a starting point for individual study on topics related to ARSOF history.

Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

Michael E. Haas' book provides an excellent overview of the United States unconventional warfare operations in the Korean War. Divided into four sections, the book deals with each of the service components and the CIA covert operations. It recounts the arduous efforts to rebuild the U.S. unconventional warfare capability that was moribund after World War II, and highlights the ingenuity and valor of the men and women, both U.S. and South Korean, who took the war behind the lines against the North Koreans and Chinese. Highly recommended. Available from online bookstores.




John H. Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma* (Houston: Gulf Publishing Co., 1946, 1977).

This is the only book published to date on the second long-range penetration group in Burma, the MARS Task Force or the 5332nd Brigade (Separate). It was written shortly after the war by a “Marsman” in the Public Affairs Section who interviewed all ranks, collected the official Army photos, and accessed unit operations logs. As a firsthand account intended primarily as a keepsake for MARS veterans it lacks critical documentation, footnotes, and sources. However, Randolph's account is very readable, includes elements not covered in Merrill's Marauders books (scout dogs, veterinary and pack animals, and the 75mm pack howitzer artillery battalions), and a useful glossary of “WWII vernacular” terms. Out of print; available from libraries.



Stephen E. Pease, *Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950–1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992).

Compact summary of Psywar activities during the Korean War with short early history written by a career Air Force intelligence officer. Quality photos and Psywar products (such as propaganda leaflets and safe conduct passes) illustrate text and show capabilities. While veterans' comments address viability of techniques and operations, the absence of corroboration and cross-referencing documentation limits their value for analysis and any assessments. Absent is any discussion of how disjointed the Psywar campaign was during the Korean War. The tactical and strategic Psywar operations are intermixed in this book. It is a good starting point for more general knowledge on Psywar and further research. The book contains a good bibliography and a command report for the 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company as an appendix. Available from online bookstores.



Robert D. Burhans, *The First Special Service Force: A Canadian/American Wartime Alliance: The Devil's Brigade* (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1981).

This is the most accurate war history of the First Special Service Force from its activation 20 July 1942 at Helena, Montana, to its inactivation at Villeneuve-Loubet, France, on 5 December 1944, now celebrated as Menton Day. It was written by the Force HQ S-5 and first published in 1947. Since Burhans drew primarily from first-hand experiences, unpublished reports and journals, and the *History of the Fifth Army* published in Italy, this history has the marked advantage of being “fresh” from the war. The extensive use of operations and intelligence section journals and award citations is obvious. There is a roster of all members—officers and enlisted—by country and an honor roll of those who died in combat. Lacking are the footnotes of exact sources to verify Burhans' account. Quality of reproduction of official photos is poor. Force veterans cite this book as best. Available from the FSSF Association and online bookstores.

## Other Recommend Books:

- ♣ *War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)* (New York: Walker & Co., 1976).
- ♣ Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
- ♣ Joseph A. Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade: The True Story of The First Special Service Force in World War II* (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History, 2001).
- ♣ Wilson A. Heefner, *Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2001).
- ♣ Donovan Webster, *The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003).

# Snapshot

What makes a photograph historically significant is often surprising. An innocuous picture taken by soldiers as a way to remember their participation in an operation may in fact contain valuable information when looking back. Presented here are some photographs from this issue explaining why they are historically significant.



Barracks Photo from Camp MacKall, page 10. This photo contains a wealth of information showing the life of a soldier in World War II. The details of the living conditions in the barracks, the lack of personal effects, and the daily shining of boots are well represented in this photo. What may seem to be mundane topics can provide a great deal of historical information.



Demo Photo, page 36. This is a photo that graphically depicts the soldiers in the performance of duty. What makes this valuable is the amount of detail displayed. The soldiers' uniforms and equipment are easily discernible, as well as the method being used to demolish the bridge. How things are done in the field is very important from the historical standpoint. Photos like this are useful for documenting the rapid advances in technology.




CPL Edward Pucel, page 44. Often the most common personal photos are taken during down time in the midst of operations. This photo allows for the identification of CPL Edward Pucel who figures prominently in the accompanying article. It depicts him in a normal situation and adds historical accuracy. Too often the only photo of an individual is unrelated to the event being described.



# Jack L. Knight

## Medal of Honor



**I**N May 1945, First Lieutenant Jack Llewellyn Knight was posthumously awarded the only Medal of Honor accorded ARSOF personnel in World War II. Of the 432 Medals of Honor earned by American fighting men during World War II, only two were awarded in the China-Burma-India theater, in which Lieutenant Knight served.

As an officer with the 124th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Knight was a member of the MARS Task Force, which was the second American long-range penetration unit employed behind enemy lines in Burma during WWII, and is a part of the heritage and lineage of Army special operations forces.

Colonel William L. Osborne, veteran of Bataan who escaped to Australia in a 22-foot native boat and 1st Battalion commander in Merrill's Marauders (GALAHAD Task Force), was the commander of the 124th Cavalry Regiment when Lieutenant Knight earned his medal. Colonel Osborne had this to say about the F Troop commander:

"In over four years of combat I have seen many officers fight and die for their country, but the actions of Lieutenant Knight in leading his troop against a strong enemy will always remain as the finest example of American courage, valor, and leadership of any officer I have had under my command. It is officers of Lieutenant Knight's caliber, and troops that follow that kind of leadership, who are winning the war—not colonels and generals."<sup>1</sup>

The official Medal of Honor citation describes the actions taken by Lieutenant Knight on 2 February 1945 near LoiKang, Burma:

*He led his cavalry troop against heavy concentrations of enemy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. After taking the troop's objective and while making preparations for*



Painted by LTC Edward J. McHale

*a defense, he discovered a nest of Japanese pillboxes and foxholes to the right front. Preceding his men by at least ten feet, he immediately led an attack. Single-handedly he knocked out two enemy pillboxes and killed the occupants of several foxholes. While attempting to knock out a third pillbox, he was struck and blinded by an enemy grenade. Although unable to see, he rallied his platoon and continued forward in the assault on the remaining pillboxes. Before the task was completed he fell mortally wounded. First Lieutenant Knight's gallantry and intrepidity were responsible for the successful elimination of most of the Jap positions and served as an inspiration to officers and men of his troop.*

Lieutenant Knight will be inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia, in July 2005, and has been nominated by USASOC for induction into the USSOCOM Hall of Heroes at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

### Notes

- 1 John Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma* (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Co., 1946): 197.

# In the Next Issue of Veritas

## The Origins of US Special Forces Detachment–Korea

by Cheryl A. Walley

*The US Special Forces' relationship with the Republic of Korea is almost as old as Special Forces (SF) itself. A permanent relationship was established in 1960, when the first of an unbroken chain of SF liaison detachments arrived on the peninsula to help train ROK Special Forces. Over the past forty-five years, Special Forces Detachment-Korea has provided liaison and training to the ROK Army's Special Forces and has been a key link in US-Korean relations.*



## 2nd Ranger Infantry Company "Buffaloes" in Korea: 29 December 1950–19 May 1951

by Charles H. Briscoe

*Of the seven Army Ranger companies that participated in the Korean War, the 2nd Ranger Company (Airborne) was comprised entirely of African-American Rangers. In his article, Dr. Briscoe follows the 2nd Ranger Company from deployment through various combat actions and training activities in Korea.*

## A Tribute to Aaron Bank

by Kenn Finlayson

*Often referred to as the "Father of Special Forces," Colonel Aaron Bank is a prominent figure in ARSOF history. Dr. Finlayson profiles Aaron Bank in preparation for the dedication of the Aaron Bank Special Operations Academic Facility.*



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